Vice Versa

AN ARTISTIC APPRAISAL OF JOINT DOCTRINE’S EXPRESSION OF CAMPAIGNS, MAJOR OPERATIONS, AND OBJECTIVES

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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford publicly and frequently expresses his frustration with the legacy joint phasing construct (Phases 0–V) for organizing joint force actions across theaters. Gen. Dunford’s comments echo other national security officials’ conclusions, but a deeper problem beyond the notion of phasing resides within professional joint literature. Doctrine misses the art of connecting the use of force with the force’s use in competitive and wartime statecraft. To a casual reader, joint doctrine presents an imposing, seemingly comprehensive and authoritative expression of joint force principles and processes. In general, doctrine’s characterizations of employing military force throughout its primary publications are thematic. While much of the content is indeed worthwhile, joint literature is not necessarily precise or sufficient in explaining utilization of the force. Most of these doctrinal themes reinforce sound principles, but a few perpetuate incomplete and obsolete ideas from the early 1990s. One case in point is doctrine’s overlapping articulation of campaigns and major operations, as well as their associated objectives. These shortfalls weaken our professional methodologies and models for attaining outcomes.

Currently, doctrine describes applications of military force through a hierarchy of larger to smaller military actions. Through this hierarchy, the prose explains the nature and purpose of different types of joint operations. This method is sensible, but doctrine does not articulate meaningful differences between a campaign and a major operation. Additionally, joint doctrine provides a weak description of the differences between operational and strategic objectives. In the aggregate, joint doctrine’s overriding theme is major operations and campaigns are mostly the same, creating an intellectual gap between policy and the configuration of joint activities used to pursue the policy. Joint doctrine blurs differences between these two terms in several ways. First, doctrine defines each term with the same purpose. Second, within those nearly synonymous definitions, joint publications use imprecise and undefined nomenclature. Third, doctrine articulates the crafting of both campaigns and major operations are primarily the purview of a commander. Fourth, the legacy ideas within doctrine have “pushed up” tactical and operational constructs and associated terminology to levels that exceed their meaning, capacity, and utility. Finally, doctrine states campaigns and operations accomplish similar goals and conclude in similar manners. The overall effect is joint doctrine pulls the idea of a campaign toward tactics when it should ensure the function of campaigning connects to policy and highlights the joint forces’ contributions to statecraft.

As such, joint doctrine and formal instruction may not provide the appropriate planning logic and language to inform and implement the campaigning efforts we need and the current national strategies demand. The sanguine news is a philosophical correction across the joint doctrine and concepts communities is underway and substantive change is ongoing. Soon, there will be a relevant and believable framework and composition. This change is essential as the current beliefs surrounding legacy planning are insufficient. Although pointed in places, this appraisal is a genuine paean to the
communities’ willingness to brush aside obsolete ideas and face the realities of the contemporary environment. It is an exciting time to be involved in doctrine and concept development. The emerging rewrite of Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, along with the imminent updates to Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning* and Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* offer great potential. Previously, the maturing joint and service concepts informed the strategic guidance, and they are now guiding the future doctrine and planning philosophy. The following examination highlights a few shortcomings the effort seeks to address.

**Overlapping Definitions.** The current JP 1 associates both major operations and campaigns with large-scale combat and JP 3-0 categorizes campaigns and major operations as “Large-Scale Combat Operations.” By definition, both accomplish operational and strategic objectives. Doctrine describes campaigns as the most extensive of all joint operations, emphasizing differentiation of scale and duration. The thematic expression throughout doctrine and the traditional definitions of a campaign and campaign plan “is a [plan for a] series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.” Therefore, a campaign or the act of campaigning is dependent upon the definitions of a major operation, an operational objective, and a strategic objective. Similarly, doctrine defines a major operation as “a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces.” In the same manner, doctrine states a major operation’s purpose is “to achieve strategic and operational objectives.” These two definitions are redundant as their purposes are essentially verbatim. The issue is campaigning is much more than a bundling of major operations, and an individual major operation rarely accomplishes the entirety of an operational-level goal, much less delivers the intended political goal. Furthermore, doctrine defines battles, engagements, and strikes as tactical actions occurring in combat. Therefore, joint doctrine relationally ties both campaigns and major operations to the realm of armed conflict, constraining the quality of both terms.

