The views expressed in this report are solely those of the authors and do not represent the views of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.
This is the second annual Class of 2006 War Studies Conference and is sponsored by the Modern War Institute, a research center housed within the Department of Military Instruction at the United States Military Academy, on behalf of the superintendent. The event allows distinguished representatives from the private sector, government, academia, think-tank community, and the joint military services to debate and discuss issues related to modern war and warfare. This year’s conference explored the issue of civil-military relations and how modern war and warfare are challenging previous interpretations of the “unequal dialogue.”

Specifically, the conference explored the following questions:

- How do we ensure the professionalization and apolitical nature of the US military?
- What is the proper role of the military in advising on decisions to use force or go to war?
- How should the military relate to other instruments of American power, such as intelligence, diplomacy, or finance?
- How does the increasingly dynamic and complex threat environment shape civil-military relations and vice versa?

The above themes will inform a future edited conference volume, coauthored by a select group of participants and other experts, which is intended to frame a conversation with policymakers, senior military leaders, and other decision makers in the years ahead. The War Studies Conference volume will identify ways in which to move the literature on civil-military relations forward and make it more operationally relevant to today’s environment.

The format of the conference consisted of three keynote addresses and discussions, as well as five ninety-minute panel sessions with moderators. All conference proceedings were on the record.

We would like to thank all conference participants for their active involvement and insight in addressing national security reform. A special token of gratitude goes to Maj. Jacob Miraldi and Dr. Lionel Beehner, the War Studies Conference Co-Leads. Additionally, the War Studies Conference was made possible under the auspices of the Modern War Institute, and the support of Mr. Vincent Viola. We are also grateful for the generous support of the USMA Class of 2006, and the West Point Association of Graduates. The opinions expressed in this report reflect the notes taken by the authors and do not reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the United States Army, or any other government agency.

LIAM COLLINS, PhD
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Executive Summary

The focus of this year’s conference was civil-military relations in the context of fighting today’s wars. Specifically, this conference tackled themes related to maintaining our military’s professionalization in an increasingly complex world, both internationally as well as here at home. The subject of civil-military relations is vital to our understanding of modern war and warfare, as it will influence not only future decisions to use force, but also the size and scale of our military, which in turn will shape how and whether we fight.

Nearly all of our panelists and keynote speakers agreed that the division of civilian and military roles, a hallmark of the US Constitution, faces challenges in the current environment, due in part to Samuel P. Huntington’s model of a military that is professional yet separate from the society it protects; the ability of social media and other platforms to allow members of the military to engage in political discourse that risks making the military as an institution look more partisan; and the enormity of the non-kinetic tasks assigned to the military and trust placed in it by a society largely uninformed about the global threat environment.

Among the questions posed: How do our uniformed officers lead an increasingly diverse military that is a composite of our divided society? How do we ensure the apolitical nature of our officer corps? How do we maintain the public trust in the US military, given deep political and social divisiveness? Finally, what is the proper role of the military in providing advice over decisions to use military force?

A few key themes emerged from the conference proceedings:

- First, most panelists agreed that the US military continues to enjoy widespread trust and support, even as it finds itself more isolated from the general population, entrusted with greater responsibilities, and less representative of the public it serves or the Congress it consults. Yet this trust could erode if the US military becomes too politicized or partisan.

- Second, some panelists were concerned by the influential role played by retired senior military leaders in the executive branch, further blurring the lines between civilian versus military control over the use of force, as well as the enormous influence retired flag officers wield, whether in public commentary on America’s wars or the endorsement of political candidates.

- Third, despite the reverence that many in the military have for Samuel Huntington and his work, his theory of “objective control” is flawed, misunderstood, and partly dating itself. That said, his central tenets remain and there is much to be learned by a close rereading of his work—both for civilian and military professionals alike. Panelists mostly agreed that adapting to the challenges of the modern world requires new thinking and new ideas. Whether those ideas are derived from Huntington or are a radical departure remains to be seen.

- Fourth, the relatively low financial and human cost of war felt by the average American has resulted in a populace that is much more indifferent about American use of military force. Interestingly, polls show that both the US military and populace have become much more risk averse with respect to the potential loss of US life in combat. This loss aversion has shaped the way the US military uses force, triggering, for example, the leveraging of unmanned aerial platforms in lieu of ground forces.

In sum, despite being a bedrock of the Constitution, civilian control of the military has found itself under increasing strain in recent decades. The purpose of this conference was to convene a select group of military
professionals, senior academics, and current and former government officials to discuss this important topic and how it is reshaping modern war. This conference hopes to frame the conversation among policymakers and military decision makers on this important topic in the years ahead.
Executive Agenda
25–27 March 2018

Sunday, 25 March 2018

**Opening Keynote**: Maintaining the Professionalization of the Modern Soldier
Speaker: Gen. (ret) Wesley Clark
Moderator: Ms. Indira Lakshmanan, Poynter Institute

Monday, 26 March 2018

**Session 1**: Divided We Stand: Pathologies, Politics, and the Profession of Arms

**Motivating Questions**

- Given the divisive political climate, can the military maintain its professionalism?
- How should active-duty officers voice approval or dissent in this new age?

**Session 2**: Revisiting Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State* for Today’s Wars

**Motivating Questions**

- What is the appropriate model for healthy civil-military relations?
- How is modern war challenging Huntington’s notion of objective control?

**Session 3**: A Hammer in Search of a Nail: A Discussion of the US Military’s Overextension

**Motivating Questions**

- Given its expanded purview, is the military being asked to do too much?
- How is this overextension shaping civil-military relations (or vice versa)?

**Session 4**: Is There Too Little Civilian Oversight of the Military?

**Motivating Questions**

- Are civilian lawmakers abdicating their oversight role of our current wars?
- Are combatant commanders wielding too much power?

**Second Keynote**: The Military’s Role in the Application of National Interest
Speakers: Gen. (ret) David Petraeus & Ambassador Ryan Crocker
Moderator: Col. Suzanne Nielsen, SOSH
Tuesday, 27 March 2018

Session 5: The Great Untethering: Sharing the Costs of Today’s Wars

Motivating Questions

• Is there a civil-military gap when it comes to casualty aversion?
• How are new types of wars shaping public attitudes on the use of force?

