Peaceful protests outside of Vilnius, Lithuania, covered widely by the Russian media, abruptly turn violent, with Russian-speaking civilians inexplicably killed in a sudden explosion. A Russian airborne battalion parachutes just east of the chaos, on the Belorussian side of the border, prompting the 82nd Airborne to rapidly deploy its brigade designated as the core of the US military’s Global Response Force into action. When one of the Russian airborne battalions—fully mechanized with BDM-4 infantry fighting vehicles, BTR armored personnel carriers, and reinforcing tanks—encounters a lone US airborne battalion, with only eight Humvee-mounted anti-tank missiles, the Russian forces find it to be easy prey.
By design, light infantry forces sacrifice certain capabilities in order to maximize flexibility and mobility. But when the capabilities sacrificed leave American light infantry forces particularly vulnerable to a potential adversary, change is required. Army light infantry brigades currently have a critical anti-armor gap. However, by combining solutions across the DOTMLPF spectrum—doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities—the Army can maximize the anti-armor lethality, standoff, and capability within the light infantry brigade.
Doctrine
After over fifteen years of combat against largely dismounted insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Army recently made a doctrinal pivot toward fighting mechanized, nation-state competitors who could pose a major tactical challenge for US Army forces. Field Manual 3-0, the Army’s capstone operations manual, published in October 2017, states that “large-scale ground combat against a peer threat represents the most significant readiness requirement.” However, the most recent doctrinal publication that should, ostensibly, be most specific about anti-armor employment, Field Manual 3-21.12, The Infantry Weapons Company, is based on US Army combat experience prior to its 2008 publication and makes no mention of this type of combat. Its focus is largely on supporting dismounted infantry, not aggressively attacking and defending against mechanized enemy formations. The publication contains two hundred pages, with few references to tanks or armored vehicle (a more recent publication has since superseded the manual, but condenses the discussion of the infantry weapons company down to a forty-one-page appendix). It does not discuss engineer planning factors for digging in Humvees into mutually supporting defensive battle positions.
The Army must make a concerted effort to revamp its anti-armor doctrine to match FM 3-0’s focus on large-scale combat operations against peer enemy formations. A nomenclature shift, from “infantry weapons company” to “anti-armor company,” would also more clearly emphasize the anti-armor capabilities that will be vital on the future battlefield. New doctrine’s content should focus on defeating armored threats first and foremost, with infantry support as an important but secondary mission. By deliberately updating anti-armor doctrine to match FM 3-0, the Army will lay the foundation for tremendously increased capability.
Organization
If the Army is serious about focusing on defeating mechanized peer threats, then it must give equally serious consideration to mechanizing and mounting the entire active-duty component. Infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs) would undergo a total motorized makeover, while armored and Stryker BCTs would remain unchanged. While this would be a tremendous organizational undertaking, it would only match our Russian counterparts, who have mechanized their entire Army, fielding no true dismounted elements. IBCTs, while able to rapidly deploy to a combat theater, have no inherent offensive capability against mechanized forces, and a highly insufficient capability to successfully defend against an enemy mechanized assault.
Critics of mechanizing all IBCTs would likely suggest that this would leave the military short of dismounted infantry. However, should the US military need more dismounted infantry than can be fielded by the eighteen National Guard IBCTs and the entire Marine Corps, then it is likely engaged either in theater-wide counterinsurgency operations or multiple urban operations, both of which are doctrinally and historically strategic misuses of US forces.
Funding for this all-mounted active-duty infantry force can come from a reduction of infantry BCTs to produce the required number of mechanized infantry, capable of rapid anti-armor offensive operations against mechanized peer enemy forces. The newly created motorized infantry BCT would include an anti-armor assault battalion, comprised of two anti-armor companies and two truck-mounted infantry companies. This combined-arms team would be capable of defeating peer-enemy mechanized forces, seizing key terrain throughout a designated area of operations, and defending against large-scale, mechanized counterattacks.
