Beginning in 2000, the US Army infantry branch began a broadening initiative for its soldiers. For officers, this was known as the “light-heavy imperative,” where company-grade officers were expected to lead in both mechanized and light formations. For enlisted soldiers, it meant consolidating the 11-series military occupational specialties (MOS) into 11B, with the exception of 11C. The intent was to create infantry soldiers who were capable of sharing a common skillset and culture, along with leaders who could lead different formation types. Unfortunately, this has not proven to be the case. The push to broaden soldiers’ professional experiences and create a “one size fits all” infantryman has resulted in soldiers that are constantly shifted across various weapons systems and vehicle platforms, and leaders who find themselves in front of formation types they have little experience with. It’s time for the Army to acknowledge the experiment’s poor outcomes, remove all forms of the broadening initiative, and work to create a population of infantrymen who receive specialized training and experience in a specific field. Doing so will greatly increase professional expertise and, thus, enhance the lethality of our infantry forces.
Prior to October 2001, there were four separate 11-series MOSs for soldiers from private to sergeant first class: 11B (infantryman), 11C (indirect fire infantryman, 11M (fighting vehicle infantryman), and 11H (heavy anti-armor weapons crewman). The role of the 11M MOS was to fill mechanized infantry formations while the 11H served in anti-armor roles. After October 2001, the 11M and 11H MOSs were consolidated into the 11B MOS, with the idea that an 11B MOS that included all of those skillsets would create more versatile infantrymen capable of filling any infantry role, with the exception of the mortarman, in any infantry unit. The problem is that while this idea is good in concept, it has robbed infantrymen of the opportunity to truly become subject-matter experts in their craft.
The Army fields multiple different types of infantry formations: light, airborne, air assault, Ranger, and mechanized. Despite the Army reorganization from a division- to a brigade-centric model, these are essentially the same types of formations that existed before the 11-series consolidation took place. Each type of infantry plays a valuable role in the Army’s overall warfighting capability. Different formations have strengths and weaknesses that make each type ideal for a given type of combat, whether that be rapid deployability, defending against a near-peer armor threat, mountain or jungle fighting, etc. What makes each of these formations better suited for different forms of combat is their differing compositions; they are intended to provide distinctly different capabilities. As such, each type of formation is task organized differently, provided with different equipment, and assigned unique tasks on its mission-essential task list.
One of the most common problems units encounter during rotations at the combat training centers is a lack of weapons-systems familiarity—on the part of both soldiers and leaders. All too often soldiers fail to employ weapons systems to maximum effect because they simply don’t know how to take utilize them. When this is addressed during after-action reviews, soldiers often explain their lack experience in a given area. Having been forced in some way or another to move across the different types of infantry formations has prevented them from developing any depth of professional experience in a single one.
The solution to this problem is simple: stop forcing infantry officers and noncommissioned officers to transition between the various types of infantry formation solely for the sake of broadening. This initiative results in limited benefit. In theory, any infantryman is capable of serving in any infantry role (except the mortarman) because they are all 11A (infantry officer) and 11B roles. However, the jobs of an infantry officer or noncommissioned officer vary immensely across the various types of infantry formations. What happens in reality is that those soldiers and leaders spend their time learning new or relearning old tasks, rather than excelling at specialized ones. There is only so much carryover between one type of formation and another. A Bradley company manned by 11Bs of which some, perhaps a majority, had only recently joined a mechanized formation for the first time would be forced to play catch-up, rather than fine-tune its formation-specific skillsets. As it stands presently, one of the biggest threats to an infantry brigade combat team is a near-peer armored force. This is, in part, because IBCTs manning their anti-armor roles with 11Bs that were arbitrarily assigned to fill them are not able to employ those weapons to maximum effect, producing a significant gap in organic anti-armor capability. Nonmechanized formations cannot consistently rely on the support of mechanized attachments to provide a counter to an enemy armor threat. Subject-matter expertise has a direct relationship with lethality, so if the Army’s true focus is enhancing lethality, it follows that we should be doing everything possible to cultivate that subject-matter expertise rather than imposing roadblocks to it.
The question that needs to be asked is this: Is it necessary to create a system where we can move infantrymen from one formation to another? Given that the only reason to do so is the artificial requirement infantry branch has imposed on itself, it would be reasonable to surmise that the broadening requirements do not create an advantage that outweighs the loss of professional expertise.