Closing Keynote: Interagency Challenges to Healthy Civil-Military Relations
Speaker: Mr. David Rothkopf, The Rothkopf Group
Prompt

The keynote speakers all discussed versions of civil-military relations from different perspectives—one exploring the historical aspects of military professionalization, another with an emphasis on civil-military relations in theater during a time of war, and the final one focused on civil-military relations and the interagency process in Washington. The speakers were instructed to draw from their own professional backgrounds and provide illuminating anecdotes to give the audience a clearer sense of how civil-military relations work in practice.

Discussion

Gen. Clark focused on three issues related to civil-military relations: America’s non-politicized armed forces; how to speak truth to power for those in uniform; and the role of retired officers in political life. He provided historical examples as well as more recent ones and personal ones, where he found himself disagreeing with civilian decision makers.

First, what does an apolitical military exactly mean? Gen. Clark provided a historical overview of the role of civil-military relations in society, and the role of officers and their politicization, focusing on three examples: Gen. Winfield Scott, Gen. John J. Pershing, and Gen. Douglas MacArthur, all of whom clashed with the political authorities in Washington, DC and were unsuccessful presidential candidates. In each case, he noted that the US military has always been more realistic than civilian leaders about what the real challenges are. For Gen. Clark, the problem with politicians is threefold: politicians don’t want to hear bad or ugly truth; politicians are skilled at making people think they are with them; and the military is judged on different standards (not duty, honor, country) by its political counterparts.

Second, Gen. Clark emphasized the point that for the military there is no shame in fighting to win, but there is shame when there is the belief that the military is flawless and ends up losing. He pointed to examples from his own career, such as the US-led interventions in Haiti, Grenada, and Iraq in 2003, all of which he said lacked a clear strategy and were notable for their absence of planning. Tangentially related is the question: When should a senior commander resign rather than carry out an order or some other policy he or she disagrees with? He said that not all political decisions are worth quitting over. His disagreements on the invasion of Haiti, for example, didn’t compel him to resign.
The same principle applies to retired generals. What role should they play when it comes to offering advice beyond military matters? Talking about his own experience before the 2003 Iraq war, he reflected on how he failed to do his job as a retired general. He said he was against the war, but wishes he had been more direct and less deferential. He said it is about speaking truth to power. During the Vietnam War, retired senior officers saw that things could have been done better but no one said anything. No one voiced concern over the lack of strategy and the North Vietnamese were not isolated effectively until the end. Military professionalism exists at the troop level, but for senior officers, it is not easy, and cadets and junior officers on the battlefield do not make policy.

Finally, he closed by emphasizing that the responsibility of civilian leaders should not be to ask the military to do things it cannot do, and it is incumbent on the military to say what it cannot do. For example, disarming the population of Sarajevo was not a job for the military, yet nobody disputed the idea at the time. When it comes to political discourse and elections, he worried about senior officers increasingly meddling in politics, but also said politicians are wrong to use service members in uniform as backdrops on the political stage, even though the “uniform” brings credibility to politicians. Likewise, Gen. Clark considered that President Barack Obama’s 2009 speech at West Point on Afghanistan was also wrong. Retired officers, he said, should maintain dignity and speak with evidence and only provide military advice, though this will depend on the timing within the process of decision making.

*  *  *

The aim of the second keynote discussion between Ambassador Crocker and Gen. Petraeus was to examine civil-military relations in theater. The moderator noted how their relationship was “the gold standard of civ-mil” relations in the modern era during wartime. Three key themes emerged from the keynote discussion. First, while it is not necessary for the ambassador and senior commander be best friends, it helps if they have a personal admiration for each other and cordial relations. Second, civil-military relations are helped if both share an appreciation of the importance of the task they face. A third theme was the importance of previous regional experience—not necessarily expertise, but it is helpful if both have some knowledge of the region’s cultures, politics, and military dynamics.

Asked what his qualifications were to take on the civilian task of bringing order to Iraq after the surge, Ambassador Crocker stated that he had extensive experience in the region during multiple presidential administrations. By virtue of him having family members in the US Air Force as well as early aspirations to join the Marine Corps, Crocker also had an understanding of the military. Petraeus noted that he had had two and a half years of experience in Iraq, having served in multiple capacities, most notably as the first commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. This, compounded with his previous military experience in peacekeeping operations, lent him the ability to lead and to navigate the war’s unique challenges.

What was their relationship like in the beginning? Both realized that in 2006, the war in Iraq was in a crisis. Conditions were unfavorable and both shared first and foremost the desire to avoid failure. This in turn created a mutual need for cooperation from the start. Moreover, it informed how the two would act when working with their Iraqi counterparts. Together, the two had an understood dynamic of how they would propose plans to Iraqi officials, navigate challenging relationships within and among those officials, and implement the plans against enemy combatants. What were the organizational steps that led to a successful civil-military relationship? Given that the war was at a particularly low inflection point, then-President George W. Bush took deliberate steps to provide various avenues for continual conversation (e.g., teleconferencing) between the civilian and military leaders, as well as with the White House.
This, compounded with Petraeus and Crocker’s own personal relationship, lent itself to relatively positive civil-military ties. Further, both speakers noted that the awareness of the machinations within the political system (e.g., Congress and the September 2007 briefing they gave on Capitol Hill) allowed the two to navigate other bureaucratic obstacles. Were there dangers of the relationship souring? While there were personal, structural, and executive branch difficulties, the two remained overall committed to the mission, and what they were capable of doing in the situation. The dynamic, which the moderator described as one of “good-cop, bad-cop,” was built on a consistent dialogue.

The keynote speakers were asked, in light of the fifteenth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, what lessons they learned to navigate the decision-making process and avoid circumstances like those that characterized the Vietnam War in the context of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Gen. Petraeus replied that questioning the use of force was not his prerogative but rather posed the question as, “If we are [in Iraq or Afghanistan], what are the existing structures? What is the country? Will the operation create or deter [enemy combatants]?” Crocker added that policymakers should “be careful about what you get into” and “be careful about what you get out of [in reference to disengagement].”

The camaraderie between the two keynote speakers was palpable, and this kind of relationship made their endeavors during the Iraq War successful. But their relationship was also unique. Hence, while their recommendations of mutual respect and cooperation are valid, questions remain: Absent a personal connection or mutual professional admiration, under what conditions can a civil-military relationship in theater work? Which concrete measures can be taken to ensure civil-military relations remain healthy and are not detrimental to military effectiveness and unity of effort?