Training
As Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood wrote, “Success in war can be achieved only by all branches and arms of the service mutually helping and supporting one another in the common effort to attain the desired end.” This notion is reinforced by American military history and points to the importance of utilizing combined-arms teams to achieve victory on the battlefield. An infantry battalions should train almost exclusively as a combined-arms team, incorporating anti-armor and dismounted infantry—similar to how their armored counterparts combine infantry and tanks to rapidly seize key terrain, destroy enemy forces, and exploit the initiative. Commanders routinely hesitate to employ formations for which they have limited training exposure during combat training center (CTC) rotations. This is likely due to a tendency of dismounted infantry companies, mounted weapons companies, and most other combat-arms and combat-support units to train almost exclusively as a single arm until haphazardly thrown together, typically at the last minute, for a CTC rotation. Battalion and brigade commanders who expect to win in decisive action against a peer mechanized force must train combined-arms maneuver from the beginning of a training cycle. Heavy weapons / anti-armor platoons must regularly train and develop professional relationships with their supported infantry companies. Engineers must train with these forces to provide mobility, countermobility, and protection, while small unmanned aircraft system operators provide intelligence to commanders and platoon leaders. Dismounted infantry cannot be expected to understand the extensive capabilities, resourcing needs, or limitations of anti-armor formations without working beside them in every step of the training path. Combined arms must be the leader-enforced standard, not the exception during a CTC rotation.
Materiel
Anti-armor platforms within the infantry BCT require two significant upgrades in order to provide the overmatch required to defeat highly mechanized peer adversaries. First, these platforms need a turret-mounted cannon system to rapidly destroy targets out to more than 2,500 meters, in addition to anti-tank guided missiles as an alternate weapon. Secondly, they require full amphibious capability in order to negotiate all water obstacles without relying on limited engineer assets.
Currently, IBCT maneuver battalions rely solely on the eight Humvee-mounted TOW missile launchers within their weapons companies to engage all armored threats beyond the 500-meter range of its organic man-portable recoilless rifles. While TOW missiles are effective at destroying all known armored threats, they are slower to operate compared to a turret-mounted cannon system, they cannot engage on the move, and they are technically complex, requiring specialized maintenance. The Army should experiment with a small- to medium-sized anti-armor platform that can mount 25–40mm autocannons, coupled with a TOW missile launcher as an alternate weapon. This would allow anti-armor elements to quickly engage sudden targets of opportunity while on the move, maximizing their offensive capability. When necessary, the platform could also halt to engage enemy tanks at ranges nearing 4,000 meters. The retired M19 dual 40-mm self-propelled anti-aircraft weapon, which proved extraordinarily lethal against massed Chinese infantry in the Korean War, could be one of many inspirations for a new anti-armor system, capable of destroying armor, dismounts, and nearby aircraft.
In addition to coupling a cannon and TOW system, this new vehicle must be fully amphibious and able to cross all rivers without any external assistance. Currently, no US Army maneuver platform is amphibious, and while this capability may not have been necessary during counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it will be an absolute must against the adversaries envisioned in FM 3-0. In a highly contested multi-domain battlefield, where combatants will compete to exploit temporary windows of advantage, US infantry battalions and their anti-armor assets cannot wait on a limited supply of highly vulnerable engineers to bridge every water obstacle before resuming the offensive. Critics of creating an amphibious anti-armor vehicle will likely point to the necessary reductions in armor as an unacceptable risk to the crew; however, enhanced emphasis on cover and concealment, coupled with the mobility to master local terrain, including water crossings, will do much more to protect anti-armor crews than any additional layer of armor. The Army can achieve maximum anti-armor lethality by incorporating a cannon system in addition to its TOW missile, and a fully amphibious capability.
Leadership and Education
Leadership at the company and platoon echelon should reflect a marked level of mastery in combined-arms maneuver. The current infantry weapons company provides the infantry battalion commander much greater combat power than any of the battalion’s rifle companies, and with the materiel upgrades above, this relative combat power ratio will increase dramatically, further necessitating an enhanced leadership capability within the anti-armor company. This requires an acute, careful talent management effort by the battalion commander, who must be very deliberate in selecting anti-armor platoon leaders and company commander. From the author’s observation, infantry weapons company leadership positions are treated at best as an ordinary manning requirement, and at worst as places for infantry lieutenants who the battalion commander doesn’t trust to lead rifle platoons. This is a mistake, as rifle platoons bring only a fraction of the combat power of an infantry weapons platoon. The best, most seasoned leaders must be in charge of the most powerful and capable of formations.