If the Army resurrected the 11M and 11H MOSs, abolished the broadening requirement for infantry officers, and ceased encouraging broadening for noncommissioned officers, the subject-matter expertise of infantry formations would greatly improve. A company of Bradleys manned by 11Ms who had spent their careers in mechanized formations would be intimately more familiar with how to employ the vehicle and its weapons. If that same company was led by officers who had served principally in leadership and key developmental positions in mechanized formations, the company will be able to play to its strengths and mitigate its weaknesses. A paratrooper who has been conducting airborne operations his or her entire career is going to have significantly greater subject-matter expertise in doing so than one who has shifted across all five formations. If brigade combat teams filled their anti-armor roles with 11H anti-armor specialists, the balance between enemy and friendly forces would be substantially altered in our favor. If we want US Army infantrymen to become true experts at their craft, they must be allowed to remain in the same type of role for an extended length of time.
In the May–August 1998 edition of Infantry magazine, then-Chief of the Infantry Maj. Gen. Carl F. Ernst wrote that the goal was not to create a more “generic” infantry. Unfortunately, that’s exactly what happened. When multiple components are combined, they become averages of the whole. By combining roles with clear delineations into one MOS and spreading that watered-down MOS across different and unique types formations led by officers with often only partially relevant experiences, modern-day infantrymen are unable to refine their subject-matter expertise. By abolishing the broadening initiative, the Army will produce infantryman can excel at one job, rather than just being “good enough” at many.
Capt. Steven Head is an Observer, Coach, Trainer at the Joint Readiness Training Center. He previously served in a variety of positions in the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Patrick Albright, US Army
This is a great philosophy if all you are concerned about is specializing and training for success on the next CTCs. We tried this before and it was a long term abject failure on a variety of levels.
First, comparisons of CTC performance between units who were split MOS (pre-2000) and unified 11B were generally consistent. Second, personnel management became problematic as retention and training opportunities between light and heavy infantry formation were not consistent. Sentencing the heavy infantrymen to a 20+ year career rotation of Hood, Bliss, Riley, Carson is somewhat limiting. Third, as the wars in the Middle East of the last 20 years have shown, we need to be able to tailor or formations and distribution of infantrymen, which becomes more difficult and cost if the MOS is split again. Forth, our officers and NCOs are smart enough to figure out the issues identified at home station and the CTCs, which is entirely the point behind having training. Out officers, NCOs, and soldiers are smart enough to figure this stuff out.
As a career infantryman who served in light, mech, and specialized formations this would represent a great leap backwards.
What creates the "need" to be able to move infantrymen around? That perceived need comes from the broadening requirement. What external, mission-oriented requirements makes that the ideal option as opposed to dedicated, subject-matter experts?
To the same point, what in recent conflicts has created a need to "tailor" formations to something other than their existing structures and purposes? If that were true, we would only have 1 type of infantry formation, instead of 5. We have the ability to tailor our formation down to the tactical and operational levels, by virtue of deploying to appropriate type of BCT/infantry formation. The problem comes when we do exactly that, but it's manned by individuals with no experience in that area.
Learning to operate across the spectrum of infantry operations in heavy, light, and motorized/Stryker units isn't broadening, it's learning your branch. We didn't create a need; rather in the mid-90's we recognized that splitting the MOS between heavy and light had created a situation where the heavy side of the equation had seen an unacceptable degradation of basic infantry skills. The belief of the previous 20 years that mech infantry could just rely on massive armored close in fire support from tanks/IFVs to get the job done was found wanting,
Why does one need to understand the branch as whole rather than be a true subject-matter expert in one part of it? Given the brigade centric model, soldiers could fight and lead at all levels up to brigade command before needing to leave and go to a different type of formation. And those leaders that reach that level don't need to have experience in those other areas to successfully employ them, they need competent subordinate leaders who can provide quality solutions and recommendations. We don't expect soldiers to understand the Army branch as a whole, we have specialists and sub-specialists fill each important role. The broad mission of the infantry breach is similar.
As for the degradation of infantry skills sets, I wiuld argue that's because the mechanized infantryman was judged against the light infantryman standard. There are many references from that time period leading up to the MOS consolidation thst discussed how not enough 11M were airborne, ranger etc qualified. While those skillsets would be especially useful in the light, airborne, air assault, and Ranger communities, why not instead have the mechanized communities focus on their own skills sets and training. The Army didn't get rid of the mechanized infantry force it still recognized the need for that capability. It just reassigned its duties to a different MOS. The mechanized infantryman didn't go away.