Next, the definition of a campaign associates the attainment of objectives within a given time interval and space. Although joint doctrine has a general acknowledgment of multiple domains, its appreciation of “space” is limited. Its use is nearly synonymous with “place” or a geographic area. At best, doctrine touches on space in the context of freedom to decide and synchronize action. This oversight is unfortunate as adversarial behaviors can unfold across a multitude of spaces. Regarding time, a particular interval does not always define a campaigning effort. In many instances, actual durations are only identifiable in retrospect. Thus, assumptions regarding time do not necessarily make for a good metric in defining campaigning. Finally, a major operation might consist of only direct combat actions, but campaigning must account for many more military capabilities and facets of international relations than just arranging a big battle. For example, while campaigning through cooperation with partners and allies, both commanders and diplomats normally have to manage relationships with dozens of other countries, with each state having distinct peculiarities.

**Imprecise and Undefined Terms.** Joint doctrine repeatedly describes campaigns and major operations as similar applications of the joint force in conditions of armed conflict. In a bit of a contradiction, JP 3-0 inserts an obtuse caveat stating campaigns and major operations can also be noncombat operations as well. JP 3-0 differentiates the two from other noncombat operations through
a summary of size and duration. Joint doctrine provides only a general explanation of how these definitive combat operations tie to noncombat policy goals, partly because joint doctrine does not define noncombat operations either. In or out of combat, a more accurate portrayal is the joint force can campaign against a broad array of antagonists’ actions in many contested spaces beyond the constraints of geography. Samples include subjects such as disinformation, perception, legitimacy, criminality, coercion, cyber intrusion, and political subversion. Furthermore, the joint force campaigns against antagonists in more conditions than just high-stakes armed conflict. Patterns of campaigning include countering nuanced uses of military force along with other elements of state power short of war, and while consolidating gains as an inherent aspect of waging warfare. Finally, the joint force campaigns to maintain conditions favorable to US interests in the re-characterized competitions that arise in the long aftermath of armed conflict.

A Cascading and Detrimental Effect. As doctrine provides a weak divide between campaigns and operations, it similarly fails to make a definitional distinction between operational and strategic objectives. The result is the terms are open to broad interpretation. For instance, their use in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (DODDMAT) conflates definitions and in the Unified Joint Task List (UJTL) and confuses the development of standards for mission essential tasks. For many important definitions, the DODDMAT defines a term’s purpose as to “accomplish operational and strategic objectives” or to “accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or [other] operational areas.” The most troubling aspect is the assertion of a strategic objective physically “existing” within a boundary of our choosing. This description is not always accurate. The broader point is these terms and definitions are key. Each term should have accurate and precise meanings. In some sections, the UJTL describes strategic objectives as physical entities the joint force targets. Within other tasks, the joint force supposedly maneuvers against operational and strategic objectives as if they are both tied to a specific piece of geography. In a few sections, UJTL tasks suggest the idea of a strategic objective is synonymous with the pursuits of statecraft. These detrimental aspects within the UJTL may even affect readiness reporting; therefore, they can ultimately skew policy decisions.