Current education of new infantry lieutenants minimizes exposure to the capabilities or employment of infantry weapons platoons. Infantry lieutenants must receive a formal, structured, and practical training regimen in anti-armor capabilities comparable to their armor-branched counterparts. All officers and noncommissioned officers selected for service in an infantry weapons company should be sent to a robust, expanded heavy weapons leader’s course. This course, currently located solely at Fort Benning, provides the premier education in using heavy weapons—but only to a select few students each cycle. The course should be expanded to every Army post that hosts an IBCT, and capable of providing the same quality instruction to every officer and noncommissioned officer serving within the infantry weapons company.
Personnel
Infantry military occupational specialties (MOS) should revert back to specialization during one-station unit training. All soldiers designated for service in the current infantry weapons company should receive specific training as anti-armor crewmen, earning the once-coveted “11H” MOS designation. These soldiers should be trained, cultured, and indoctrinated in the use of anti-armor and heavy weapons support. Soldiers should progress from private to company first sergeant within the Army’s infantry weapons companies. Moving noncommissioned officers who have spent their entire careers in rifle platoons to infantry weapons platoons reduces their capacity as subject matter experts, which the officer corps relies on for their in-depth experience in a wide range of matters technical, tactical, and administrative. The “learning gap” of any soldier or leader transitioning from a rifle company to an infantry weapons company is time that could have been used mastering doctrine and unit tactics, techniques, and procedures—instead of learning the basics of a weapons company and its capabilities. The Army should bring back the 11H designation, and the related training, in order to maximize the lethality of the soldiers within the formation.
Facilities
Army posts with IBCTs must expand their training facilities to accommodate for the wide area required for mounted maneuver in offensive and defensive operations. From the author’s observation, Army posts with IBCTs tend to have a limited quantity of ranges that can accommodate .50-caliber ammunition, and fewer still that allow for extensive mounted maneuver. Army installations must look to expand training facilities on the periphery or consolidate certain small-caliber ranges in order to allow the most lethal companies within the light infantry battalion the opportunity to maximize their training and readiness. Additionally, IBCT posts should expand their virtual-simulations facilities to allow for constant rotation by the infantry weapons companies when they are not conducting training in a field environment. Commanders must budget limited available time to ensure all crewmembers conduct virtual gunnery before expending live ammunition.
Maximizing the lethality of anti-armor within the IBCT cannot be solved by any single upgrade to weapon systems. Rather, solutions across the DOTMLPF spectrum must be synchronized toward the desired end state of highly competent, well-trained, and superbly led anti-armor infantry forces, capable of defeating any peer enemy force in a contested multi-domain battlefield.
Image credit: Capt. Justin Wright, US Army
Might wanna look up ATP 3-21.20…. keep yourself current Sir…. Just some NCO advice
An interesting article and it would seem necessary comment to aspects of force development given where we find ourselves at this juncture in time with the array of possible contingencies and threats with available and anticipated force capabilities. What is striking is the similarity of infantry capability challenge being addressed to comment I and others made in several articles published in "Armor and Infantry Magazines" and "Military Review" in the 1990s and reprised a bit in a leadership vignette series published in "e-Veritas" one that recalled then XVIIIth Airborne Corps Commander LTG Foss' generated excursion by the DA Armored Family of Vehicles Task Force, Watervliet Arsenal, and the Marines at Marine Corps Base LeJeune in 1987 to examine the feasibility of firing a 105mm gun off a LAV chassis as a possible solution to the rapidly diminishing inventory of Sheridans in the 82nd.
What about vehicles like the M-1117 ASV as an interim stopgap measure?
You've got a combo of .50 cal and Mk19 on top and you can easily fit a 2 man Javelin team in it as well. Said team can dismount to engage main armored threats while leaving the turret systems for lightly armored vehicles as well as targets in buildings, woods, etc.
Granted it does not have amphib abilities, but it is better than nothing.
A BN commander with 6 – 8 of those at his disposal has a heavy weapons platoon he can move round as needed.
