“You have a Russian mechanized brigade trying to come through the Blackrock Pass. What now, Colonel?”
This is the scenario templated for Marine infantry battalions as part of the culminating exercise for Integrated Training Exercises at the Marine Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, California. And virtually the only feasible option to commanders is to withdraw.
Even with supporting tanks, light armored reconnaissance assets, and notional air support, a Marine infantry battalion in a blocking position or a defense would not survive an assault by an enemy mechanized, motorized, or armored regiment. We are not equipped for such a confrontation, nor are we trained for it. We have long taken pride in being the “tip of the spear,” an organization that “does more with less.” But enemy armor is a problem we are not equipped or organized to solve, at least not without herculean effort from supporting aircraft. And at a time when our aircraft expect to be operating in closely contested skies, their unhindered support would be the first casualty of any near-peer conflict, a prospect that is triggering increasing anxiety in the force.
Similar unpreparedness for enemy armor capabilities has resulted in the wholesale annihilation of first response forces before. During the first days of the Korean War, Task Force Smith, an Army formation hastily assembled and ill prepared, was overrun by North Korean forces in Soviet-supplied T-34 tanks in only a few hours. A complete disaster, the brief engagement has become synonymous with military unpreparedness. But the lightly armed Task Force Smith’s key capability gap was the lack of effective anti-armor weapons and training provided to a unit that was, in effect, an emergency response force—a role the Marine Corps proudly fills today.
Adversary armor and mechanized units are not niche capabilities that we can expect to avoid on the battlefield. Russia has thousands of tanks in its inventory and uses them as the core of their ground forces. They do not field dismounted infantry; even their airborne units are fully mechanized, and they may still be intending to incorporate main battle tanks into airborne formations. China fields over 6,000 main battle tanks of various types and also puts a premium on armored and mechanized maneuver units. Some of the tanks fielded by our potential adversaries are outdated, but many are comparable or even superior in quality to the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank that the Marine Corps currently fields. As a service we need to recognize that a return to conventional or high-intensity conflict does not just require improvements to the force in terms of cyber, stealth, and other high-end capabilities. It also means that our ground combat element will be facing armor—and lots of it.
Even our sister services have noted the increased threat that enemy armor poses to our rapidly deployable forces. The Army recently announced that it is increasing the firepower of its own rapid response force—the 82nd Airborne Division. The armored component of the division, disbanded after the First Gulf War, is being reactivated and equipped with the LAV-25, (before being disbanded, the unit fielded the M551 Sheridan light tank).
Currently a Marine infantry battalion has only a handful of true anti-armor weapons in its armory: eight Javelin missile systems and eight Saber missile systems. The Corps is in the process of eliminating the wire-guided Saber systems and replacing them with four more Javelin systems. This will leave the battalion with only twelve shoulder-fired anti-armor missiles, or about one system per seventy Marines. This is far from enough; the battalion should have enough to put six systems in each company, for a total of twenty-four at a minimum. This would give company commanders the flexibility to employ mass surprise fires, a requirement to defeat emerging active defense systems like the Russian Afganit system. Six systems per company also enables the commander to attach a pair of systems to each rifle platoon. The currently fielded Mk 153 Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon (SMAW), even with the coming upgraded version, is only a marginally capable anti-armor weapon at best, ineffective past a few hundred meters and reliant on a spotting rifle for accuracy. It is a generation behind at a time when even nonstate actors in Syria can field advanced anti-tank guided missiles. The SMAW’s replacement at the infantry squad level by the Carl Gustaf recoilless rifle, sometime in the next few years, will add anti-armor capability; but even this upgrade leaves infantry companies with a massive shortfall in sufficiently ranged anti-armor capabilities. Even the Javelin, with a maximum effective range of 2,500 meters, cannot come close to outranging the tanks it is intended to be used against.
