Since the first American boots hit the ground in Afghanistan in October 2001, countering jihadist terrorism served as the central focus of US national security until the reemergence of great power competition over the last few years. Clearly the United States needs to compete with a rising China, a revanchist Russia, and rogue states like Iran and North Korea, but competing with rival states and countering jihadist terrorism are not mutually exclusive efforts, and if conducted appropriately, they can be mutually reinforcing.
The False Dichotomy of Ending “Forever Wars” During Great Power Competition
Both the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy make clear that great power competition is the United States’ strategic priority, and both acknowledge the enduring importance of defending against terrorist threats and consolidating hard-earned gains in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, persistent presidential tweets and comments on the need to end “forever wars” in the Middle East and Africa really drove a narrative that great power competition is mutually exclusive to continuing efforts to counter jihadist terrorism. This narrative presents a false dichotomy that the Biden administration needs to dispel.
The United States should compete with rival states and continue to help other countries reduce jihadist terrorist groups and address the root causes of radicalization. Competition with rival powers does not obviate the need to continue the unfinished work of countering jihadist terrorism—the two efforts can be mutually reinforcing. A coherent, whole-of-government approach to competing with rival states, rather than relying excessively on containment or military deterrence, will improve the US ability to help countries deal with jihadist insurgencies and other transnational criminal activities like trafficking in drugs and humans. Likewise, improving its approach to countering jihadist groups by adopting counterinsurgency efforts that address the root causes of poverty and political disenfranchisement will improve US access and influence, and thereby its ability to compete with rival powers.
While the 2018 National Defense Strategy focuses on rebuilding the military to prepare for war with near-peer competitors, it does not direct an end to overseas military engagements. In fact, it explicitly states the need to expand relationships, consolidate gains in Iraq and Afghanistan, and address significant terrorist threats in Africa. These nuances, however, got lost in the noise as the military rushed to reduce deployment tempo and focus on preparing for the next war, apparently forgetting Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ warnings about “Next-War-itis.” Additionally, there was significant pressure from the Trump administration to reduce or end military activities in the Middle East and Africa. Trump personally directed the military to abandon Syria and in his last weeks in office ordered a reduction of forces in Afghanistan and the near total withdrawal of US advisors from Somalia.
Failures in Iraq and Afghanistan Do Not Mean the United States Should Cut and Run
US efforts have not yet succeeded in Afghanistan or Iraq, but this does not mean it should cut and run; instead, the United States should do a better job. With an extensive list of strategic mistakes in Afghanistan and unforced errors in Iraq, it is more surprising that the United States has accomplished so much. It has fallen short in both cases not because it cannot achieve success, but because it has not pursued success effectively. In both cases, the United States can accomplish national security objectives by establishing reasonable goals, clearly articulating a strategy based on reality instead of wishful thinking, and then staying the course.
Retired Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster points out that rather than pursuing a single coherent strategy over nearly two decades in Afghanistan, the United States has fought a succession of one-year wars. Even so, there have been many improvements in governance, security, education, and gender equality, to name a few. By pursuing a coherent, whole-of-government strategy with reasonable goals and a sustainable footprint, the United States and its coalition partners can still succeed in Afghanistan.
Missteps in Iraq began with the decision to invade, which is generally considered a strategic mistake. But invading Iraq without a plan for occupation goes beyond being a mistake—it was naïve and negligent. Additional errors such as dismissing the Iraqi army and not recognizing the growing insurgency unnecessarily added to the challenge. When the surge of additional troops and the Sunni Awakening finally reduced the insurgency, US and coalition forces were in a position to provide security and allow developmental efforts to improve governance and the distribution of services in the fragile democracy. Unfortunately, neither Iraqi politics nor government institutions were stable when the Obama administration pulled out of Iraq in 2011, showing that the United States cannot unilaterally end unpopular, protracted conflicts by choosing to stop taking part in them. In the absence of US involvement, the situation degraded almost immediately with sectarian purges in the Shia-majority government. The resulting disenfranchisement of Sunni communities enabled ISIS to make rapid progress across the Sunni west and north of Iraq, ultimately forcing the Obama administration to commit massive resources to address ISIS and a collapsed Iraqi military. More critically, the vacuum left by the US withdrawal from Iraq ceded Washington’s influence in Baghdad to Tehran and encouraged Iranian adventurism in the region. Ultimately the US withdrawal from Iraq did not end a forever war, but rather reduced US influence over the conflict’s outcome and created a vacuum for adversaries to fill.