M1117 was my first thought when reading that portion of the article. It certainly wouldn't be ideal, but like you said a decent stop gap. Especially if they could replace the Mk19/M2 turret with one of those unmanned Cockerill turrets that houses the M230 30mm gun the Apache uses with a 7.62 coax and a mounted Javelin launcher.
The author makes many interesting points in his article, in which some might have already been fielded. I read this article with frustration because the Airborne Anti-Armor solutions were (or still are) there. It’s funding, motivation, politics, or Red Tape that drags this issue on.
It’s the political mentality that the USMC and the U.S. Army needs to change because solutions have already been tested, presented, and made available for COTS purchase. The U.S. DoD just needs to obtain the funding.
The 82nd received LAV 25mms from the U.S. Marine Corps. These LAVs, air-droppable, can be re-turreted with new DELCO 25mm turrets with twin TOW ATGM launchers or Lenoardo HITFIST turrets, also with twin ATGM launchers and 25-30mm cannons. The U.S. Army has the 8X8 former USMC LAVs now…up-arm them with new turrets.
LOSAT and CKEM Anti-Armor hypervelocity (Mach 5+) missiles were already tested out to five miles. HMMWVs can mount and launch them. The program, mysteriously, was shelved and canceled. This was perhaps the world’s first true hypersonic working missile (although I don’t know if it was guided). Even defense authors don’t know what happened to this program.
The new 2.75” APKWS guided rockets can also be incorporated into the remaining HMMWVs or MRZRs for added anti-armor out to 8-10KM using Fletcher pods. At just 14lbs a rocket, even a single APKWS man-portable launcher can take out a Russian BMD-4 IFV at 8KM…that is a huge “Force Multiplier” and a “Game Changer” for Airborne and Light Infantry. The M3 Carl Gustav weighs in at 21lbs (M4 variant at 15lbs) and that is effective out to only 500m as the author states. Buy Fletchers and also get the APKWS from a four-tube Fletcher pod launcher into a single man-portable rocket launcher with built-in laser designator fire control.
Too bad the 27-ton NLOS-Cannon wasn’t purchased and built even when the Future Combat System program was canceled. The NLOS-C could have provided light mobile M777 155mm artillery performance range AND an Anti-Armor capability with direct fire.
The M1117 ASV could mount a Cockerill 90mm gun turret for around 18 tons. The MPF Light Tank mounts a 105mm-120mm turret. Wikipedia reported that the U.S. Army tested the 90mm turret back in 2014 and nothing came of it. Is the M1117 90mm Direct Fire Vehicle Air Droppable at 18 tons?
These simple, effective, COTS purchase solutions can be implemented now. It’s unfortunate that this article had to appear in 2019 when some of these solutions have been made available for years already. There should be no excuse anymore as these solutions could provide long-range organic firepower to any situation and scenario, be it against Peer Nations or low-tech Insurgents. ICBTs and Strykers with 30mm Dragoon cannons or USMC LAV M41 SABER TOW are an expensive, unit-borrowing, and complex solution to deal with the Airborne and Light Infantry Anti-Armor issue.
Interesting comment on dual 40mm cannon. They also had success against ground targets in Europe during WW II.
Bring back the Airborne Anti Armor Defense of the late 70's and 80's. I don't believe that the Airborne brigade combat team needs a turreted anti-armor vehicle. TOWs and Javalins can do the job when effectively employed. Having been on several anti armor exercises as a CSC Cdr in the 82d, I can say that unless you are in the desert, it is difficult to find 3 KM (max range of the TOW) shots. In the European scenario that the writer is describing, Javelins employed in towns and forests will do the job. As far as offensive capability, there is a severe doctrine disconnect, Sending light infantry to attack mechanized forces, unless it is in built up areas or mountainous terrain is contrary to any doctrinal (or common sense) plan.
Bob, same holds true for Javelins as does the TOW. Difficult to find the ranged shot you need. You need an advanced warning to warm up the CLU and a somewhat open engagement area. JMRC rotations proved the Javelin ineffective in that terrain and our experiences in the Baltics confirmed that fleeting opportunities to hit fast-moving armor with those weapons were very rate. The good news is that we now have the M3 Garl Gustav as well as some Baltic nations having 90mm recoilless rifles that worked the best in mobility and penetration power.
In Eastern Europe, it really comes down to targeting and the distances end up being short which is why the old school recoilless rifles are supreme!
