In the blurred spaces between peace and war, a contest over influence plays out. But how is the contest won? What are the components of an effective strategy in this gray zone? What role do irregular warfare campaigns play? And how do strong alliances enable these campaigns?
This episode of the Irregular Warfare Podcast explores these questions and more, specifically looking at the competition for influence in the Indo-Pacific region, where observers can see the broad contours of China’s gray zone strategy. In competition with this strategy are the activities of a network of actors, a centerpiece of which is the strong alliance between the United States and Australia.
The episode features a discussion with two guests. Clementine Starling is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program and the author of a 2021 strategy paper, “Seizing the Advantage: A Vision for the Next US National Defense Strategy,” which forms the basis of the conversation. And David Van is a member of the Australian Senate, where he has worked extensively on foreign affairs and defense issues and where he serves as the deputy chair of the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs and as a member of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade.
You can hear the full episode, hosted by Adam Darnley-Stuart and Julia McClenon, below. And be sure to subscribe to the Irregular Warfare Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app so you don’t miss an episode!
Image credit: Spc. Christopher Wilkins, US Army
If the reason why such diverse entities as China, Russia, Iran, N. Korea, the Islamists, etc. — and even conservative/traditionalists here at home in the U.S./the West — now fight back against the governments of the U.S./the West (etc.) today — using irregular, hybrid (etc.) warfare — if the reason for this is that:
a. The "achieve revolutionary change both at home and abroad" (more along political, economic, social and value lines more compatible with markets and democracy) political objective of the governments of the U.S./the West, etc., if these
b. Now gravely threaten the status quo power, influence and control of ALL of the diverse entities that I list above,
Then, from that such perspective, how does the U.S./the West (etc.) — using irregular, hybrid (etc.) warfare today:
a. Achieve its such "achieve revolutionary change both at home and abroad" political objective; this, in spite of:
b. ALL the diverse entities that I describe above using irregular, hybrid (etc.) warfare to prevent, contain and/or to reverse these such "achieve revolutionary change" initiatives?
(Thus, as to importance of allies, to consider this from perspective of the common "resistance to transformation" cause of Russia, China, Iran, N. Korea, the Islamists, etc., above?)
Let's consider that:
a. A reason why the U.S./the West might have used such things as irregular and hybrid warfare against the Soviets/the communists back in the Old Cold War of yesterday; let's consider that this may be the same as/may be similar to:
b. The reason why China and Russia (etc.) now use hybrid warfare against the U.S./the West in the New/Reverse Cold War of today.
First, re: the U.S./the West such use of irregular and hybrid warfare in the Old Cold War of yesterday, let's consider the following from the War on the Rocks article "America Did Hybrid Warfare Too:"
"The purpose of all this? Defending America from hostile foreign interference … "
"Employed as part of a broader strategy, what hybrid warfare did was allow the United States to carry out open-ended competition and signal certain confidence that the value of protecting the U.S. sphere of interest was greater than any opponent’s interest in upsetting it."
Next, let's consider the possibly similar/exact same reason why China and Russia might be using irregular and hybrid warfare against the U.S./the West in the New/Reverse Cold War of today:
The purpose of all this? Defending China and Russia from hostile foreign interference.
Employed as part of a broader strategy, what hybrid warfare does is allow China and Russia to carry out open-ended competition and signal certain confidence that the value of protecting their spheres of interests, this is greater than any opponent's interest in upsetting it.
(In this regard, the entire War on the Rocks article "America Did Hybrid Warfare Too" is, I believe, worth reading.)
If my explanations above are correct — as to why China and Russia (and others) might be using such things as irregular and hybrid warfare against the U.S./the West today —
(To wit: so as to defend China, Russia, etc., from foreign U.S./Western, etc. interference and, as part of a broader strategy [think "containment" and/or "roll back"], to carry out an open-ended competition, and signal a certain confidence, that the value of protecting their [China, Russia, etc.'s] spheres of interest, this is greater than any opponent's [for example, the U.S./the West's] interest in upsetting same.)
Then, from that exact such perspective, what would the "offensive" hybrid warfare efforts of the U.S./the West need to look like, for example, as addressed by the following "bullet" excerpt from the introduction to the “Seizing the Advantage: A Vision for the Next US National Defense Strategy” paper referenced at our podcast above?
" * The DoD needs to compete now and engage in offensive hybrid conflict actions. The United States must respond where competition with China and Russia is taking place today, primarily by playing an enhanced role in gray-zone competition. Accordingly, the Pentagon must embrace the paradigm of competition as a continuum from cooperation through competition to armed conflict. But embracing the continuum is not enough; the DoD, working with interagency partners where appropriate, must defend more aggressively and take offensive actions in the gray zone, consistent with American values. Seizing the Advantage articulates the concept of a competition continuum and advances recommendations for the DoD to shape the information environment and compete in cyberspace."
Note:
From the perspective that I provide above (the U.S./the West seeking to transform Russia and China more along modern western political, economic, social and value lines; Russia and China, for their part and thus threatened, seeking to "contain" and/or to "roll back" the U.S./the West's such "transformative" efforts.); from that such perspective, our "offensive" irregular and hybrid warfare efforts would seem to need to be crafted so as to:
a. Overcome Russia and China's "containment" and "roll back" strategies and
b. Their — related — irregular and hybrid warfare efforts designed to help achieve same.
(This allowing that the U.S./the West might — in spite of these such "containment" and "roll back" efforts by Russia and China — transform Russia and China more along modern western political, economic, social and value lines anyway.)