Typically, infantry battalions organize their heavy machine guns and anti-armor weapons into platoon-sized units called combined anti-armor teams, or CAAT platoons. That organization is only one of several proposed in MCWP 3-11.1, Infantry Company Operations but has become so ubiquitous that it even has its own Wikipedia page. CAAT platoons use armored Humvees as their basic platform. These vehicles were initially designed in 1979, and despite having been upgraded in the years since, are completely outdated. The addition of thousands of pounds of armor has turned what were originally vehicles that lived up to their name (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle—HMMWV) into inflexible behemoths. Humvees today are often restricted to roads, difficult or impossible to deploy by air, and ride on suspension that is buckling under the weight of their armor. The intended sixteen-inch ground clearance is usually reduced to far less, and they are unable to even fit a litter with a casualty in an emergency. Furthermore, the platoons are usually outfitted with a mix of heavy weapons—Javelins, Saber systems, Mk 19 automatic grenade launchers, and M2 .50 caliber machine guns. Nominally, the heavy machine guns contribute to the combined anti-armor team by providing a suppressive capability that affords the missile crews time to engage armored and mechanized assets, the logic of which is faulty at best: current and even previous-generation adversary armor will not be suppressed by 40-millimeter grenades or .50 caliber rounds. Equally as ineffective will be the cumbersome armor on the Humvees that will do little against anything more potent than 7.62 rounds; even cheap and mass-produced rocket-propelled grenades will destroy the vehicle and its occupants. Humvees are also less mobile and often slower than the armored and mechanized vehicles they are supposed to be hunting. When we add loud, hot, and large to their list of attributes it becomes clear that a gun truck in a CAAT platoon, even when armed with a Saber system, is inferior by nearly every metric to the vehicles it is supposed to kill. When combined with dated anti-armor doctrine, the result is a looming gap in the capabilities of the Marine infantry battalion.
The ground combat element’s lack of fangs extends beyond the infantry battalion. The Corps has only two active duty tank battalions to support three divisions and the legacy amphibious assault vehicles are no better armed or armored than the Humvees used by the infantry.
So what is the answer to this dangerous lack of capability? The right weapons, the right platform and the right tactics. Utility Task Vehicles (UTVs) have recently come to the infantry. These small, fast, and highly mobile vehicles can carry four Marines and gear across nearly any terrain. This platform, coupled with Javelin missile systems and existing small unmanned aerial systems (SUAS) can turn the hunter into the hunted.
Organizationally, small, agile, anti-armor teams would represent an improvement over the cumbersome CAAT platoon construct. Each team would be led by an experienced noncommissioned officer and consist of four Marines: a driver, a two-man Javelin team, and a SUAS operator flying an RQ-11 Raven or RQ-20 Puma. The team would be tasked with operating independently ahead of its parent battalion as an advanced guard or reconnaissance formation. When it locates enemy armor, its preferred method of engagement is an ambush at maximum range, and the team’s superior mobility allows it to move into ideal terrain for an ambush ahead of enemy units. The team would not mass fires unless necessary, and would work in coordination with other teams to disrupt, delay, and ultimately destroy enemy armor over a deep engagement area. The teams’ mobility would allow them to operate this way, ahead of the battalion, during either offensive or defensive operations. It would be conceived of primarily as a covering force, intended to gain time and space for the commander while intercepting, engaging, and delaying the enemy—a low-cost force optimized for distributed and potentially limited-support operations in constricting or compartmentalized terrain.
The team’s superior battle space awareness, provided via organic SUAS, enables it to locate enemy assets and maneuver into position to attack or ambush them with anti-armor missiles. The SUAS integration is essential so teams can find and identify enemy armor and mechanized assets with sufficient time to then maneuver on them—something a larger, heavier, or slower force couldn’t do. These teams’ superior speed and mobility then allows them to egress after firing, their small size and low-signature vehicle helping prevent them from being seen and targeted. To the adversary, it would appear that there are dozens of dismounted Javelin teams along all of his maneuver corridors—whenever he finds a new route, the Javelin teams are waiting for him. What he doesn’t see is that it is only a few Marines maneuvering around him with superior mobility and drones that pinpoint his tanks and allow the Marines to anticipate his axes of advance.
This team has been imagined in a contested or distributed environment where external support may be unavailable or unreliable. If significant artillery, mortar, and close-air support are available their support can be leveraged simply by including a trained joint fires observer; a company fire support team mounted in another UTV traveling in coordination with the teams could also be utilized to coordinate supporting fires and dramatically increase their lethality.
To be clear, the infantry would never want to go it alone against enemy armor or mechanized forces. But that doesn’t mean the Corps should eschew changes that give the infantry the capability to do so if needed. The Marine Corps Operating Concept has envisioned a future in which Marines will need to fight and win in environments where “even the non-state actors will further challenge our use of low-altitude airspace for maneuver, supply, and fire support.”