Learning across spectrum is a theory, unfortunately the equipment we use and continue to upgrade are specialized gear that takes time to master. And while CTC rotations are great places to hone skills and evaluate the larger echelons MET; time and time again OCT consistently see a degradation of individual skills. Breaking up the branches facilitates this. It doesn't fix it completely, but combined with the new branch design of choosing leadership (eventually) you will have narrowing of this effect.
Again, only part of the fix. Additional all of this is the "Up or Out" system. Not all Service Members are designed to be leaders. And just because you aren't a good at leadership capacity, doesn't mean you aren't a technical expert at a weapon system, vehicle platform, or other job proficiency. Something the Navy understands, but the Army doesn't.
You should still have cross spectrum training. It needs to measured approaches of how to develop NCO leadership. Officers have been and will always need mentorship from experts. But how do you get and expert if he is moved every six years or less.
Not down play the formation's adaptability, but are currently talking about the Infantry. An MOS series with the lowest score requirements from the ASFAB. I'm Not saying they are dumb (there are some intellectual extremes in all branches) but as the recruitment and retention missions keep missing goals, the force might need some stabilization.
My company has just come off rotations to JRTC and NTC as a newly converted Mech infantry unit. I would say a good 75% of the soldiers had never heard or seen a Bradley before the conversion and even through two CTC rotations we have yet to become SMEs on any portion of the Bradley’s. More importantly, these soldiers will come to the formation, become a Bradley driver, hate their experience and get out within their first contract because that’s not “what they signed up for” or they want to do actual “infantry shit”. I think the rate for infantry across the board in the division is extremely low due to similar reasonings.
Having mechanized warriors who have been mech through the surge in Iraq etc greatly increased the lethality of these units. I wouldn’t confuse the lack of competent mech infantry with the lack of employment or inability to employ them in our current battlefields. That being said, I think putting leaders in different formations allows the leadership challenge and tactical challenge to those coming to the units. It will enhance their knowledge in the long run of their army careers, if they should choose to stay in after being mech.
Could not disagree more. I started my career as a light (airborne) platoon leader. I did well. I was fortunate enough to become a Ranger platoon leader. I did well…probably not "you'll command a Ranger company" well, but well. Then came my mech rotation, and I absolutely sucked. I sucked because I couldn't maneuver BFVs nor employ TOWs or 25mms effectively. If we dismounted early, we were torn apart by BMPs and BRDMs on the approach march, and if we dismounted on the objective…well, we never got that far, because see above. If a had that right balance of grunt and DAT DNA, I'm sure I would have been a fine mech guy. My DNA was light infantry, and the Heavy-Light imperative ended what I think could have been a solid career. I think CPT Head is spot-on. There's a reason centers and running backs and wide receivers are not QBs…
If anyone was in the INFANTRY in 1995 & was a 11C you know every system, weapon, etc….. anyone ever get their EIB & CIB ?…. you have to know all weapons.
I was tasked to work the M60, SAW, grenade launcher, Stinger missile, Javelin systems. 101st Airborne Infantry Veteran.
IF you want to live on the battle fields, know all the weapons.
Stinger? That's ADA, not 11 Series.
I was in the 75th, started as an 11B then moved to 11C and eventually cross trained in 11M, 11H and even did time in the 16 series (by the way tankers don't want to be 11s) and then eventually 18B…
James is correct, we also had training in all the versions of stingers.. if it flies it dies..
The stinger missile system at one point was part of the infantry skill set. I had relatives that were in the infantry and had to know how to use them. They later became part of Air Defense Artillery. Manpads was a shared platform between infantry and ADA.
I did 6 as an 11c we are the work horses of the infantry we learn all weapons and formations including cab. Cause we are assigned to all units and types. We seem to have no problem going light or mech maybe the 11bs need to take a lesson and quit looking at it as separate jobs and start looking at it as one big picture job and quit letting leader ship hide behind "I don't know" and make West point do more than turn out coffee punks
Were you a 2/187 Rakkasan Raider?
That's is a very good point. I am an elisted man in the Spanish army, currently in the IMZ (mechanized infantry) specialty, but i wish to move on to more quick action units such as the BriPac; however, due to the regulation active as of writing this comment I am told this is not possible unless I either leave and enlist from scratch or go throught NCO school, but the time requirements don't really make it worth it. Sepcialization shouldn't come at the cost of limiting adaptability of a soldier, or his career oportunities.