Mr. Rothkopf, the closing keynote speaker, discussed the current configuration of civil-military relations and interagency challenges in Washington. Specifically he discussed President Donald Trump’s current role in today’s civ-mil relations, and how Congress and the public are not upholding their oversight responsibility, mostly due to ignorance. Vis-à-vis today’s international system, he said that American-made institutions are not fit for the current environment, and that today’s threats require an innovative edge that the United States does not have—a symptom of, for example, think tanks ignoring the potential role of millennials and policymakers’ ignorance of new threats. In other words, “we have been talking about all wrong things.”

Contributing to the current crisis is the military’s irrational exuberance. The military is perceived as untouchable and treated almost religiously, while President Trump has surrounded himself with generals to elevate his statures. “We’ve created reverence rather than security,” Mr. Rothkopf quipped. He noted how the United States is facing the poorest adversaries, but they are being more creative about the use of force. The political-military nexus lies at the top of the chain of command—with respect to the president and National Security Council—yet he noted there is no “Trump Doctrine” and the National Security Council remains dysfunctional. Regarding the “civ” versus the “mil,” he added, “We must introduce ourselves to each other.” As a case in point he referred to recent congressional hearings, which he defined as educative insofar as how they illuminated the limited presence of veterans in Congress and lack of military expertise on military committees. “There is a need for a civic education,” he emphasized, “a debate on what citizenship entails. The notion of taking responsibility seems to be lacking in civilian leaders.” A symptom of this lack of responsibility is civilians’ casualty aversion, which Mr. Rothkopf equated to a combination of the “Vietnam and Somalia syndrome.”
Among the biggest threats to a healthy interagency process is politics. The Democratic Party should be careful to not give the impression of being anti-military, Mr. Rothkopf cautioned. This is further reflected in the “uninterested oversight by Congress and an uninformed public.” He anchored his analysis in twentieth-century history. After World War II, a number of institutions were set up but the baby boomer generation did not invest in the continuation of such institutions. For Mr. Rothkopf, those institutions—from those established at Bretton Woods to NATO—are outdated for today’s international system.

Institutions closer to the seat of power in Washington, specifically public or foreign policy think tanks, are also contributing to poor civil-military relations, he argued. Why? He said these institutions are too risk averse and employ the wrong people, adding that there is a dire need for a new generation of thinkers.

That is because the new threat environment America faces shapes civil-military relations, as well as vice versa. Is the world safer today? Not really, says Mr. Rothkopf. In fact, he points to new threats, such as empowered individuals and other non-state actors, which are harder to deter.

To close his remarks, Mr. Rothkopf did sound a note of optimism. “Algorithms are power,” he noted, “and the most powerful person will be the one able to write the algorithm that decides which post goes first in your Facebook feed.” Because of this, we are living at a watershed moment in history that requires strategic rethinking. “We need to teach technical courses in universities,” he added, describing himself as a “techno-realist,” not a “techno-pessimist.” Yet at the same time, traditional statecraft still matters. Alliances, for example, are useful to US security. What’s worrisome to him is the remarkable inability of policymakers to talk about issues related to cyber or artificial intelligence. He also worries the military may fall into a similar trap.
Panel Session 1 – Divided We Stand:
Pathologies, Politics and the Profession of Arms

Panelists
Dr. Marybeth Ulrich, US Army War College
Lt. Gen. (ret) James Dubik, Institute for the Study of War
Mr. Phillip Carter, Center for a New American Security
Dr. Elizabeth Stanley, Georgetown University

Moderator
Dr. Dominic Tierney, Atlantic Monthly

Motivating Questions
- Given the divisive political climate, can the military maintain its professionalism?
- How should active-duty officers voice approval or dissent in this new age?

Prompt
This panel featured distinguished representatives from academia, military, and the private sector, with all the panelists having previously served in the military. The questions for this panel addressed the increasing challenge for both active and retired military personnel to maintain their professionalism and apolitical nature given the ongoing divisive political climate. Three themes emerged from the panel discussion: First, the politicization of the profession of arms will erode public trust in the military, a process some panelists worried is already underway. Second, there was broad agreement that the political divisions, as well as the advent of social media as a new space for military members to vent political opinions, risk politicizing the military. Third, the challenge to keep the military apolitical is partly a result of the military drifting away from its core responsibilities, a function of the military’s popularity as well as its large budget.

Panelist Discussion
Dr. Ulrich kicked off the discussion by summarizing some of the historical norms of civil-military relations. The US Constitution provides the framework necessary to ensure civilian control of the military. Yet, she pointed to a “do-no-harm”-like norm for civilians to follow, stressing that when it comes to the civil-military divide the real issue for those in uniform is adhering to ethics of non-partisanship. The people elect representatives into power to decide when and how to use the military. Because both the civilian and military sectors lack a common understanding of these historical norms, neither can enforce civil-military norms. She also pointed to an expertise gap—because the military’s civilian counterparts, both in society and on Capitol Hill, are largely misinformed on military matters. She called for greater civic education in society and said the United States should learn from other countries actively fighting to save their democracies and operating on a concept of total defense, such as the Baltic states, which ensures smoother civil-military relations.

Lt. Gen. Dubik remarked about an informal poll he had previously conducted in which he asked people three questions: Why do Americans have high confidence in the military? What could the military do to erode such
confidence? And is there evidence that the United States is on the path of erosion? He found that the confidence in the military derives from the belief that the military is apolitical, but also that it works and gets things done. However, this confidence can be eroded and the erosion has already begun. Even though ostensibly one of the reasons Americans have such high confidence in the military is because most people consider the military an apolitical organization where its members have the country’s best interest in mind and offer their best military advice, according to some data, there has been a rise in the number of military members who support the Republican Party. While some panelists thought this was a normative change, others argued that the military has always consisted of more Republicans than Democrats. Put simply, according to Lt. Gen. Dubik, the politicization of the military will erode public trust and confidence in the institution.