This organizational recommendation draws on many similar and earlier proposals. The arguments for integrating SUAS capabilities into more and lower-level units are innumerable, and most infantrymen understand the utility of the new UTV without argument. But what we need is an amalgamation of capabilities for the purpose of filling our anti-armor gap. If, as a service, we cannot create a credible anti-armor capability organic to our infantry we will limit ourselves to operations on the periphery. The trend toward increasingly distributed operating concepts further underlines the need for battalion- and company-size units to have organic anti-armor capabilities.
However, by integrating the tactical reconnaissance potential of already fielded SUAS, leveraging the speed and mobility of our new UTVs, and further increasing the number of Javelin systems fielded by our infantry units, we can create a relatively cheap but effective anti-armor capability without acquiring any new systems. To develop a distributed operating capability against peer and near-peer adversaries for the ground combat element of America’s “911 Force” we need to significantly increase the organic anti-armor capabilities of the infantry battalion.
1st Lt. Walker Mills is currently a student at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California. 1st Lt. Michael Rasmussen serves as a company executive officer with 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Cpl. Kowshon Ye, US Marine Corps
I generally agree with your article and proposed solution, especially in regards to increasing the number of Javelins per battalion as well as making them into smaller, more mobile units.
However, I believe you didn't fully address the issues you brought up in the beginning related to active defense systems on current enemy armored vehicles and how that might affect your tactics prescribed. Specifically, the Javelin is (relatively) slow and follows a pretty predictable ballistic pattern (in high or low attack mode), making it easy for these defense systems to kill it. I believe this is similar to the current developments in ship-based missile and ICBM developments (and their counter-systems), where the new frontier seems to be hypersonics that can travel in fast and unpredictable paths that make it much harder for missile defense systems to counter. Following that you did not recommend development of new systems to address this, I believe it would then require even more Javelin systems per battalion, where the anti-armor units will need to engage single targets with multiple missiles to ensure a kill (mobility or otherwise). I think, however, this runs counter to the light, fast, and distributed tactic you discussed as it will require the application of these teams en-masse, or to make them larger to accommodate multiple systems.
Just curious what your thoughts or responses are to that?
john,
We certainly share your (and other commenters') anxiety over advances in active defense that limit the effectiveness of Javelin and Saber systems. However, we think that our proposal can be implemented immediately – whereas developing an entirely new system could take several years. Additionally, the Marine Corps is much less likely to develop new technologies on their own and will probably acquire next generation anti-armor missiles only after the Army has led the way (and paid much of the cost) for their development.
Wow, I wished journalists and the DoD could really answer questions posed by public comments.
The article hit the nail on the head as to the deficiencies of the USMC infantry…Marines on foot can only carry and take so much enemy mechanized and artillery abuse.
What about the FGM-172 SRAW “Predator?” It was built, tested, and remarkably stopped production. Can’t more SRAWs be ordered and built? The Predator should be a lot cheaper than the Javelin and more effective than the Carl Gustav.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FGM-172_SRAW
The same with the canceled LOSAT and CKEM hypersonic anti-tank missiles, also tested as prototypes and canceled. Can’t those be brought back into production since the USMC has lots of HMMWVs?
The F-35B’s Small Diameter Bombs should also help as should new anti-tank HiMARS smart munitions like Viper Strike.
If the USMC wants a steady and consistent anti-armor unit, then the USMC should buy plenty of the U.S. Army’s Mobile Protected Firepower Light Tanks and just have platoons of MPFs aboard amphibs in the event of a tank war. The MPF Light Tanks may not be the best anti-tank cannon around, but at least it would be like World War Two M4A1 Shermans against Panther or Tiger I and II tanks…a mobile fighting chance at least.
The new ACV should upgrade to the BAE ACV “Demonstrator” with 30mm cannon, UAV, and Javelin ATGM and 2.75” APKWS rockets instead of just CROWS II with MK-19 or M2HB.
“lighter” and “more mobile” vehicles to fight tanks has been tried before, with unsatisfactory results when fighting a competent enemy. In WW2 the concept was used to justify Tank Destroyers.