I see your point but totally disagree, also there are a lot more bases than just those four world wide ,& not everyone spends 20yrs do they ? But honestly if we could of stayed at one base for 5-10yrs it would make it easier on families as I hated having to go to a new school every 1-3 yrs as a kid …so if I’d gotten married I sure wouldn’t want to drag my kids all over ,although I did enjoy being on the bases growing up..
Being I was 11H (4gen military) plus went through mountain school airborne etc etc….back before they combined the the four specialized units 11B was basically the main foot soldier in the unit , but we still were all mixed in the units , as 11B got to ride in the Back 11H either drove ,or fired the tow ..
Learning to fire a tow missile isn’t easy and it takes some skill, even with some training back then very few guys were able to fire follow and hit the targets..
There is a old saying about jack of all trades , the military since it’s inception has always had specialized units and it seemed to work, my son was 5th generation military,& even he has said that the training is poor in the way they do it and many guys do not know what they are doing or they spend most of their time relearning instead of being highly skillled ..I get the idea that if one guy falls then there’s always meant to be someone who can pickup where he left off..
And that’s great but as you said Nco’s and officers (most of them) are smart enough and trained to the point they can do the job, but if that’s the case then it shouldn’t be a issue then if they are commanding a unit that’s trained and highly skilled in one job while being able to follow orders and work together with other units to get the task done…
It’s the reason other branches also have specialized units instead of everyone doing the same thing..
Although when I was in (80’s-90’s) we didn’t have any issues doing our job, it worked fine in the gulf..
It just makes more sense to be good at one job than to try to be jack of all trades …there are plenty of guys who can be JACK & be great at it but you know as well as I do there are a lot of guys that really can’t handle doing more than one task, so why not utilize everyone to their best ability ,also it simply takes more funds to cross train everyone never mind the additional time..
My first squad leader in the Army was a reclass from 11H. He had some insights into the broadening of the 11 series skillset and said a lot of the same criticisms cited here. Furthermore, his opinions were not in the minority. He was however NOT and Army officer nor in a position to argue the change. My point is maybe a focus towards gathering feedback from the war fighters most effected (i.e. those doing the job vs. those just administering the job…) would make for better high level decision making and avoid some of the "experiments" that failed during the GWOT that will undoubtedly be reexamined in the next global conflict.
I do not disagree that adequate trading on weapons platforms are likely insufficient for reassignment from light to heavy to light before a CTC, but what every leader should be asking in each formation type is how do my skills translate into the weaknesses of my new assignment?
I have grew up in the 75th before having a few stints in other light (including the 82nd) formations, and ending up in a heavy infantry formation. My biggest butt chewing came from executing table XII and not keeping the vehicle in a SBF position.
But why would I let dismounts advance on a known machine gun position without the armor the vehicle provided them? I deviated from a canned table and used this technique throughout multiple deployments with great effect as I became knowledgeable of weapon system capabilities, not ineffective roles of infantrymen that sends them to the slaughter. The entire series is complex, but bringing your weapon system employment knowledge of carbines to medium MGs, to heavy MGs, to weapons platforms is what we are supposed to be doing. Not creating a superficial specialized career path that makes an 11H, 11M, or 11B ineffective in performing duties across the basic soldier tasks.
I have viewed the effective utilization of BFVs as means of transport (airborne quote) the introduction of an effective weapons squad for dismounted operations in a mechanized unit, and the need for armored protection for effective assault on objectives by drawing MG and RPG fire from the assaulting formation during war. None of these prohibited me as a leader from being effective and decisively engaged during combat operations. Table VIII, XII, NTC, JOTC, and JRTC? Yes, I sucked as a leader in various formations. In combat I have a pretty good record, where lives really matter.
To be clear, it’s because of all of those failures I was effective in combat, by you trainers showing me my weaknesses and reinforcing the importance of accountability throughout my formation.
Particularly agree that the ideal of creating Army officers capable of leading different formation types is unachievable. CO's assigned to units outside their specialty / expertise too often focus on what they think they know or assume they ought to control, while avoiding what they need to learn. Junior officers are being frustrated, even to the point of giving up careers, due to CO's obviously out-fo-their-depth but unwilling to grow or change or God-forbid admit limitations.
My recent 19M article in Armor Magazine has a similar theme to bring back the old Bradley 11M MOS, except under Armor branch management as MOS 19M. Win-Win for both Infantry and Armor branches, in my opinion.