Several panelists argued that the Republican-Democratic divide in the military is forcing it to become a more politicized, partisan organization. Based on a number of recent vignettes, Mr. Carter observed that the military has become a rent-seeking organization, like other political entities in the United States, seeking to gain more resources and further its own interests. Military agencies have their own budgets and policy preferences, and their leaders regularly frame policy choices in terms of what will be favorable to the military or veterans population. This has bled over into other areas of political discussion too, with military framing or argumentation being used on issues from drugs to obesity to poverty. Over time, this increased political activity has resulted a more politicized military, and more politicized military leaders, despite their avoidance of direct partisan activity or electioneering per se.

Additionally, military members are increasingly publishing their political opinion on social media and turning a blind eye toward unprofessional political behavior. As Lt. Gen Dubik noted, even with a disclaimer that “this is my personal view, not…” social media is a public space and he said it was inappropriate for members of the military to voice political opinions online.

While Maj. Gen. Dunlap did not think that the framers of the US Constitution intended to prevent retired generals from speaking out, he did not believe that they should be involved in partisan activity, like demonstrations or political rallies. However, he insisted that divisive politics was even more prevalent in the past. He mentioned a couple of polls that showed that the American public had the most confidence in the military. He further argued that while the military enjoys high confidence as an organization because of its perceived competency, the challenge is for the public to get to actually know the military. He stressed the importance of getting young people to join, and even thought that a military parade down Pennsylvania Avenue was a good idea. “There are many ways to serve that are not necessarily combat,” he added.

Dr. Stanley insisted that though the public trusts the military, there is a perception that the military is broken. She noted that 80 percent of the public believe that the military has more mental health issues than the general population. Dr. Stanley noted that military members bear the burden of today’s wars, and this has affected the civil-military divide. Dr. Stanley quoted a statistic indicating that 84 percent of the military feels like civilians do not understand the military. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are the first wars fought by an all-volunteer force representing only .5 percent of the population. Nearly one-third of the force is drawn from people who have experienced challenging social issues like sexual violence, family divorce, and drug abuse. These personal experiences affect soldiers’ ability to respond to events both while serving in the military and after leaving the service. Considering more than 90,000 troops have deployed several times, these personal issues combined with boomerang deployments has increased troops’ resentment, adjustment, and coping mechanisms thereby causing an increasing divide between the military and civilian populations. The civil-military gap has created a warrior caste where only people from select regions and backgrounds in the country serve in the military.
During the Q&A with the audience a few themes emerged. First, part of the civil-military divisions that exist in this country are a legacy of the difficult years of the current wars we face—a series of stalemates and/or strategic failures is having its effect on society, which manifests itself in its war weariness. There is a perception of a US military that wins battles but not wars, which harkens back to the Vietnam era. Yet, there is also a fundamental conceptual error in this thinking, which is that one deploys the military to end fighting, not to end the war.

Second, there is a remarkable degree of trust in the military compared to other institutions, like Congress, the Federal Reserve, or the Supreme Court. Yet, the public adulation of the military can be dangerous as it can lead to a conflation of roles and feed a vicious cycle of sorts, in that lawmakers overfund the Department of Defense, while underfunding other instruments of power (e.g., the Department of States). Moreover, this notion that the military can do things other people or institutions can’t is true only up to a point.

Third, on issues related to defense and the military we’re seeing greater polarization as issues are increasingly viewed through a political lens. One panelist remarked that at no point over the past decades of war has society been asked to contribute because of the deficit spending that goes on to pay for our wars, but that the civilian leadership should have a responsibility to ask more from civilians. Keeping the military apolitical is partly a result of the military drifting away from its core responsibilities. The panelists agreed that the military shouldn’t be building wells or villages abroad, as this by its very nature gives the military political authority.

Conclusion

In closing, the themes of discussion throughout this panel highlighted the challenges of this issue. While the majority of panelists believed the public had confidence in the military, too much confidence has led to an increasing civil-military gap where the military has garnered a lot of political support and persuasion. Whether concerning questions of the political nature of the military, political versus military advice, theory, norms, recruitment, or civil-military training, the challenges of civil-military relations are complex and important to consider in both the profession of arms and the development and execution of national policy.
Panel Session 2 – Isolation or Integration?  
Debating Huntington’s ‘The Soldier and the State’

Panelists
Dr. Risa Brooks, Marquette University  
Col. (ret) Isaiah “Ike” Wilson, New America Foundation  
Lt. Col. James Golby, US Mission to NATO  
Dr. Peter Feaver, Duke University  
Dr. Richard Kohn, University of North Carolina

Moderator
Dr. Gideon Rose, Foreign Affairs

Motivating Questions
- What is the appropriate model for healthy civil-military relations?  
- How is modern war challenging Huntington’s notion of a professional military?

Prompt

The second panel focused on Samuel P. Huntington’s seminal *The Soldier and the State* and its application to today’s civil-military relations over sixty years after its publication. Despite some disagreement, the panel generally agreed that his book, which touches on the norm of military professionalization, remains relevant. They examined topics including Huntington’s legacy, the past, future, and ideal models of civil-military relations, the military profession’s outlook in civil-military relations, recent trends that challenge the status quo of civil-military relations, and the increasing physical and psychological gaps between civilians and the military that serves them. A number of key themes emerged from the panelists: First, Huntington’s model of objective control and a strict separation between civilians and the military has led to a growing isolation and lack of familiarity between the two. Second, military autonomy is an earned privilege, not a given right. Third, civilian control of the military does not mean that it is okay for civilians to be wrong but rather that the military should not be the referee.

Panelist Discussion

Dr. Brooks opened by reminding the audience that Huntington’s theory provides the norm of apolitical military professionalism. There is clear delineation of responsibility that meets at the apex. The military is in a silo of its own and nested away from public life and engagement. While this may appear as the norm, there has historically been a vigorous debate about this arrangement and Huntington was a participant in that debate. Dr. Brooks offered what she termed “the four paradoxes of an apolitical military.” They are:

1. Huntington both precludes and enables political activity by the military. The military tells itself that it is apolitical—but isn’t everything political?
2. Apolitical professionalism promotes and undermines civilian authority or control over the use of force. It promotes deference to civilian decisions which undermines control.
3. Huntington promotes esteem of military but also separation from society. This encourages the creation of a subculture through reverence which distances and divides the two.

4. His notion of “objective control” keeps military officers from being bureaucrats and limits their ability to influence and manage bureaucracies. There is a false separation between the two which calls into question if officers really understand the value of bureaucracies.