Granted, early on in WW2 screens of towed flak cannons were used by Rommel’s Africa Corp to good effect, but their vulnerability was soon used against them.
Troops in what is essentially a quad runner similar to those sold at BassPro trying to set up an anti-armor ambush against a competent armored force are going to be swept off of this plane of existence by artillery; at best after they get off the first shot but likely before that.
Aaron,
The caveat of our proposal is that it is for an infantry force. Certainly the most capable anti-armor force is an armored force. But we believe the Marine Corps could significantly increase the capability of the infantry community with a relatively modest investment. Even with the capability we suggest, infantry alone are not a match for the combined arms of an armored brigade or division.
Wow, I wished journalists and the DoD could really answer questions posed by public comments.
The article hit the nail on the head as to the deficiencies of the USMC infantry…Marines on foot can only carry and take so much mechanized and artillery abuse.
What about the FGM-172 SRAW “Predator?” It was built, tested, and remarkably stopped production. Can’t more SRAWs be ordered and built? The Predator should be a lot cheaper than the Javelin and more effective than the Carl Gustav.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FGM-172_SRAW
The same with the canceled LOSAT and CKEM hypersonic anti-tank missiles, also tested as prototypes and canceled. Can’t those be brought back into production since the USMC has lots of HMMWVs?
The F-35B’s Small Diameter Bombs should also help as should new anti-tank HiMARS smart munitions like Viper Strike.
If the USMC wants a steady and consistent anti-armor unit, then the USMC should buy plenty of the U.S. Army’s Mobile Protected Firepower Light Tanks and just have platoons of MPFs aboard amphibs in the event of a tank war. The MPF Light Tanks may not be the best anti-tank cannon around, but at least it would be like World War Two M4A1 Shermans against Panther or Tiger I and II tanks…a mobile fighting chance at least.
The new ACV should upgrade to the BAE ACV “Demonstrator” with 30mm cannon, UAV, and Javelin ATGM and 2.75” APKWS rockets instead of just CROWS II with MK-19 or M2HB.
Also JLTVs w spike missiles or hellfire missiles could go a long way to fight armored brigades
Same for longer range rocket artillery
Interesting info but the writers only discuss weapons systems and ignore the engineering component of anti-armor operations. Blown tank traps, placed obstacles and anti-tank mines are decidedly low tech (and comparatively low cost) but allow a blocking force to redirect and delay advancing enemy armored formations buying the time for reinforcements, long range fires and air support to be brought into the fight.
Our intent with writing this article was to address the technological "killing component" shortfall the infantry currently has. We didn't address any engineering capabilities because Marine Corps infantry currently doesn't possess any organic engineers and are not trained in mine laying or anti-armor obstacle construction. If a unit had engineer support and enough time to construct those obstacles though, you're absolutely right that they would benefit the unit in it's mission to block or delay and could actually work well when working in tandem with our proposed changes.
Back in the late 70s we Marines had TOW Companies, mission was purely anti-armor as we were still planning to fight the Soviets. Maybe we should revisit a unit such as that for the USMC.
The SABER mentioned is actually a TOW with a new name. Back about 2010, am upgraded sight optic was rolled into the BGM-71 system and has since been given the name SABER. If you could work it in the 70s you’d still be functional.
The real shortfall in the modern military is the inability to realize that the imperialistic model of past centuries has become so entrenched that we can’t see the relativistic incompatibility of nation building. This entire article is negated if you realize that all the OPFOR armor in the world is not a threat to America. Only American forces in foreign conflicts. Russian tanks aren’t backed with the economic might to transport them across the Pacific and drop them uncontested on American shores. Chinese armor has economic backing but insufficient Naval might to do the same.
So this only becomes a problem if we continue to try to defend third country nations, who have almost no organic capabilities, using minimal footprints, while continuing to sell both sides modern weaponry in the hopes that next-gen is about to roll out and be fielded.
If the last century’s constant American losses in wars should have taught us anything, it’s that trying to use expensive, heavy, tech to defeat entrenched, determined and vested forces in a war of attrition is a costly endeavor more likely to result in economic collapse than victory.
This is the paradigm that needs to shift, and no Marine Corps-only change will matter. It’s just wasting assets and dollars that could be better spent training more infantry to absorb the losses.