In these cases, limited understanding of complex situations and the associated ill-informed decisions hampered US efforts to counter jihadist terrorists. The fact that the United States made mistakes, however, does not suggest that it should stop pursuing its interests; rather, it needs to get better at dealing with jihadist insurgencies in countries with difficult political and societal conditions. More specifically, the United States needs to do a better job of helping other countries address their jihadist insurgencies through sustainable, long-term approaches informed by facts on the ground and expert advice.
An Effective Approach to Counter Jihadist Insurgencies During Great Power Competition
A sustainable US approach to countering jihadist insurgencies requires a whole-of-government effort that emphasizes good governance, economic development, and lower corruption, relying heavily on the diplomatic and development communities. A limited military presence to train, advise, and assist partner forces will likely be important to help the host government provide security for the population and the extension of governance and development. To be sustainable over time in a mission that requires patience, small US military efforts must be affordable and limit the risk of US casualties. Both diplomatic and military efforts will increase US influence with the host government and population and help crowd out malign actors.
In Africa, the United States should help partners provide security for their populations, while diplomatic, developmental, and military civil affairs efforts extend governance and economic opportunity. It can sustain support to counterinsurgency campaigns with a light military footprint that entails limited risks. Special operations forces, small elements of the Army’s security force assistance brigades, and other advisors best suited for these missions are effectively dual use, as they both help the United States compete with great powers by making it the partner of choice and extend the democratic values of rule of law, respect for human rights, and transparent governance.
By proving that it can master complex political situations and achieve desired goals, the United States will improve its credibility and influence abroad, which is fundamental to competing with rival powers. Multiple missteps in dealing with jihadist terrorists have damaged US credibility, delayed or reduced successful outcomes, wasted vast amounts of money, and unnecessarily cost lives. Yet the United States has and will overcome these setbacks; it should learn from these mistakes and improve how it addresses jihadist terrorists as it pursues US interests abroad. Moreover, US decisions to disengage, out of frustration or an inability to develop a coherent strategy, have emboldened competitors. This suggests that continued engagement—not retrenchment—will improve success in great power competition.
Additionally, addressing jihadist terrorism complements, rather than degrades, the US ability to engage in great power competition by increasing its access and influence with foreign partners. By aiding countries with jihadist terrorists, the United States can leverage access provided by shared security interests to address governance and development goals as part of an overall counterinsurgency strategy. US assistance also enhances soft power by generating goodwill that can translate to increased influence. The United States can compete effectively while promoting reforms consistent with democratic norms and helping crowd out authoritarian competitors who promote illiberal forms of governance.
The corollary is that a more comprehensive approach to great power competition should improve the United States’ ability to address jihadist terrorist threats across the Muslim world. To compete with rival powers, the United States should strive to be the partner of choice across the world. If it aggressively competes for influence to expand democratic norms, then by extension it will address many of the root causes of radicalization and instability such as poverty and political disenfranchisement. Additionally, countries may be more open to democratic reforms when framed as a necessary step to reduce violence and political instability.
Leveraging the Synergy Between Counterterrorism and Great Power Competition
It is time to rethink the relationship between great power competition and countering jihadist terrorism. The recent trend toward abandoning the latter in favor of the former misses the potential benefits of pursuing them both at the same time. The Biden administration should recognize the synergistic relationship between great power competition and efforts to counter jihadist insurgencies. It should focus on crafting a sustainable, long-term approach to both great power competition and countering jihadist insurgencies that leverages their synergies to improve outcomes and end a series of costly and unnecessary foreign policy missteps.
Marcus Hicks is a retired Air Force major general who served as commander of US Special Operations Command Africa from 2017 to 2019. He previously was chief of staff at US Special Operations Command and a career AC-130 pilot.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Senior Airman Grovert Fuentes-Contreras, US Air Force
"The United States should compete with rival states and continue to help other countries reduce jihadist terrorist groups and address the root causes of radicalization."
This is first and foremost foreign policy, not military strategy. It also fails to recognize the limits of the United States interests, which do not extend to every corner of the world. Even the discussion of Iraq while cataloging American errors does not appreciate the historic enmity of Iran and Iraq (itself partly the result of Western meddling in the region). The balance of power in the Middle East is not simply about Iran, but also Turkey and Saudi Arabia. If we wish to unite the entire region against us, we have but to offer further support to Kurds wishing for their own ethnic state (denied them by the last imperial tinkerers). I bring them up as they have a terrorist wing identified by our NATO ally in the region (Turkey), that we have nonetheless sought to use against Syria and in Iraq. Does support to the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan in the 80s begin to ring any bells? The simple assessment of who is bad and who is good and who the U.S. should support (particularly premised on Cold War calculus) is not going to do anything but lead us into further misadventures.