Building on Dr. Brooks’s analysis, Col. Wilson added that events of the modern world have challenged our interpretation of Huntington and his work in important ways. Do civilians still have the “right to be wrong?” How much does the pervasiveness of objective control shape and impact (negatively) our conception of modern war and our manner of practicing it? In light of our recent military outcomes it seems that the US government does too little with too little, too late, and for not long enough. This forces us to question central tenets on how our society views wars and fighting. What does fighting and winning America’s wars mean? How does Huntington’s view retard the military’s and society’s understanding of war? What challenges do we face as a Western liberal democracy when battles and engagements become a means which don’t mean anything? Modern applications of power in traditional ways have failed to provide acceptable returns on investment. But we shouldn’t be surprised at this outcome as we’ve separated warfighting from its political object. The military’s purpose is to achieve peace, yet if there is no civil-military dialogue before engagement we cannot expect “victory” or peace.

Lt. Col. Golby noted that Huntington’s work has created a deep misunderstanding of what it means to be a professional. Most members of the military, he said, don’t understand that autonomy is earned, not given, and that the client grants power to those that show character and competence. Huntington also ignores the complete separation of the two realms: civilians give guidance and the military do. Yet, these circles are not separate and distinct and thus Huntington’s ideas are idealistic. A case in point was the disastrous Bay of Pigs operation. Military professionals are often asked for advice and recommendations, but many officers don’t know the difference or distinction. While many officers spend time thinking about civil-military control, their time would be better spent focusing on giving civilians the best possible information, which can only be accomplished by giving mid-grade career officers training and preparation for dealing with these types of issues before they assume the advisory and command responsibilities of senior officers.

Dr. Feaver said that contemporary events have forced us to re-engage with the question of whether or not civilian leaders have “the right to be wrong.” With recent events in mind, he provided some thoughts about this “right.” Generally, the insight is still true, yet the “right to be wrong” is not a claim for how it would be nice for things to work; it is a statement about what is necessary for a democracy. Drawing on a sports metaphor, Dr. Feaver said this question is a litmus test for when the military is committing a foul. If the military prevents a course of action they think is wrong, it’s a real problem. “We don’t expect sporting games to be played without fouls,” he added. People and institutions will push boundaries and there will be overstepping and shirking of responsibility. On the other hand, this does not mean that it is okay for civilians to be wrong; it means that the military should not and cannot be the referee. What’s more, the impulse to admonish civilians is not off base. Civilians must learn their role and job, reinforce proper norms, and encourage military candor, professionalism, and dialogue. Even though there are scenarios in which one may want the military to commit a foul, this does not mean that we should rewrite the rulebook to allow them to. In sum, “the right to be wrong” is still a bedrock of civil-military relations.

Dr. Kohn took on the discussion question of, what is the appropriate model of civil-military relations? He said the Constitution never explicitly says “civilian control.” It does set up a form of government that implies it, but with an overlap of systems and powers which causes political problems. There are also problems related to deference toward the military, greater isolation, and a widening civil-military divide. Yet the only model that
makes sense is that found in the Constitution, which defines how military and civilians at highest echelons interact and meet in this cooperative space. We must recognize this is an unequal but necessary dialogue. Our current context is that the legitimacy and status of the military are rising while those of politicians are dwindling and we’ve reached an inversion point between the two. We should read Huntington as a springboard but realize his limitations and deficiencies.

As previously mentioned, the discussion drew out several key themes. First, it is in the military’s interest to prove that Huntington was correct in his thesis and that it is in their bureaucratic self-interest to preserve this norm. The second theme is this question over the definition of “expertise”—Is the military giving expert advice or just advice it thinks is expert? Third, there was broad agreement that the military has been doing more thinking about civil-military relations than civilians and that the military should perhaps fund courses on understanding the military in universities, both to close this cultural gap but also for national security purposes. Fourth, the military is a sui generis profession. Other professions, such as the US Foreign Service, may have it harder, since the military has absolute control over its command structure and given its size and wealth of resources.

**Conclusion**

Despite the reverence which many have for Huntington’s work, it is ultimately flawed and his theory partly dates itself. That said, his central tenets remain and there is much to be learned by a close rereading of his work—both for civilian and military professionals alike. What is clear, however, is that the challenges of the modern world require new thinking and new ideas to adapt. Whether those ideas are derived from Huntington or are a radical departure, only time will tell.
Panel Session 3 – A Hammer in Search of a Nail: 
A Discussion of the US Military’s Overextension

Panelists
Ms. Rosa Brooks, Georgetown University
Dr. Jessica Blankshain, Naval War College
Dr. Antulio Echevarria, Army War College

Moderator
Dr. Nina Kollars, Franklin & Marshall College

Motivating Questions
• Given its expanded purview, is the military being asked to do too much?
• How is the overextension shaping civil-military relations (or vice versa)?

Prompt
This panel discussed the role of the military, how it is currently being employed, and how it should be utilized. Motivated in large part by Ms. Brooks’s 2016 book How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything, this panel explored the question of how to keep civil-military relations healthy and balanced when the military’s role seems to be permeating into an ever-increasing set of activities outside of its traditional expertise regarding the application of force. The panelists were asked to address the broad questions of whether, given its expanded purview, the military is being asked to do too much and how this overextension is shaping civil-military relations.

Panelist Discussion
Several panelists initiated their commentary by challenging the premise of the panel’s theme by questioning whether the military is in fact overextended. Ms. Brooks challenged the notion that the military was sui generis or “special,” and argued that “all groups tell stories of how special and unique they are—this is a very American thing.” She pointed to the example of firefighters, noting that all of us have multiple identities ranging from personal, emotional, and professional. She also noted that the Constitution is actually part of the problem with our civil-military relations today. After all, the United States was borne out of unlawful rebellion. For the Founding Fathers, the Constitution is based on the belief that power means control over the use of force. But there are numerous other threats to American democracy and other ways to exert coercion other than military means, such as cyber or information warfare. The trouble is there has been this blending between the military and the political.