Beyond a Commander’s Purview. A significant difference between the art of campaigning and the act of executing major operations is a question over the key figures that drive the process. According to Janine Davidson and her team, emerging or violent crises can generate continual journalistic headlines which eventually influence domestic US politics. As demand for US action builds, the civilian leadership will want to examine a breadth of alternative approaches with an associated range of possible outcomes for each. Unfortunately, a traditional commander-centric military planning process ultimately seeks a single viable course of action for a focused operation. This process is well-suited for tactical action but lacks utility within a spiral civilian-military dialogue that’s associated with policy choice development and corresponding campaign design. In reality, the civilian leadership will rarely begin deliberations armed with the omniscient knowledge and conviction to declare the desired future regarding a specific circumstance. Therefore, the civilian-military interaction must first develop a foundational set of considerations. After understanding the opportunities, costs, and risks different styles of interventions might carry, then the civilian leadership can build toward an approach that can achieve favorable results.
In contrast, doctrinal courses of action can orient more on military accomplishment than formulation or implementation of policy. “Actual iteration can only begin once civilian policymakers and military advisors have had a more fundamental conversation” above and beyond the expressed purview of a commander and the scope of the joint operational planning process.\textsuperscript{16} \textsuperscript{17} However, joint doctrine describes the idea of a commander as the central figure in the creativity and application of operational art. The military planning surrounding operational art assumes the commander is previously vested with the overall authority, responsibility, and accountability for a specific military mission. For any operation in line with existing policy guidance, this is normally the arrangement. However, campaign artistry—the act of developing strategic guidance, putting it in motion, and continually pursuing the aim—unfolds a few levels higher than joint doctrine’s description of exercising operational art and the circle of responsibility includes more military and civilian officials than just the commander.\textsuperscript{18} Ultimately, the commander may be the conductor of a campaigning effort, but never the sole composer.

**Military End State: The Vanishing Point.** The current lexicon leans heavily on the idea of a military end state to describe the ideal conclusion of both operations and campaigns. Moreover, joint doctrine characterizes the term as a point of primary accomplishment. One doctrinal theme running throughout the joint publications is attaining a military end state invariably leads to a favorable political situation. However, the description of how this occurs is ambiguous. What is clear is an unrealistic expectation of a transition of responsibility to another enterprise. The contrived notion of a military end state provides a poor articulation of success and a worse indicator of conclusion relative to a policy outcome. This flawed element of operational design creates an intellectual void within joint doctrine’s description of the military’s contribution to a particular policy and the follow-through required to realize its purpose. In fact, the artificiality of a military end state almost singlehandedly distorts and corrupts our understanding of the relationships between policy/strategy, campaigning, operations, and objectives.

Consolidating and maintaining gains is an integral part of campaigning. It requires a continuing opportunity cost of military effort. Any notion of completeness or resolution suggested by a military end state can be completely irrelevant. Ironically, a military end state may be a good servant for the construct of an individual operation, but it makes for an inappropriate master for describing campaigning’s relation to policy aims. This notable difference is in stark contrast to joint doctrine’s current commentary on either term. By orienting on a military end state, campaign artistry can miss the magnitude and attributes of effort required to achieve the appropriate measures of success, translate success into political outcomes, and prepare for future repercussions. Moreover, focusing on short-sighted notions of achievement can mask risks inherently associated with the known patterns of armed conflict. History documents that “military establishments repeatedly find that war’s aftermath comes with its own set of unique and lasting consequences for both the victor and vanquished as clear conclusion and finality are elusive.”\textsuperscript{19} It should come as no surprise at this point, but joint doctrine does not define military end state, and yet the influence of this flawed term resides throughout every joint publication.

**Conclusions and Overtures.** By classifying campaigns and major operations in a similar and overlapping manner, joint doctrine dilutes and obfuscates the meaning and utility of both terms. Just as
the community should not confuse aspects of statecraft and the implementation of policy with tactics, we should not view campaigning as synonymous with operations. Future doctrine should eliminate the thematic vice versa descriptions of the two. Additionally, the joint community should not be satisfied with a lack of clear definitions for operational and strategic objectives. This oversight further obfuscates an understanding of the differences between campaigning and operations. Furthermore, the joint community should have a comprehensive appreciation of when, where, how, and in what circumstances the joint force may campaign. The joint force’s current and future capability to campaign across not only armed conflict, but varying conditions is a vital element of national power. In the future, a policy shift might direct the joint force to campaign in a manner and expectation the current models and definitions do not reflect at all. Therefore, this appraisal offers a few overtures for consideration.

**Espy: Clarifying Campaigning from Operating.** The joint force’s doctrine should articulate campaigning as the activities and instruments that orchestrate a broad range of simultaneous actions within and between multiple combatant commands. These actions, in concert with other elements of power, not only pursue policy aims but anticipate a future beyond those goals as well. These actions include many service-component operations, joint operations, and continual alignment of military actions with interagency and allied efforts of sufficient scope and scale to achieve and secure the desired outcomes. No less important, major operations synchronize tactical capabilities and conclude in military terms, which should build toward but are far short of the desired political conditions.