We are paying the price for the light infantry investment. The only thing that kills armor is armor. Mounted warfare is Cavalry and Armor business. Get some Cavalry and Armor capability into the Airborne and Air Assault MTOE structure and start the combined arms training. Dust off the 1980's doctrine and get busy. This is nothing new it's more about what has been forgotten.
Some questions/observations:
-Do the Rifle Companies no longer have 2x Javelins per platoon? I think we're missing a huge portion of the current AT capability if they're still equipped as such (and ATP 3-21.20, as the good NCO points out, says they still are).
-For that matter, the .50 cal and the Mk19 do wonders against light armor when properly employed. I suspect the employment of these systems in such a role is still a training gap for U.S. forces, but these should be part of the discussion.
-How long does it take to deploy this new motorized formation? 96 hours for an SBCT was a persistent myth at creation because airlift capacity wasn't there to support it. In 2002, Rand concluded, "a force with more than 1,000 vehicles cannot be deployed by air from CONUS to the far reaches of the globe in four days." A lot has changed in 17 years, but any recommendation to add mechanization must address strategic mobility factors. It's no good arriving to the fight three days late with the perfect tank killing organization.
-With the above, what are the implications to the rest of the logistics chain? How much more tail do we add to supply more fuel, ammo, and parts?
-I like the discussion of the lack of combined arms understanding/employment, but this recommendation falls victim to the same. While I further grant we're looking at helping the Infantry brigade–and the Infantry forces should be the focus–what about efforts to integrate the other branches? Is the engineer capability adequate to dig troops in and produce obstacles that make it easier to kill armor? What about fires? Are the units trained to employ these tools? It is, after all, a brigade in full deployed in the above scenario.
True, arriving 3 days late is no good. But if you're dropping paratroopers on the objective within 8 hours of getting the call, but 2 hours later they get literally rolled over by a mech infantry brigade, what was the point? True light infantry probably doesn't need much in the way of anti-armor capability. But we shouldn't have much straight leg light infantry anyway. Airborne troops probably need the most anti-armor ability of anyone besides an actual mechanized formation. They're the ones being dropped in there to seize key terrain until the slower heavier guys can show up. Remember that on D-Day the forces that hit the beach were intended to link up with the paratroopers within a matter of a few hours. But that didn't exactly work out. It sure would've been nice if they'd had some actual armored vehicles dropped in there with them instead of just bazookas. The delivery aircraft of the day didn't allow that. But ours do today, so there's no excuse not to have it.
The vaunted 11th ACR has been fighting very successfully at NTC for years with their Anti-Tank Troop. I bet they would have some input.
Everything old is new again. Old 11H. I went through the transition from anti armor company to platoon back in the 90's and then dragon – horrible weapons system -.
I agree that finding 3k Lanes in some terrain to take advantage of stand off is difficult. It is hard to beat that range and the capability of the m220 round short of heavy armor or an airborne platform. One other capability 11H brings is increasing the screening/scout capability organic to the BN or BGDE.
Great article and I love to see the Army's emerging leaders wrestling with how the Army shapes itself to deal with the challenges of tomorrow.
Two comments:
1. Everything old is new again. Consider looking through the TRADOC Historical Monograph Series "The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army." There's a great discussion of how the Army designed its light INF Divisions, including tradeoffs of firepower and personnel. It goes with "how does the Army intend to employ IBCTs?" Developers of the day put some real work into mitigating risks of small Infantry Divisions by supplying them high-tech solutions (referred to as the High-Tech Light Division). Expect the Army to struggle with some of the same questions in the future as it did in the 1970s-80s. Comparing the development of the Army post-Viet Nam to post-Iraq/Afghanistan. Interesting.
2. "…counterinsurgency operations or…urban operations…are doctrinally and historically strategic misuses of US forces." With an increasingly urbanized and interconnected global population, is it reasonable to expect those requirements will go away? If those conditions exist and the US is not going to employ its military forces, what capability should it leverage to enforce its will over the enemy? We only have one Dennis Rodman.