Maj. Gen. Scales contended that, given the military’s mammoth budget, claiming overextension is political rhetoric. The military has fought two wars simultaneously, he noted, and “has not broke.” Referencing casualty statistics, he noted that 90 percent of casualties occur in the infantry, which received only 0.89 percent of the Department of Defense’s budget. Narrowing his argument slightly, he asserted that it isn’t the entire military that is overextended, but rather a small “intimate cadre of killers,” specifically the Army’s infantry non-commissioned officer corps. The audience questioned whether the military was facing a lack of material resources, which Maj.
Gen. Scales refuted. He again pointed to the Department of Defense’s massive budget and argued that the real issue would always be shortages of personnel to man the systems and equipment. He recommended that the Army focus on building a sense of elitism in the NCO corps, ostensibly to improve retention and encourage expansion of this population.

Dr. Echevarria also questioned the premise that the military is overextended, or more specifically that the military is being asked to do more than it has in the past, by examining the use of the US military since the late nineteenth century. According to his analysis, the military has been used at least once a year since the Spanish-American War. He concedes that the United States has been using the military at a rate over double that of the Cold War, but points out that the post-9/11 period has also seen an expansion of the role of the covert forces, claiming that the CIA has essentially become a paramilitary arm of the US military.

Similarly, Dr. Blankshain highlighted the expanded role of the National Guard and Reserve in the post-9/11 context. What role should it have—a strategic one, or an operational one? While in the first half of the twentieth century, the reserve component was a strategic reserve, mobilized only in the event of a conflict and quickly demobilized following its conclusion, this force has now become what she terms an “operational reserve force” that deploys with nearly the same consistency as the active component. In response to Dr. Kollars’s question during Q&A, the panelists also highlighted the expanded use of private contractors to fill resource and capability gaps in recent conflicts. Maj. Gen. Scales posited that this use of the reserve component and contractors has prevented the military from becoming truly overextended while Dr. Blankshain cautioned that the extensive use of the reserve component prevents these forces from being used for homeland defense purposes. Rather than claim that the military is being overextended, the panelists argued that policymakers need to clarify the military’s mission and resource it appropriately. As Ms. Brooks put it, “let’s figure out that we want it to do and see if it can do those things well.” Agreeing with Ms. Brooks’s stance, Maj. Gen. Scales contended that the military needs to be redesigned, equipped, and resourced in accordance with what policymakers are asking it to do or it does in fact risk becoming overextended.

This conversation around whether the US military is overextended, which parts of it may be, and how the employment of forces have (or have not) changed over time led to a discussion of the role of public opinion and political rhetoric in creating or reinforcing the concept of overextension. Both Maj. Gen. Scales and Dr. Echevarria (who also happens to be a retired Army officer) referenced a shift in policymakers’ and the public’s appreciation of the duration of conflict and the purpose of the military. Both panelists seemed to contend that the military’s role hasn’t dramatically changed over time, but rather that the public has become more casualty averse and less patient with protracted conflict and drawn-out military commitments.

The panelists also pointed out that the current use of the military and the public’s changing views could have significant implications for civil-military relations. Dr. Blankshain referenced survey results she and her colleagues have analyzed suggesting that the public’s view of the reserve component has been gradually shifting. Whereas the general public used to view the reserve component service member as a true “citizen soldier,” the distinction between the reserve and active components is gradually diminishing. “Has the way that we use the reserve component,” she asks, “changed public conception of its appropriate use or the public’s support of executive use of force?” Similarly, does the public’s changing view of the reserve component create potential challenges for civilian control of the military, given that a number of elected officials serve in the reserve component?
The panelists also discussed the American public’s overwhelmingly positive view of the post-9/11 military and what implications this may have for civil-military relations. Recalling his time in the military during the Vietnam War, Maj. Gen. Scales referred to a “crucible of goodwill,” arguing that the military has a responsibility to safeguard the positive reputation the post-Vietnam generation worked so hard to re-establish. Ms. Brooks cautioned against the notion that the military is a distinctive institution, arguing that “feeling special and unique is not new; it makes us American.” She challenged the notion that the military is “separate and distinct,” arguing that it is much more heterogeneous and reflective of the broad American population than is often thought, despite the small portion of the population (less than 1 percent) that currently serve. Both panelists seem to conjecture that this veneration of the military might lead to a lack of healthy civilian scrutiny of the military and its leaders and has contributed to the politicization of the military.

During Q&A, the panel was asked whether we might consider learning from other countries for how to address some of these issues of potential overextension or expansion of the military, and the role of public opinion in shaping policy. Maj. Gen. Scales pointed to the inclusion of representatives from the United Kingdom’s and Israel’s militaries on an advisory board for the Secretary of Defense as evidence that the United States is seeking input from other countries, while the audience member’s suggestion of a national service scheme prompted a heated exchange regarding the issues with a military draft. Dr. Blankshain, acknowledging her limited knowledge of foreign militaries, suggested that the uniqueness of the American political system might limit the applicability of foreign models to that of the United States.

Conclusion

The topics discussed in this panel reflected a variety of opinions based on extensive experience, historical knowledge, and rigorous research intent on understanding the role of the military, both historically and in the present. The discussion reinforced the importance of the topic with respect to policymaking, especially policies regarding resource allocation, but also conceptually with respect to how Americans view the military and how it should be used, and in turn how this perception may shape the relationship between the military and the civilian leaders charged with its oversight.
Panel Session 4 – Is There Too Little Civilian Oversight of the Military?

Panelists
- Dr. Mara Karlin, Johns Hopkins University
- Dr. Jason Dempsey, Center for a New American Security
- Lt. Gen. (ret) Mark Hertling, Florida Hospital
- Col. Heidi Urben, Joint Staff
- Dr. Lindsay Cohn, Naval War College

Moderator
- Mr. James Mann, author of *Rise of the Vulcans* and *The Obamians*

Motivating Questions
- Are civilian lawmakers abdicating their oversight role of our current wars?
- Are combatant commanders wielding too much power?

Prompt

This panel addressed the question of whether civilian authorities have abdicated their oversight role of our current wars, focusing primarily on how we define civilians and oversight, and the responsibilities of military and civilian leaders. It also addressed the question of whether combatant commanders wield too much power.