The genesis of campaigning occurs in the viscous space between the strategic discussion, evolving policy, and operational-level processes. The selection of the arrangement, implementation, adaptation, and follow-through of campaigning is usually the overall choice of policymakers. Typically, the commander is just one of many trusted figures providing input along with other senior civilian and military leaders serving as both advisors and integrators. In the end, policymakers, both inside and outside the Department of Defense determine the primary blueprint of the policy and help steer the effort. However, as a measure of useful overlap, military and civilian leaders together form an undivided interest in accomplishing the intent of the policy. An effective and continual civilian-military dialogue guides the process, not purely military decision making and execution orders. Policy revisions or shifts drive campaigning’s progression, modification, and scoping. On some occasions, policy drives campaigning efforts to seek broad, transregional, or even global achievement, requiring many more parallel actions and substantially more diverse operational-level objectives. Policymakers, normally advised by their senior diplomatic, military, and intelligence leaders, determine when the campaigning effort has reached a point of diminishing necessity relative to political calculus. Normally, these decisions occur over many years and appear as methodical transitions. In the most successful examples, the United States maintains enduring relationships and joint force presence.

Campaigning centers on a deep understanding of shifting circumstances and orients on policy outcomes, not adherence to idealistic phases or flimsy force planning scenarios. In the context of appreciating art of all types, there is a perpetual discussion about negative and positive space. “Positive space refers to the subject itself, the flower vase in a painting or the structure of a sculpture. Negative space is what is left around, between, and within the subjects.” Together they constitute the total form or an environment. However, these spaces are not always self-evident. Skilled artists can employ
negative space to create illusions. The most sophisticated artists can purposefully blend spaces to create an almost indistinguishable arrangement, veiling the subject’s meaning or dispersing its signature. Similarly, competent adversaries are equally capable of manipulating spaces and environments in pursuit of their interests. In many cases, veiled narratives lead the nuanced use of diplomacy and force within these manipulations. Campaign artistry must recognize the subject, its complex surroundings, and all the sophisticated measures levied against both. As for the burr in the defense community’s saddle, the legacy phasing construct, it focuses on none of these aspects. Its faulty orientation is inward. Legacy phasing offers a seductive story for the novice practitioner. However, the model and terminology do not account for what is necessary to vividly imagine how to successfully campaign through the simultaneous circumstances of cooperation, competition, and armed conflict as experienced throughout history.

An effective campaign framework is a function of integrating principles organized around a prevailing logic of what is truly required to prevail against the subject and why it should succeed in the face of uncertain reality. The artist’s language must provide for precise expressions for the logic’s use of force. The seminal crux of the logic is empathizing with adversaries and identifying their actions’ real causes, incentives, aspirations, key enablers, and mechanics of manifestation. This comprehension provides deep insights and appreciation for the antagonist’s calculus and decision making. The insights enable campaign artistry to account for all the adversary’s foundational factors driving decisions. The recognition of these factors enables campaign arrangement to parse those key elements and synthesize the necessary behaviors and conditions the joint force must create to confound and collapse the adversary’s pursuits. Additionally, this identification provides a basis to inoculate valued interests from the adversarial actions’ harmful effects. Alternatively, when the artists’ campaign design does not center on this rationale, the first steps can lead straight toward failure. When we take action uninformed by an empathetic perspective, we may not address the adversary’s true motivations or sources of power. Although the actions may seem like a stroke of genius or based on a previous successful experience, the adversary might not understand US actions. The misinterpretation can reinforce the adversary’s greatest fears regarding our intentions. On the other hand, when we act out of poor context, the adversary can also perceive the measures as irrelevant or meaningless. The result can be a completely ineffective use of force that reinforces the adversary’s ambition or leads to dramatic miscalculation and unthinkable escalation. Currently, joint planning does not have an appreciation of empathy or describe the importance of an empathetic perspective as a factor of campaign design.