A true article to say the least, and one though that has been more the debate of whom the Marines are really supposed to be fighting. Is it a light, sea-mobile, yet not truly "extremely mobile" force, say compared to the 101st Air, which has to get somewhere fast and move around fast? Or is it the kick the door down force that takes on anyone to gain some ground and then be relieved by a heavier force if necessary, like a Tank division? Light enough, yet heavy to a point. I'd say the latter. But the point of making run around like crazy UTV's carrying Javelins really is not that much of an improvement, if any, over say stripping the armor off the Hummers and letting them regain mobility. The other point which is spot on though, they just need alot more missiles. Even if the Russians do improve their APS sheer numbers can win out in those instances of massing fire to a hit point a specific vehicle. Add in it's much cheaper to improve missiles and detection ability than to buy whole new systems like a new tank makes sense. Getting rid of the TOW's could be debated all day long. That sounds as much budget as anything else, the latest/greatest TOW's can be obtained without wire guidance and certainly pack a long range punch.
throwing debate out, the best weapon against a tank is attack choppers, and certainly Abrams Tanks. I thought the Marines would get a 3rd tank battalion, which so far at best turned into another company for the 2nd tank battalion. It probably should have an organic tank battalion per all 4 divisions and of course upgrade to at least m1a2 sep v2 type compatibility. More missiles, more tanks, and certainly look at the midget tanks the Army is pursuing- but before diving into them- wait to see if the Army really moves on unmanned anti-tank. The pairing of the lethal but very small drone tanks complete with basically an engine with a turret no living space underneath paired to an Abrams or in a uneven pairing could be a big odds changer, especially if more can be transported to shore quickly.
I have an idea! Why not invent an RPG with the armor piercing warhead? They've killed more GIs and blown up more of our equipment than all other hand fired weapons since 1960 combined.. I've never understood why we didn't develop a similar weapons during or right after the Viet Nam fiasco.
With all due respect, but it's still looks like you fought with an unequal enemies for too long. Unfortunately, you won't be able to "create a relatively cheap but effective anti-armor capability without acquiring any new systems".
The problem number one is you have no SUAS able to operate in heavily jammed electro-magnetic environment. When Russian brigades are on the move they covered not just by anti-aircraft systems but also by jamming systems like "Zhitel". We in Ukraine received your Ravens and abandoned them almost immediately exactly b/c of Russians were able to intercept and jam video streams from drones.
The problem number two is Russians also has SUAS, and thermal visions, and night visions, and anti-sniper hardware and all the rest of the fancy staff your Marines has. Their thermals may be not so good but they have it. So the idea of anti-armor units to stay invisible is quite naive.
You make a good case for the need for more AT capability, and trading the lumbering Humvees for speed and low profile sounds like it has possibilities, but I have to agree with Mykola that the drone is the weak point in the scheme. If air power is in question in a near-peer confrontation, how long will something that flies a few hundred feet off the ground and at about the speed of WWI's Sopwith Camel survive?
The idea of essentially a dune buggie trolling around the battlefield with a very short ranged missile trying to attack an armored formation that is equipped with thermal imagers and weapons that outrage the marines by several kilometers is absurd.