Panelist Discussion

Dr. Karlin noted that to answer the question posed of the panel, one must define what we mean by “civilians.” Presumably this means Congress, particularly its role as representatives of the will of the American people; the president, as the commander-in-chief; and the secretary of defense as the primary civilian engaged with the military. Staffs also matter in this process. Oversight requires an organization, not an individual. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is charged with thinking through an incomprehensible amount of issues. When staffs are not prioritized, or they become stove-piped, it impacts debate, limits rigor, and ill serves policy and decision making. So what do we mean by oversight? Civilian leaders are charged with the following: force development (what do we need moving forward and how do we build the right force?); force management (how is the military postured globally?); and force employment (senior civilians play a vital role in determining military operations). To properly oversee the military, civilian leaders must be able to understand what is going on in the world and with the military, make and enforce decisions, and be comfortable with winners/losers, advocating for issues, and being unpopular. Making this happen requires the people with the right capabilities, including military leaders who don’t believe in myths and civilians who know what they’re talking about. Finally, leaders that are comfortable with serious dialogue communicate serious intent, are willing to have hard conversations, and develop a level of trust and transparency. Without this, civil-military relations suffer.

Dr. Dempsey, reiterating the panel’s title, asked if there is sufficient oversight of the military, and answered with an emphatic no. In general, he claimed, civilians maintain a state of respectful indifference because they have no skin in the game. “We’ve demonstrated we can end the fighting, but not conclude a war,” he noted. There is a disconnect with military strategy. Both civilians and military leaders focus on designing a host–nation force of
several hundred thousand fighters that the government can’t sustain and requires things that don’t exist. The US Army exists because America exists, so “we expect the same conditions to pop up around Afghan forces.”

Dr. Dempsey posed another question: Do combatant commanders wield too much power? He argued that accountability is so diffuse it doesn’t really even exist. Civilian oversight is hindered by an inflexible personnel management system and nine- to twelve-month deployment rotations, which he called “insane.” But the larger issue hurting civil-military relations is that elected officials are unwilling to question military strategy.

Are the civilians abdicating their roles? Lt. Gen. Hertling said it depends on which group of civilians one is talking about (e.g., the media, the American people) and what roles are being talked about. To the question of whether combatant commanders wield too much power, he said they wielded the power because nobody else was doing it. There is also an imbalance because combatant commanders have resources that the Department of State does not have. For Lt. Gen Hertling, leadership in the profession of arms comes down to inter-professional development. Military leaders don’t trust civilian leaders. Military leaders are trained, whereas civilian leaders are not. The military is bound by an ethos, shared standards, and values but emphasized that the military should also demonstrate humility in dealing with civilian leaders.

According to Lt. Gen. Hertling, the military has failed on a number of fronts. When dealing with civilian leaders, for example, the military doesn’t teach (how to do the job), train (how to make decisions), or coach (how to give information). Military leaders have to learn how to “lead up.” On a personal note, he added that originally he didn’t want to take the job as a military analyst for CNN, but realized the civilian population just wasn’t that informed and believed the job was part of the key to civ-mil integration.

Col. Urben said the military bears certain responsibilities when it comes to civilian oversight. “We are partners in an unequal dialogue,” she noted. That is, the military must consider whether we are making the process harder and whether we are being good stewards. It must avoid the pitfall of “believing our own press.” She noted how the military sees itself as superior due to polls showing overwhelming trust in the military and diminished support for civilian institutions. There is also a belief that autonomy should increase and oversight should decrease. She worries that the United States has fostered a culture where criticizing the military is forbidden. Col. Urben pointed out the difference between respect versus reverence, which implies a lack of understanding, discourse, and debate. Col. Urben has carried out much of the existing original survey research on civilian and military attitudes. She noted a few interesting findings: 37 percent of service members believe the president should have served in military, and 40 percent of service members believe control of war should be given to the military. Her data also reveal a lack of restraint of uniformed personnel in criticizing elected officials: 35 percent of service members made or shared inappropriate comments on social media, and 50 percent observed someone they know making or sharing inappropriate material.

In sum, she finds the military refuses to admit the dialogue is unequal. The lack of experience of civilian leaders makes it unequal and oversight is perceived as an intrusion. Col. Urben noted the recent trend of retired senior leaders broadcasting personal views on political decisions and argued that the public perception is that retired generals speak for the profession and for service members. So what can the military do to help fix it? There should be consistent and forceful messaging across military units and in professional military education programs.

Dr. Cohn asked how this discussion might reshape the national security landscape. This is an important issue when it comes to considering future authorizations for the use of military force. Unless you have civilian direction and governance of policy, she noted, military effectiveness is pointless. Without a political plan for how to use
force to achieve something, it doesn’t matter how good the military is at fighting. This is a governance issue, Dr. Cohn added, insofar as oversight and control should not be viewed as a one-way street. One must determine whether the political class is doing good or bad policy, as the latter breaks down trust and the civ-mil relationship. “Civilian leaders have a right to be wrong, but we shouldn’t want them to be,” she said.

Reflecting on the discussion from the second panel, Dr. Cohn said that maybe Huntington’s model is making things harder. After all, Clausewitz emphasized that logic of force should not win out over the logic of policy. But in the Huntington model, civilians think of the logic of policy (to what end is force used?) whereas the military think of the logic of force (how to employ force most effectively in battle?).

Ultimately, the civil-military relationship should be about making smart policy. Congress should expect the military to act legally, be good stewards, and be fully transparent. Likewise, when it comes to foreign policy (which is the function of the executive branch), Congress has the power of impeachment and withholding funds to influence policy but must inform itself and the public. Should there be more civilian oversight of the military? Yes, but the situation is not incredibly bleak. “We must put to rest the notion that politicians identify ends and the military runs the war,” Dr. Cohn said. “This idea is contributing to bad policy.” Rather, she urged that we must be less optimistic about the utility of force. There is an incorrect belief that the United States has the greatest military and that that will ensure victory. “Neither is true,” she noted. This “fallacy of military expertise” was also mentioned by Clausewitz, who believed there was no such thing as expertise in how to win wars—success was based on genius and judgement.

