Most people know something about the most famous amphibious operations in military history—the D-Day landings in Normandy during World War II, for example, or Gallipoli during World War I. But what about an amphibious night attack on the shores of Tuscany in 1555? Or a Turkish amphibious assault in response to a coup in Cyprus in 1974?
A new book, On Contested Shores: The Evolving Role of Amphibious Operations in the History of Warfare, examines these and a wide array of other amphibious operations spanning more than four centuries of conflict. It also pairs these historical case studies with an examination, over the course of several chapters, of the role of amphibious operations in future conflict scenarios. In this episode of the MWI Podcast, one of the books co-editors, Tim Heck, joins John Amble for a conversation about the book, about why the US military might need amphibious capabilities in any future war, and about these capabilities’ enduring role in the Marine Corps as the service undertakes major efforts to prepare for the future operational environment.
You can listen to the entire discussion below, and if you aren’t already subscribed to the MWI Podcast, be sure to find it on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, TuneIn, or your favorite podcast app. While you’re there, please take a moment and give the podcast a rating or leave a review.
Note: You can read the full book for free online, thanks to Marine Corps University Press.
Image credit: Sgt. Austin Hazard, US Marine Corps
The question of MDO and Amphibious Operations in the future would be: How much ordnance and money does one want to spend fighting for an island or a tract of land?
For example, pre-bombardment would require LRPFs, naval gunfire, and precision bombs to "soften up" the island in the A2/AD INDO-PACOM. Then the Marines invade and land, requiring CAS firepower and ordnance, requiring more precision munitions and money. And then the Marines have to hold the island against an attack. So the enemy fires TBMs and cruise missiles that require ground Air Defense, fighter interception, and AEGIS BMD, and THAT costs money, all the while under Cyber, EW, and ECM with UAVs and AWACS C5ISR overhead—all to take one island. And I'm not even touching on Hypersonics yet.
Then the Marines have to neutralize the mines, bobby traps, CQB in the buildings and tunnels, etc. All the while, the peer nations fires off some cruise missiles and TBMs and mines the waters for ONE island! See where this is getting? The "Money Pit trap" ensues and it's no longer "Mission Creep" but "Ordnance and Dollars Creep" that can hurt both sides. As long as the ordnance keeps flowing into the fight, that is OK, until the fight for the NEXT island consumes and repeats the MDO of required ordnance and money.
And THEN there is the invasion of the Mainland and the naval battles requiring even MORE ordnance. So the logistics of pulling all this off is massive, just to take up a tract of land or an island or a seaway. Since the USMC is a lighter force, that requires MDO Joint Operations. Can the US and NATO afford all this expenditure of ordnance for A2/AD and keep other nations in check, other nations that have a bigger BOOM! in explosive yields for cheaper with TBMs and TELs? Recall that with SAMs, Cyber, hacking, ECM, EW, space battles, ASAT, and ASW, not every fired shot will hit due to defenses and CIWS.
And take into account the causalities, the battle-damaged ship repairs, the hunting for TELs, etc. So, yes, perhaps avoiding A2/AD is the proper approach all together as A2/AD is in a fixed location and the peer nation is spending vast sums to defend its doorstep while leaving the doors and windows open to other areas in the sides and behind, not to mention possible internal strife.