"A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyse a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects."
Robert Heinlein
To give an outside perspective as an engineer officer the idea of only having to understand the nuances between light, mechanized, and heavy would be a dream. I've seen 12As in infantry, armor and logistic slots nevermind the jump in knowledge between combat engineering, rte clearance, horizontal engineering, vertical engineering, bridging, geospatial, prime power, firefighting, diving, and survey/design. This is in addition bouncing between ibct, sbct, abct, eabs and working with civilians with the corps of engineers for civil works and disaster relief. I will caveat this as it is somewhat comparing apples to oranges as engineer officers are deliberately trained as Jack of all trades with minimal specialization. From my minimal perspective our operating environments in general are becoming more complex and diverse requiring a broader understanding and more flexibility. In my opinion our cornerstone manuever units will have to reflect this diversity in some fashion. With some exceptions for very technical positions, our formations and MOSs will become more generalized moving forward not more specialized.
How about mapping out career path for infantrymen, then put him through infantry school where he learns the ropes in all infantry formation types then finally graduates to airborne, light, mechanized and what have you. This way, you can have qualified people ready to be deployed in any infantry formation type with a minimum of retraining tailored to requirements as required over 3 days or a week at most.
Are we thinking too big? Loathe though I am to suggest it, perhaps we should look at how the Marines do it?
Ya'll are larger so the argument isn't the same, but we can always learn and adapt from each other, hence we read stuff you write like this. Our infantry isn't specialized at the officer level but is among the enlisted. (0311 infantry, 0331 machine gunner, 0341 mortarman, 0313 LAV Crewman) that, upon graduating the course and being promoted to SSgt (E-6) become one MOS, 0369.) Officers are 0302. Armor is specific MOS for Tanks and AAVs for officer and enlisted alike but becomes common at higher ranks. That said, we task-organize much differently and also we have to cut units up to operate at smaller combined units like our MEU that lacks a similar comparison at the same level… I think the nearest comparison is the BCT or ACR units and those are comparatively huge (as they should be given the scale of things you have to accomplish).
One possible issue that wasn't addressed is how the Army dealt with large attrition rates in a World War. We can all agree there are several MOS's/specialties out there in the army. Shoot, I probably don't even know half of them.
If we revert back to having light/heavy/mech infantrymen and a large scale war occurs, large attrition rates come with it. Which is more feasible? Training fresh soldiers/leaders to fill those spots? Or relocating/moving personnel from other units to cover down? How do we prepare them to be as lethal without spending months to train them up?
Thus why I believe broadening the skills of our leaders is a way to mitigate that threat. I do agree that it can be frustrating to spend several years mastering your craft as a light infantrymen, to all of a sudden be thrown into a Bradley and become an expert on it. But if all hell broke loose and that person gets sent to a place where he will be a BC for that Bradley, I'm sure he will be thankful for that time he spent on the platform prior.
You bring up some valid points, but I wonder what your response is to the need for some breadth of experience especially for officers as they progress through the ranks. Brigade- and division-and-above officers, staff and commanders, need some variety to their experience so they don't end up slave to stove-piped thinking. Also, the most senior commanders and staff have a variety of formations in their charge, they need to know how to use each effectively.
Perhaps we start moving around senior company grade officers to other types of organizations?
A middle road, maybe?
A bit of historical perspective: the Mech/Light imperative didn’t come about in 2000. It was alive and well as early as the late-80’s. It had it’s plusses and minuses. I was light my first tour and am glade I learned my craft as a PL that way. The learning curve was steep in my mech tour, but I learned a lot that helped me later in my field grade years when I was back in light units, but had to pay a lot more attention to logistics and maintenance. My Bradley company’s dismounted skills were marginal, though; the training focus from above was on gunnery. All of the field grades and Bn/Bde commanders had grown up Mech in Germany in the 70’s and early 80’s and that was the focus there, so dismounted skills had atrophied. Then I went to JRTC in the Mid 90’s as one of the few Armor/Mech O/C’s and saw the ones from that same generation of field grades and commanders who had managed to stay light Infantry their entire careers absolutely befuddled over what to do with the attached Heavy company-team during the rotation. It wasn’t unusual to see them, for lack of any better idea, split the company-team up, assigning a platoon to each battalion, who in turn split the platoons up, assigning one vehicle to each company as an “assault gun.” Clearly these guys had not read JFC Fuller or BH Liddle Hart!
