Episode 63 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast explores the French experience with irregular warfare in the Sahel since 2013.
Our guests begin by explaining why the French were involved in combat operations in the Sahel region of Africa and how their forces were organized against several armed insurgencies. They go on to explore the effectiveness, and shortfalls, of the light-footprint approach utilized by the French in Africa, to include in the area of building partner-force capacity. They conclude by emphasizing the essential role that local political dynamics play in irregular warfare success and arguing that French operations in Africa provide a valuable case study in light-footprint intervention as compared to the US-led large-footprint intervention in Afghanistan.
Brigadier General François-Marie Gougeon is a career officer in the French army having served in the Troupes de Marine and commanded the 1 Marine Regiment. He has deployed to Bosnia, Kosovo, and multiple locations in Africa including as chief of staff for the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali from 2019 to 2020. He is a graduate of the Marine Corps University, where he received a master’s degree in military studies. He currently serves as the French national military representative at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.
Professor Will Reno is the chair of the Political Science Department at Northwestern University. The author of three books on African politics and warfare, he has conducted extensive research on the politics of violence and state collapse in sub-Saharan Africa. He is currently conducting research on foreign military assistance in weak states. He has been a Modern War Institute nonresident fellow and served as the director of the Program of African Studies research center.
Laura Jones and Kyle Atwell are the hosts for Episode 62. Please reach out to Laura and Kyle with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast.
The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.
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Image credit: Chief Warrant Officer 3 Martin S. Bonner, US Army Africa
From the European Council on Foreign Relations article entitled "Russia’s long shadow in the Sahel: The EU’s values-led foreign policy and its stabilisation objectives in the Sahel are in tension with each other. Russia is now waiting to exploit that tension" by Andrew Lebovich:
"One lesson from Mali is that the EU will find it difficult to reconcile its values-led foreign policy with its stabilisation objectives in the Sahel – a region where governments are prone to dramatic changes in power (and behaviour). Another is that, if the EU alienates Sahelian governments, Russia will be waiting in the wings.
Russia’s ambitions in Africa extend far beyond the Sahel. The EU increasingly understands that its contest with Russia – sparked by President Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine – is spreading to different theatres, including those in Africa. The EU’s Sahel strategy needs to account for Russia but should avoid becoming fixated on expelling it from the Sahel. To make Russian assistance unappealing to Sahelian governments, the EU will need to adopt a flexible approach to its values when they jeopardise relations with a government that is essential to sustaining a military or training mission. When the foreign policy objectives of values and stabilisation come into conflict, stabilisation will need to take priority."
Bottom Line Thought — Based on the Above:
The regimes in Africa and in much of the world — much like our opponents/our competitors in Russia, China, etc., — understand that:
a. The U.S./the West's need/requirement/desire to install U.S./Western values in other states and societies; this relates to:
b. Our desire to transform these states and societies so that they might interact with, provide for and benefit from such things as capitalism and trade IN A MUCH MORE EFFICIENT AND OPTIMUMALLY PROFIT-PRODUCING WAY.
What Russia and China would seem to be offering the world — in the alternative — is an opportunity to interact with, provide for and benefit from such things as capitalism and trade (a) in a somewhat less efficient and profit-producing way but (b) in a way that allows the regimes to (1) stay in power indefinitely, to (2) deal with their at-home opponents as they might wish and to (3) profit from such things as corruption.
Thus, to regimes in Africa — and indeed to regimes all over the world — the Russia/China capitalism, trade (and security) offering/model can look very attractive. Yes?
(Additional thought: With the Russian and Chinese capitalism, trade and security model, a countries own individual and unique values, attitudes, beliefs and institutions; these are less likely to need to be sacrificed — and/or — less likely to need to be sacrificed as much. This allowing that [a] those in power, influence and control today locally [for example, religious and cultural figures], these folks will not lose/will not lose as much of their present power, influence and control with the Russian/Chinese model. Thus, [a] a very competitive offering indeed and [b] one that has appeal to individuals (for example social conservatives) even here in the U.S./the West?)
As to the very last sentence in my final — in parenthesis — item above:
“Liberal democratic societies have, in the past few decades, undergone a series of revolutionary changes in their social and political life, which are not to the taste of all their citizens. For many of those, who might be called social conservatives, Russia has become a more agreeable society, at least in principle, than those they live in. Communist Westerners used to speak of the Soviet Union as the pioneer society of a brighter future for all. Now, the rightwing nationalists of Europe and North America admire Russia and its leader for cleaving to the past.”
(See “The American Interest” article “The Reality of Russian Soft Power” by John Lloyd and Daria Litinova.)
“Compounding it all, Russia’s dictator has achieved all of this while creating sympathy in elements of the Right that mirrors the sympathy the Soviet Union achieved in elements of the Left. In other words, Putin is expanding Russian power and influence while mounting a cultural critique that resonates with some American audiences, casting himself as a defender of Christian civilization against Islam and the godless, decadent West.”
(See the “National Review” item entitled: “How Russia Wins” by David French.)
Thus, even for folks here in the U.S./the West, the Russian/Chinese model (which is less profit-producing but also less societally-destabilizing); this such model is viewed more favorably than the U.S./Western model (which is more-profit-producing but also more societally-destabilizing)?