Well, there is one more thing you should know, 1st Leut. Mills and Rasmussen. Russians has already stole your idea. And they made it more realistic. UTV in your concept is fit enough for stone desert like Iraqi or Syria but when you come to the… for example Ukraine, Mykola's homeland, for example in autumn after a little rain… On this soil russian tracked BMP-1 after just a pair of kilometers will stuck whitin mud. And your UTV wil be a HMMWV 2.0 with 4 men and all their EDC-stuff, and this mini-UAV container… and Javelin launcher… and at least four(or maybe 6?) rockets… and gas… Not enough speed, not enough manuver, good target. So, Russian made their choiсe for this role – russian 4×4 jeep "Lada". With 12,7-mm "Utes" HMG and "Kornet" ATR. (https://warspot.ru/14642-nivy-srazyatsya-s-tankami) "Utes" for the infantry, HMMWV or light armor, "Kornet" – for the tanks. So, you should change in your concept UTV to the "Toyota" 4×4 technicals for the most part of AT-unit and arm it with additional MH2B or Mk19 in 50/50 share. For the most part of the another part of unit you should leave UTV's but remove Javelins and 4th man. One man – driver, one – for the mini-UAV, third – mobile radar station operator (radar unit like russian PSNR). And another part of this part should be a anti-UAV-only equipped to disable or jam russian UAV. Surprise, but the steel wave of russian tanks and AVF's exists only in Cold war fan's imagination. IRL, we, russians, know sometnig about tactics and far before you should see our tanks you will be spotted by our UAVs then ambushed by our recon units which (SURPRISE!) moving in avanguard of the battle order, and then – you will be attacked by our infantry with support of mobile artillery units like 2S9 "Nona". So, with your first move in this game you must disable our UAV's, spot our recons and cover them with your own mortar or artillery fire. That is why we need a UTV-part of unit. Then our offensive will be halted, recon begin spending time to infiltrate the landscape to spot your forawrd artillery observers and you will cover them with your Mk19 from the hidden forward Toyota group. And only then, incapable of making a fast succesfull recon, some stupid russian commander will order the mass of his heavy armor and AFV's to blind mass-attack. And you will have a chance to try your DDOS-attack on our armor's "Afganit" systems. Good luck with it. But.. i just think about some thing… what if the armor unit's active defence system will have some AI potential, integrated with armor's communications system "Azart" which already have a MESH-structure? One intercept round for one rocket. DDOS attempt will fail and you should retreat to your M1 Abrams tanks wich have their DU ‘crowbars’ onboard.
Marines should not ever be placed into a situation to fight a tank battle. Ever. Their role is small arms in small wars, not the Suwalki Corridor. Leave that to the Army, with more tank companies per division than any Marine division (1AD, 1CD, 1ID, 3ID, 4ID). Even the ARNG can field more tanks than the USMC (29ID, 34ID). If anyone permits a Marine division to end up in a tank fight, someone should end up testifying before Congress to explain themselves.
Good points, but POLITICIANS and the STATE DEPARTMENT usually excel at putting US forces into these types of situations. The rules of engagement, tactical situation, strategic situation and political situation, plus uncontrollable things like weather and the sheer logistics of moving indigenous people and military units around in remote areas usually force our hands. Whether it is USMC or any other unit, they have to have some sort of an option to stand where they are and fight. That means having the hardware solutions capable of doing it. Any good enemy commander will exploit all of the above. You cannot count on being able to withdraw.
Thank you for an excellent article that prompted so many excellent comments.
One thing that I would point out is that the basic problem you have described is not limited to just the USMC and modern times. Militaries have historically often sent overly heavy units against light, agile forces and ended up getting trounced, just as we have historically done the reverse. The point that I perceive that is being made is that the USMC needs to have both the capabilities, tactics and hardware inventory levels to face armored forces because we have gone too far in downsizing our force sizes and creating smaller, more lightly armed forces and our equipment and technologies are not so modern anymore while the capabilities and organization of our adversaries is dramatically improving across the board. We are not running into small bunches of poorly armed, poorly trained skirmishers and irregulars. Likewise, we cannot be so prepared for the present enemy that we neglect the idea of a large conventional standing military force moving against a USMC unit.
There has to be a balance in capabilities and training and what we procure so at least the feasible option exists for a local USMC unit can stand and fight against a significant larger or armored force if the ROE, tactical or political situation do not allow the unit to withdraw. One of the problems that the USMC seem to run into stems from the fact that it is part of a navy, and Navy leadership is apt to have competing requirements and different priorities for budget, systems, equipment, etc. that may not consistently align with what the USMC needs to accomplish its mission in a modern battlefield. Yes, stopgaps are going to be needed, but longer term, the USMC needs to think about affordable, modern solutions that address its battlefield needs.
What might be useful to deal with lower procurement levels and budgets for R&D is for the Corps to emphasize research on creating mission kits for adapting production or close-to-production weapons systems that address USMC needs more closely so that a weapons system that would not otherwise meet USMC needs could go into production and be augmented with kits that allowed USMC units to have better capabilities. The kit could be as simple as a cold launch booster that allowed a larger missile to launch from a confined, enclosed area, a booster to augment range and speed, a different seeker or warhead, or perhaps a fuse that made something useful across shorter distances, etc.
I guess now that Gen Berger has gutted the Corps and removed tanks period, it's even a bigger problem.