Episode 7, Season 1 of the Social Science of War podcast is the first in a two-part series that examines land warfare in Europe, with a focus on the lessons learned from Russia’s war in Ukraine.
The second part in this series will examine tactical and operational lessons from the war, and what they can teach us about large-scale combat operations. Today’s conversation takes a broader view by focusing on the strategic and political dynamics of the NATO alliance. Topics discussed include how the United States and its NATO allies would fight together in a great power war, the concept and practice of burden sharing between NATO allies, and lessons learned about working through coalitions from the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine.
Dr. Benedetta Berti has served as the head of policy planning in the office of the secretary general at NATO for nearly six years. Dr. Berti’s research focuses on foreign policy and security, and she has published widely, to include four books. She previously served as a nonresident fellow at the Modern War Institute at West Point, and she is currently an Eisenhower global fellow and a TED senior fellow.
Lieutenant Colonel Jordan Becker currently serves as an assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. As an Army officer he has served as the US joint staff liaison officer to the French joint staff and held positions at NATO headquarters and the US mission to NATO. As a scholar he has authored multiple publications on transatlantic burden sharing and the political economy of European security. He is also currently a research fellow at the Brussels School of Governance. He was previously a research fellow at the Ecole Militaire and Sciences Po in Paris.
The Social Science of War podcast is produced by the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. Visit our website if you would like to be a student or teach in the Department, or if you would like to connect with any of our instructors based on their expertise.
Kyle Atwell created and is the host of the Social Science of War. Please reach out to Kyle with any questions about this episode or the Science of War podcast in general.
Image credit: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Consider these matters from the perspective of a New/Reverse Cold War; thus, from the perspective of:
a. The U.S./the West, and our allies and partners, post-the Old Cold War, seeking to achieve "revolutionary change" both at home and abroad — this, in the name of such things as capitalism, globalization and the global economy. And:
b. Such diverse entities as Russia, China, Iran, N. Korea, the Islamists — and even conservatives/traditionalists here at home in the U.S./the West — their power, influence and control thus commonly threatened by these such "revolutionary changes" — adopting containment and roll back strategies to prevent/to reverse same.
Example: In this case of the U.S./the West, post-the Old Cold War, seeking to achieve "revolutionary change" abroad; this, in the name of such things as capitalism, globalization and the global economy:
"Since the 1990s the focus of American international security policy has been focused on creating conditions for extending zones of security and prosperity to other states under the theory that ‘political as well as economic globalization would make the world safer — and more profitable — for the United States.’ Consequently, the United States saw expansion, rather than retraction, of American military presence around the world.” (See the bottom of Page 2 of the Introduction chapter of the 2016 edition of the book “Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the US Military” by U.S. Naval War College Professor Derek S. Reveron.)]
Conclusion:
Thus, such things as "land warfare" (in Europe" and/or elsewhere), "the politics of coalition warfare" (in Europe and/or elsewhere) and such things as conventional warfare, unconventional warfare, irregular warfare, political warfare, large-scale combat operations, small-scale combat operations, burden sharing, etc., etc., etc. — ALL OF THESE to best be understood from the perspective of this New/Reverse Cold War.
(This, whether these such matters [exs: conventional warfare, unconventional warfare, land warfare, coalition warfare, etc., etc., etc.] are:
a. Being utilized by us to achieve our "achieve revolutionary change both at home and abroad" political objective. And/or are:
b. Being utilized by our opponents [exs: Russia, China, Iran, N. Korea, the Islamists — and even conservatives/traditionalists here at home in the U.S./the West] — to prevent these such revolutionary changes from being realized.)
Note that, from the point of view that I provide above, such things as "burden sharing," this must be understood from the perspective of the "burden" that comes when states and societies (exs: the Soviets/the communists and their partners and allies in the Old Cold War of yesterday, and/or the U.S./the West and its partners and allies in the New/Reverse Cold War of today)
a. Seek to achieve "revolutionary change" both at home and abroad and, thereby,
b. Run headlong into states and societies (and/or the regimes controlling same) — and/or individuals and groups (and even within their own countries) — who (1) depend upon the status quo (or the status quo anti if too much unwanted change has already taken place) for their power, influence, control, status, safety, security, etc., and who will, accordingly, (2) stand hard to defend (and/or to restore) same.
Herein, to note that these such "defend the status quo" (and/or "restore the status quo anti") folks — given the existential threat that they face at the hands of the "achieve revolutionary change both at home and abroad" folks — will, quite understandably, often use whatever means are available to them, for example, nuclear warfare, conventional warfare, unconventional warfare, irregular warfare, political warfare, large-scale combat operations, small-scale combat operations, propaganda, cyber, nationalism, culture, "traditional values", etc., etc., etc. — and, indeed — both fair means and foul.
THIS, I suggest, is the proper understanding of the "burden" that the U.S./the West and its partners and allies "share;" this, re: their "achieve revolutionary change both at home and abroad" political objective in the New/Reverse Cold War of today.
(Much as THIS was the "burden" that the Soviets/the communists and their partners and allies "shared", re: their "achieve revolutionary change both at home and abroad" political objective in the Old Cold War of yesterday.)
A special circumstance — a special "burden" — that "achieve revolutionary change both at home and abroad" coalitions take on, this is the special circumstance/the special "burden" of:
a. Alienated powerful individuals and groups (for example, the threatened conservatives/the threatened traditionalists in one's own country and elsewhere); these folks:
b. Finding common cause with — and/or being courted and recruited by — one's conservative/traditionalist-spouting great power enemies.
The potential for an extremely huge, world-wide, powerful and even "in your own house" "fifth column," thus, to be a likely "burden" that the "achieve revolutionary change both at home and abroad" coalition — due to their such political objective — will have to contend with?
Examples, in the New/Reverse Cold War of today:
"Liberal democratic societies have, in the past few decades, undergone a series of revolutionary changes in their social and political life, which are not to the taste of all their citizens. For many of those, who might be called social conservatives, Russia has become a more agreeable society, at least in principle, than those they live in. Communist Westerners used to speak of the Soviet Union as the pioneer society of a brighter future for all. Now, the rightwing nationalists of Europe and North America admire Russia and its leader for cleaving to the past."
(See "The American Interest" article "The Reality of Russian Soft Power" by John Lloyd and Daria Litinova.)
“Compounding it all, Russia’s dictator has achieved all of this while creating sympathy in elements of the Right that mirrors the sympathy the Soviet Union achieved in elements of the Left. In other words, Putin is expanding Russian power and influence while mounting a cultural critique that resonates with some American audiences, casting himself as a defender of Christian civilization against Islam and the godless, decadent West.”
(See the “National Review” item entitled: “How Russia Wins” by David French.)
Thus, a very special and unique circumstance — and a very special and unique "burden" — that coalitions seeking to "achieve revolutionary change both at home and abroad" must bear — and must "share?"