Now if you want to go back even further, my 11H Anti-Tank PSG in 1988 was an old soldier, Vietnam vet who started life as an 11D, Infantry Scout. That MOS got rolled into 11H when the TOW came out. I am told that at one time there was also an 11F battle staff NCO MOS; a lateral shift from 11B for NCOs who became full time TOC rats. Now THAT’s specialization!
I can make arguments to go either way. I think a lot if the specialization came about when the Army was 785,000 plus and flush with cash; we could afford to do it. As we shrank, it became much harder to manage. My only beef with the officer part was that I saw too many guys, typically those who started light, able to pull strings and dodge their Mech tours. They were never penalized for it in any way, career-wise.
As a logistics officer we run into the same issues. I was base branch Transportation and spent two and half years filling ordnance officer slots in both an ammunition company and ammunition staff section. I discovered that the principles of success, however, had little to do with technical knowledge and more about personnel management. Conducting Table 6 live fire exercises with low density MOS logistics Soldiers used to sitting in warehouses and supply points required creativity, patience, unorthodox interpretations of Army regulations and lots of crawl training, but we did it. The Army training models expects that technical expertise can be trained in about 3 months. The principles of effective leadership requires years of experience. I currently have medivac pilots as BN CDR and XO in my logistics unit. They have barely any idea of how logistics actually happens but are successful none the less.
I tend to agree with the central premise that specialization increases competence and lethality. My personal experiences validate some of this, but simply bringing back the "11M" MOS, and perhaps keeping officers on a single track will not in and of itself fix all the problems inherent with the old career models.
The problem that mech infantry units consistently ran into was a shortage of Soldiers (a problem that is ubiquitous in the entire Army), but the rifle squads ended up being the bill-payers to keep the tracks crewed. Moreover, units tended to put their best Soldiers and leaders on the track crews, and the leftovers were "dismounts." This often led to platoons with only one ill-trained squad in it, with four fully-crewed Bradley Fighting Vehicles. Mech infantry units quickly became "light tank" companies and battalions that just happened to have a handful infantry as well. The old Unit Status Report was partially to blame, and defining a trained track crew was much clearer than defining what a trained rifle or sapper squad was. You had to keep those numbers up after all.
I do agree that we should bring back the "11M" and the "11H," and then I'd go one step further and remove the requirement for officers to flip-flop between light and vehicular assignments as a standard policy. You'll necessarily have to have some officers move back and forth due to the numbers and types of available assignments, but it doesn't have to be a requirement. After all, there were plenty of officers (me included) that slipped through the cracks and stayed strictly light or heavy. Having said all that I do not advocate managing the enlisted Soldiers in the heavy world the way it was done in the past. The Army moved away from the "11M" deliberately because it was a dysfunctional system–and then traded it for something equally as bad.
If we could figure out how to bring back "Mechanized Infantry" formations without sacrificing the "Infantry," then I think we'd be moving in the right direction. But simply bringing back the old system in and of itself will not be an improvement.
Your second paragraph is so spot on. Having to crew 14 tracks in the company meant that at best each platoon had a understrength squad of dismounts. In addition the vast majority of the 42 soldiers who were crew rarely ever conducted standard infantry tasks.
My battalion saw a serious lack of re-enlistment when we transitioned from M113s to M2's, (11B to 11M). The last couple Vietnam vets we had, and many of the older E-6 & E-7s simply wanted nothing to do with living in a turret and operating Bushmasters and TOWs. If they were lucky they finagled being a dismount, if not, most got out unless they were close to their 20.
With that said, I think getting rid of 11M was a mistake, yes we became light tankers essentially, but we were very good at operating those Bradleys, something that took a few years to become highly proficient at. Dismounts would come and go, but crews stayed together for years, with gunners becoming commanders, and drivers becoming gunners. You can't beat crewing a track with the same guys for multiple years.
Speaking as a grunt who did time in Iraq and Afghanistan in both light and mech units, I’ll say this:
I learned a lot regarding MOUT and overall fieldcraft from NCOs who came over from the light side to the mech side. I also learned that Bradley’s can be a kick ass place to nap from the old mech hands, but you’ll just live in the motor pool. The light infantry NCOs taught me how to be strong on the ground. I honestly felt more confident once the ramp dropped than while I was in the Bradley, not that I didn’t 100% appreciate that Bushmaster.