**Conclusion**

According to the panel, the subject of civil-military relations, and its broader application to modern war and warfare, is well covered but ill-defined. Additionally, the panelists agreed that there is no crisis in civ-mil relations, as long as everyone recognizes it as a process that requires continuous effort and attention—there is no end state at which the process is stabilized. Between civilian and military leaders, there is a shared burden of making it work. Civilian leaders must invest the personal time to understanding the military over which they’ve been given oversight responsibility. The military must prioritize teaching, coaching, and mentoring civilian leaders regarding how best military advice is given and what oversight is needed.
Panel Session 5 – The Great Untethering:  
Sharing the Costs of Today’s Wars

Panelists
Mr. Benjamin Friedman, George Washington University  
Dr. Sarah Sewall, Johns Hopkins University/SAIS  
Dr. Jon Caverley, Naval War College  
Ms. Alice Hunt Friend, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Moderator
Mr. Peter Beinart, City University of New York

Discussion Questions
• Is there a civil-military gap when it comes to casualty aversion?  
• How are new types of wars shaping public attitudes on the use of force?

Prompt
The panel focused on the theme that the costs of today’s wars are being shared differently than they have been historically, and this is changing the way today’s wars are being waged and future wars are being thought about. To frame this theme, the panelists were asked to address core questions: Is there a civil-military gap when it comes to casualty aversion, and how are new types of wars shaping public attitudes on the use of force?

Panelist Discussion
Three main themes were evident during the panel discussion. First, the relatively low financial and human cost of war felt by the average American has resulted in a populace that is much more indifferent about American use of military force. As it does not directly impact them financially in the way a war being funded by a war tax for example would, there is much less pressure from the public to end the use of military force quickly. One of the panelists made the observation that due to this lower cost of war, wars are becoming more frequent and less conclusive. Through the use of technology such as drones the United States is capable of using force anywhere in the world with relatively low impact to the US population and thus can continue operations like this for prolonged periods of time that historically would have caused unrest amongst the US population if they were feeling normal war burdens of war.

Ms. Friend formulated her comments around the average American’s knowledge level about and interest in the military use of force by examining the recent attack on special operations forces in Niger. Her findings through the use of surveys reinforced the fact that average Americans have a very low understanding of what the military is doing overseas as their interest level is very low until something happens that directly impacts them. However, she also found that the average American is wary about the use of drone strikes because of the perceived risk of civilian casualties, which is in conflict with the idea that the United States should use drones in order to keep US service members out of harm’s way. This conflict in how the US military should employ force was supported by another panelist’s open-ended question of what it means for the public to have opinions on military use of force if they don’t understand anything due to the information gap in the civ-mil relationship.
Second, the American military and populace has become much more risk averse to the potential loss of US life in combat. This increased movement to risk aversion is shaping the way the US military uses force, predominantly triggering the leveraging of unmanned aerial platforms in lieu of ground forces. This belief is actually interestingly the inverse of the posed question of how new types of war are shaping public attitudes on the use of force. Based on remarks it was asserted that it is not the use of force shaping the attitudes of the public, but instead the attitudes of the public shaping the way the US uses force. One panelist made the point that it is social mobilization that produces the support for the use of force and not fiscal considerations; wars are relatively cheap and easy to fund but in order to gain support the public does not want to see the loss of US life. The panelist went on to further discuss how the attitudes of the public are shaping the future of war by causing a larger reliance on special operations forces and drones to mitigate large footprints of soldiers that could result in more casualties. He described this shift in how force is used in relation to public opinion by calling it an equilibrium. In order to keep the public content with how the military is employed, the military must stay within the bounds of public attitudes to keep the balance and allow the continuation of operations with the least amount of friction.

The second theme was closed by two main points: First, both the military and civilian populations need to understand that the levels of strategic impact achievable become drastically different with increased risk aversion. By removing soldiers from the ground and relying predominantly on drone strikes we are not achieving strategic objectives as the moment of the strike is not lasting, as opposed to a higher-risk operation such as putting soldiers on the ground to train forces, which does have lasting strategic effects. Second, and perhaps the primer for the final theme, the gap in civilian understanding of military force is resulting in largely baseless opinions of how the US military should use force to achieve its strategic objectives.

Finally, the gap in civilian understanding of how to properly employ the military is pervasive, from the average American to elected leaders charged with deciding when and how the US military should use force. This gap in understanding is continuing to grow and is resulting in citizens and elected leaders formulating baseless opinions about military use. This theme was generated early into the panel discussion when one of the panelists presented her survey data on how uninformed the general public was about low-intensity operations that take place across the world, and specifically around the events in Niger. The statistics highlighted the fact that people have a very low understanding of what military force is, how it can be employed, and where it makes sense to use certain types of operations. An interesting observation about the statistics that was brought up by an audience member was that it seemed like people’s opinions on the use of military force is split along partisan lines. That point was further expanded on by a panel member, who made the observation that due to a lack of understanding people either support the use of military force or don’t based on their party, and it is being used as a measure of patriotism instead of an educated opinion measured by a level of knowledge on the subject, which is a dangerous place for US politics to be.

This theme continued with Dr. Sewall pointing out the very clear misunderstanding of roles and norms within the civil-military relationship. She emphasized that not all senior members of the military have understood their role in this relationship, and as a result their civilian counterparts and the general public are not being properly educated on the ways the US military should be employed to achieve the greatest success. Dr. Sewall highlighted the fact that it has become an unwritten rule that senior officers should not write and should do everything they can to insulate themselves from the political realm, which she feels is a dereliction of duty. It is the role of senior officers to advise and educate the civilian populace to ensure decisions are made by individuals with the greatest possible level of understanding, and to close the gap in the civ-mil relationship. She used the example of Secretary of Defense James Mattis to make her point. As a general in the Marine Corps, Secretary Mattis was
thought of as being controversial for letting his thoughts be known, whereas now he is seen as a beacon of light in
understanding US defense policy. Her point was that as a general he should not have been thought of as
controversial, but instead someone who was doing the right thing to educate and advise his civilian counterparts.

Conclusion

The themes of this panel highlighted how the attitudes of the general public are changing the way military force is
employed. The panel also highlighted the fact that these attitudes being transmitted by the public are coming
from a place of general indifference with little knowledge on the subject. This trend towards low-intensity
operations and the increased use of drones will result in the general public solidifying its attitude that war should
not be costly and leave the country unprepared to actually manage to true burden of large-scale operations. The
panelists all agreed that in order to close the apparent gap in civil-military understanding it is incumbent on the
military to become more active in educating and advising the civilian side that does not have the same level of
experience on the matter.
## Participant List

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Dr. Mara Karlin  
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Gen. (ret) William Rapp  
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NBC Universal  
Panelist

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Johns Hopkins  
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