About those struggles you mentioned… I think you may find this interesting.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sRm5UZIOIoYg_TQuwgAM2ECehp5e_Y8G/view
Sir great article, I agree with you about assigning a ASI for Anti-Armor crewman / Gunner this needs to be a priority. The USMC has done this and it works well for them and they have schools to support training this MOS. I noticed that your focus was for mounted Anti-Armor weapons and not the shoulder fired Javelin. Javelins range and flexibility is a combat multiplier but there is a need for more individual training and updating the Javelin outdoor training device.
As a Combat Engineer I agree with you about how Engineering assets are limited and priority needs to be assigned to which defensive positions need to be worked first. M104 Wolverine bridging assets are limited but do provide quick gap crossing assets.
Thanks for your effort to bringing attention to this current need.
Why not place the fire-and-forget USMC's FGM-172 SRAWs back into production? Production ended on 2006 with only 960 units built.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FGM-172_SRAW
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fNpkt-x3hL4
SRAW only goes out to 600m (200m against moving targets), and at 21lbs, is less than half the weight of the expensive Javelin ATGM. Being fire-and-forget, SRAW acts as a cheaper mini-Javelin. The SRAW would fill in the gap between the unguided M3 Carl Gustav, AT-4, and M72 LAW and the expensive long range FGM-148 Javelin. SRAW may not have the range as Javelin, but at 600m, should be potent enough, especially when fire-and-forget.
Furthermore, Raytheon received a contract to make a lighter Command Launch Unit (CLU) for the Javelins that has 50% better battery life and better performance than the current CLU.
In modern times mounted Javelin is waste of money, plain and simple. The current level of technological advancement allows to grant top-attack capability to 'conventional' ATGM systems akin to Kornet and the like. Capability, i.e. entire process is automatic, which was previously unavailable. The trick itself was doable, but it was hardcore shooting technique, then a number of technical aids were introduced(laser range-finder, automatic tracking by X axis, anti-dust mode, etc). Today T-14 is rumoured to be able to put GLATGM through the roof of not-observable target that is standing behind the obstacle, while on the move.
P.S. The tactics of missile attack in top-attack mode that is hardwired into Javelin is counter-productive when employed against technologically advanced adversary.
Am I just dumb but why do the Russian “Airborne” units in this scenario have heavy vehicles and tanks within the tables of equipment?
I believe what is left out of here is that the Russian Airborne get “reinforced” . Would not the Ready Brigade from 82d also get reinforced from NATO assets? I am not naive, if the Russians wanted to move into “Western Europe” or Baltic’s they could do so with heavy divisions
From their home bases and be in Brussels in 36 to 48 hours. We have nothing there to stop them except nuclear forces.
Nope. Russian airborne forces have organic armored vehicles. They're smaller and lighter than BMP's, but still tracked armored vehicles. They jump them. In fact the crews, at least the drivers, used to actually ride in the vehicles on the way down. I think they jump separately now. As it says in the article the Russians do not have any forces that don't ride into battle in armored vehicles. Unelss you're counting special ops I'm sure. I think the point is if they can do it, we should be able to at least have some armored assets with ours. Other than a handful of LAV's that we finally just got, second hand…..
You need the right tool for the job!
101st Airborne Division Not 82nd.
I would think the Apache's Hellfire would devistate the "armor."
Until they get shot down by the near peer fighter jets.
About 30-35 years ago I had a friend down in one of the brigades of the 82d Abn that was the Platoon Sergeant of his battalion anti-tank platoon. In fact it was such a large unit that the Platoon Leader usually divided it into two units. The Platoon Leader commanded one and he commanded the other. This way his Battalion Commander actually had two anti-tank platoons. Any way they were transitioning from jeep mounted 106 recoilless rifles to the jeep mounted TOW. As usual they only received half of their TO&E number of TOW and had to keep half of the 106s. Later they received the other TOWs. He told me that the best composition for his platoon was to keep both as the TOW could reach out and the 106 was good for the short range. I suspect that a 106 can shoot very fast, having fired one a few times, and the TOW, or whatever the Army uses now, can handle the long distance. The 106 also has a fleshette round for engaging infantry at short range.
I also noticed as I was reading that Russia and Red China were credited with watching and adjusting to our tactics. It wasn't mentioned but I am hoping that WE are doing the same with them, not just harassing's our troops about gender, etc!