In the 25th, I learned what it meant to be a “light fighter”, the best the world had ever seen. I also watched new privates learn how to operate TOW systems from specialists because in the entire platoon, only one NCO knew how the system actually worked. I had never learned it, much less seen it up until that point, so I had some joe telling me what was what. I’m just glad we didn’t have to face actual tanks.
A dedicated mech, Stryker and anti-armor course for new soldiers would be the best route. All in all, besides being airborne qualified the regular infantrymen is a leg. He either rides in vehicle or he walks, but the battle drills remain the same. Why we aren’t implementing advanced training into OSUT for mech and anti-armor is absolutely foolish.
Hint, We are preparing for war with Russia and China. This is why they are going back to some old Soviet tactical standard operating procedures. They decided to keep the Bradley and A10 tank killers , they have improved on artillery and speed for old outdated track vehicles for wheeled APC's. No need for heavy armor in Iraq or Afghanistan. Keep a look out on the NDAA and Army expenditures it's a good way to know which theater we preparing for next.
I remember the changes taking place and although I agree, in part. The light infantry has seldom been truly light. The light Infantry has motorized companies in each battalion to begin with. Beyond that we very seldom spend all our time on foot anyway. War after war this has been the case. I fought in Panama and we(airborne infantry) were mobile by means of landing craft taking us up and down rivers, which at the time were more like roads. The next war was a few months later and again we were motorized even when it took getting trucks from allied armies to augment our transportation requirements. In the more recent wars (mountain trooper this time) we drew theater provided equipment and bang-o we are motorized again. So, light units mostly aren't and every war ( the seven I been in so far) we seem end up motorized anyway. I spent some wars an officer and some an NCO, some parachuting in and others just walking off the plane, but always back in a vehicle to get to the fighting. Let's remain flexible and increase our crossover training, because it's how we end up fighting anyway. Especially with BCTs of varied types working together let's all know how to work with everyone. #retiredranger
I've never liked the way they took the 11M and 11H MOS's and consolidated them into 11B. The truth of the matter is that EVERY infantryman should be initially TRAINED to perform 11B duties. It would require a complete overhaul of OSUT where an indoctrination program (a tougher course that also also expands the training) is developed to take basic training graduates and make them into infantryman prior to MOS specific training like 11M and 11H for select personnel. You would already have 11B qualified personnel, except their MOS would be 11M or 11H with the expectation that they would develop in that career field for years given the fact that mech infantry and anti-armor will always be needed. If they choose to serve in light infantry, it should be a simple reclass since it should be a requirement in mech infantry and anti-armor formations that they dedicate a block of unit training on light infantry tasks at least twice a year to maintain those skills. There was no real need to consolidate the MOS's in my opinion. There only needed to be changes to OSUT and a new program that creates professional infantryman with additional skills (air assault training/no sling load, airborne operations classroom instruction, and reconnaissance operations) prior to assignment to their units or MOS specific schools.
This article was clearly written by someone that hasn't been in every position as a infantryman. I been light, Bradley , and Stryker. As long as a infantryman is proficient in light infantry tactics which osut is a big part of that all the other stuff is easily learned. Vehicles and equipment break down those leather troop carriers do not. I was a subject matter expert in every role I was assigned. It's called commitment and professionalism. Maybe people should just let the army do what it does and just get inline
As a light Infantry officer from early 80s to later, learning everything was impossible for heavy and light
My first observation is that the MOS a soldier holds and the unit he serves in has nothing to do with lethality. Lethality, by my way of thinking is two fold; first have good weapons with proficient operators/crews. Second, is logistics (maintenance/repair and resupply). If either component does not work lethality drops off! Second observation; proficiency equals training. The luxury of not having to cross-level personnel to keep key weapon systems/equipment manned was never a "thing" in training or combat. Cross training soldiers on all weapons in the company is a requirement not an option or nice to do! Third observation; the Infantry needs specialized MOSs for all the reasons cited in previous comments. Additionally, for instance if a dismount squad member is selected of volunteers to be a M2 crewman then he should attend a two or three week course. The same is true for 11H. Finally, The Army needs to close down the Directorate of Dumb-ass concepts at Fort Benning!