"By proving that it can master complex political situations and achieve desired goals…"
And exactly when have we actually done that? You first have to have goals – we're certainly not good at that part. Mastering complex politics? Surely you jest. It is precisely this kind of unbounded (and unfounded) ambition that undermines our credibility – internationally and domestically.
No one can do everything….especially do it well. So the US military has to make choices; it can be prepared for the most likely event to do us the most harm and hopefully be good at it because that's where they focus their attention and resources or they can dilute their efforts and be "so-so" at many things. Keep in mind that over the course of the next four years the military will have as its primary mission complying with "social reforms and gender integration" mandates oozing out of the White House and the Congress. So the military is going to focus on either fighting "big wars" or fighting "little wars" or fighting "social wars" but it can't do it all.
This article is a refreshing look from the "cut-our-losses" echo chamber that exists in a lot of academic literature on Iraq and Afghanistan. While other comments above are correct that the US cannot do everything I do not believe that the author is claiming that we should. This is merely one way that our current efforts may be adapted in order to fit into the larger GPC strategy. Showing how some adapted form of our current missions can help not only consolidate gains but can improve American access to infrastructure and populations as well as political and social influence in these key regions is actually a compelling argument for sustaining these missions.
Some questions that this article raises is that how can the U.S. sustain a full effort in both competing in a great power competition and countering jihadist terrorism? Why should the U.S. feel compelled to counter terrorism in the middle east? What is the level of involvement that we should take with those countries? As we can see with the recent withdrawal from Afghanistan, the costs and tolls that it took on our military were no longer worth the benefits, leading to a withdrawal after twenty long years. Helping other countries deal with their jihadist insurgencies didn't work for us in Afghanistan and I do not know how soon after this we are going to try again with another country.
The author articulates well the strategic reality we find ourselves in. We can't outrun COIN and CT, no matter how much we want to. And why should we? These mission sets are important tools to compete with our peers. The author points out that by assisting foreign partners with terror or internal opposition, we can build relationships in vulnerable regions such as Africa and Asia, where China is using coercion and financial pressure to build relationships and alliances. All too often, as the author points out, many will suggest simply because we've failed at COIN we should cut and run. This is counterproductive, as if it's our weakness now, it will certainly be exploited by our adversaries in the future. Why wait until they exploit to address the challenges we have faced at implementing whole of government approaches to COIN?
This is the first article I have come across that ultimately decides that focusing on both the great power competition and countering jihadist insurgencies, is the best way forward. Most other articles argue the military should pursue one effort and sacrifice the concentration of the other, but Hicks believes working constantly towards both will benefit each cause. I agree with his argument as well as his recommendation to craft a sustainable, long-term approach for both the great power competition and countering jihadist insurgencies. This will allow their synergies to improve outcomes and end a series of costly and unnecessary foreign policy missteps.
Interesting that this article pushes back against pulling out of Afghanistan and the middle east, and states that we should be focusing on a small military presence remain to train, assist, and advise. It seems that that is what we did and that force was swiftly defeated. I'm curious to see if this article were re-written, how it would look.
This article begins with a very direct thesis; stating the U.S. should be involved in power competition AND counter terrorism at the same time. This is a very hot topic today, and this article was published in March 2021. After the U.S. has pulled out of Afghanistan, politicians and military leaders still question if this was the right move. The removal of the U.S. from the on-going situation in the Middle East is thought to be a redirection of resources toward the Great Power Competition. However, Hicks states that it's better much better that the U.S. be committed to both. He makes a valid argument that supporting oppressed nations and competing in national power complement one another. If a nation can master both of these actions on a global scale, they open new opportunities for future operations and alliances. Being able to compete with rivals on both fronts would leave the U.S. in a great position to project power and influence. The over-arching problem is resource management. The U.S. military would be fighting on two fronts that could begin to overwhelm one another and leave the armed forces in disarray. The logistics of committing new doctrine, resources, and training would be immense with the nation focusing on two very different types of warfare. Hicks brings to light a great concept that could be advantageous to the U.S., but there is significant risk involved.
I agree with this article, and it raises a great point that is not discussed enough publicly. The vacuum in Iraq, left by the US withdrawal, could only be filled by an opponent of the US. The strategic benefits to providing aide to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, outweigh the possibility of a great power competition adversary filling the void. It's hard to find an instance when having more friends than not is a positive, and in this situation, the more positive influence and alliances from the US, the better.
While this is the best option, it is much easier said than done because when choosing between competency in conventional or irregular warfare, obviously we want to be proficient in both, but nearing perfection in these two styles is extremely costly in terms of money, time, and manpower.