Tactics and lethality combat will always have theories. We have the weapons and we have good 1SG and COs to lead at company level and also at higher level. Most units I've seen have good enough training to compete in combat but this is the old days. Today in these years 2020 I believe we will get our asses kick with addition to females joining. Infantry basic training is not as tough anymore. Drill sergeants can't cuss or put hands on like the old days. Drill sergeants can't talk about killing to the recruits which help with mentality later on in the unit. Someone might get offended. We can talk about higher tactics on brigade level and division level. But without Joe's to keep up the pace with orders our units are going to lose and get wiped out. We need to work on the Joe's first and what soldier we can build that can withstand the tortures physically and mentally of war. Not every person can be built for it.
As an Infantry Leader from a now older generation I feel strongly that the Infantry skills required on yesterday’s battlefields are nearly the same as today’s.
The terrain, weather and enemy capability still dictates tactics. Recognition of the Mission, your Soldiers and then your actions still demand great attention to skills. In summary walking point, manning an OP/ LP, conducting hasty ambushes, effective employment of weapons, planning for fire support, etc. A trained feet on the ground Infantryman from PFC to O5 will Stand His Ground with confidence of those to his left and right!
As a final thought: The Infantryman (11B / 11A) is a unique skill set built around survival and mission, diluting those on the ground skills will reduce survival.
The Army is not known for original thought. Here we are returning to what worked well 30 to 40 years ago. So don't get me started about modularity or Multi-domain BS! In the 70's 80's and 90's MOSs were specialized (11M came about with the fielding of the M2 with the specialized gunnery requirements. Infantry Officers studied light and mechanized tactics to include mortars and TOW gunnery. With the onset of GWOT and the nature of guerrilla/insurgent warfare coupled with the terrain and annual rotations of Brigades and Divisions. The Personnel goobs decided that 11B, 11M and 11H no difference IOT fill the realigned BCT models (Mech or Light). Now that GWOT isn't fun anymore the DoD is returning focus to our traditional rivals. The Russians and Chicoms never changed their doctrine or agonized over being "More Expeditionary". They keep the same formations and outfitted them with more lethal firepower! What does the US Army have to show for 18+ years of combat? COIN and the STRYKER! So now nearly a generation of soldiers has lost skills learned at the NTC, mounted fire and maneuver, offensive and defensive tactics. It is no wonder that company grade and junior field grade officers are puzzled with potential warfare with Russians or Chicoms! In my own experience I started out in the Armored Cavalry (The real Armored Cavalry not the current watered down version). Then I served in an M1 equipped Armor BN. My gunnery was excellent, but my maneuver tended to be more cautious not taking full advantage of the M1 speed and armor, but I kicked ass as the HHC commander, because I had developed a broad skill set of tactics and supported operations! Never the less I fared well enough to get promoted. I believe the junior enlisted need to be specialized up to mid-grade E6, and then BPT lead in both formations. Officers should be capable of leading in both formations. The army is too small for leaders to only be light or mech. Hell's Guard!
Coming from the perspective of an old timer 11m enlisted, 11m could go to light units no problem. We trained to be 11b then did 3 weeks of mike school. But sending light to heavy is where the real problem would be. But even in the old mechanized units of the Cold War the 3 weeks did not make you proficient with the Bradley. Most of our officers were ranger qualified. And most were airborne, air assault or both. And we had a good number of NCOs that were getting tabs. I’ve been out for a long time and had no idea they switched it up until I did a google search on my old MOD and read this article. But really the Bradley was built to fight that war on the Fulda Gap that never happened.
As someone who held that garbage mos, I really hope the Army does not bring it back. As I was told the mos was ideally suited to mechanized operations. Old habits die hard, if the Army operates the Tow companies the way they did in the past it will really be lousy for the enlisted soldiers. As a member of a mech unit we were looked down upon, treated as second class soldiers. Serving in legland was the worst, absolutely no opportunities to attend any schools like airborne, ranger, sniper, air assault what have you to name a few. Never mind ever getting a chance to serve in another type of infantry unit. Training was rarely ever conducted, if you were not doing some menial , mindless , bullshit detail then you were in the motorpool for endless vehicle lay outs and track maintenance and yes our basic infantry skills were severely lacking, weak at best. The only soldiers doing any regular training were the ones in the Army,s pet units, ranger regt, 82nd, 101st, and special forces. To me any soldier holding an 11 series mos should get the chance to attend the schools, not just 11a, or having to reenlist for one lousy school. 11h is dead bringing it back will only make the good soldiers ets as soon as they possible can. Forget about retention if the soldiers coming out of ait get stuck going into leg hell. 11hotel 9th Infantry Division .