Thorough campaign composition weaves each aspect of the logic in the context of the evolving political ends in mind; therefore, continual adaptation is critical. Over the course of protracted armed conflict, the campaigning effort is typically a function of ebbs and flows of offensives, stalemates, and counteroffensives. Normally this form of campaigning is characterized by surprise, violent interaction, failure, and sustained adaptation. The resulting military success and political accomplishment are normally consummated and enforced through an occupation if not annexation by the victor. Alternatively, accomplishing policy can require a campaigning effort to orchestrate a kaleidoscopic array of nuanced, subtle, and even virtual activities. In contrast to doctrine’s narrow descriptions, campaigning to attain policy aims might not include a focused, decisive aspect seeking to break the will of an adversary. Additionally, campaigning’s necessities can require the employment of hundreds of
smaller military and nonmilitary efforts implemented and adjusted over long durations. Moreover, campaigning may consist of directing thousands of informational and virtual actions occurring far beyond any notion of a geographical area of operations. This style of campaigning provides new meanings to an offensive or counteroffensive and defies the current conceptions of conventional and irregular warfare. Finally, campaigning may compose variegated movements of drastic economic measures blended with focused diplomatic efforts and enabled with credible military force. These activities might have to be successful across several regions and multiple domains to meet goals of statecraft. Regarding political results, whether in circumstances of cooperation, competition, or protracted armed conflict, joint doctrine should designate campaigning as decisive only in the aggregate and when it achieves policy's overarching aims for the use of force and provides a footing to accommodate future circumstances. Any other articulation of success such as a “military end state” falls short of the mark.

On the other hand, an operation’s conception is in the mind’s eye of a commander. A single operation should be subordinate to the overall logic of the campaigning effort. Most individual operations are tactical actions which orient on accomplishing essential tasks. Individual operations are typically sequential and unfold by phases or branches as crafted by a commander. A commander may select two or ten phases to support his or her vision of mission command and appraisal of the situation. The legacy construct’s “cookie-cutter” phases and their descriptions are rarely germane to the specifics of an individual joint or service-component operation. Alternatively, the phasing of discrete operations remains an important control measure. By doctrine, operations seek to conclude in terms of a commander’s mission-specific end states, but even this is incomplete. In reality, operations culminate and then transition to the next operation. The accomplishments of a single operation (major or otherwise) rarely equate to the entirety of an operational objective and much less deliver on one of the policy’s aims. The fault lay in joint doctrine’s use of tactical phasing to broadly describe a model of an entire episode of dynamic, challenging, and uncertain armed conflict. Legacy phasing makes armed conflict seem predictable and predestined. This poor conception of warfare has caged our thinking for over two decades. According to Eliot Cohen, “The orderliness is absurd... In practice, nothing like so orderly a process can or does take place.”

In armed conflict, successful individual operations incrementally advance or make progress toward intermediate goals. As calculated as Operation Overlord was, chaotic as the Ardennes Counteroffensive was, and as consequential as the Citadel/Kutuzov Offensive-Counteroffensive was, they were all subordinate to the greater Allied campaigning effort and wartime approach to the European Theater. These actions were all “phased” or sequenced—two deliberately and the other improvisationally. Each offensive culminated favorably with temporary gains, but far short of the war’s aims. The real virtue of phasing is in aiding tactical control and providing a template for determining if the action unfolds by design. In hindsight, a historian or military researcher might be able to point to some moment of a military end state to these individual operations. However, building an operation toward that artificial notion is contrary to the logic and principles of operational continuity. What matters most for these actions and other consequential offensives, such as Operation Watchtower in the Solomon Islands and thwarting the Japanese attack at Midway, is not some notion of “ending,” but adapting. Adapting is characterized by preparing for the threat’s reaction, adjusting to the recent
experience, consolidating the gains, and transitioning to a follow-on offensive or other appropriate action. As such, none of these historic offensives mirror or mimic the legacy phasing construct. Understanding these historical norms and moorings takes nothing away from the functional utility of campaigning or an individual joint operation. In fact, joint doctrine should describe the twenty-first century’s versions of these types of clashes between capable adversaries. Overall, the function of campaigning comprises the joint force’s entire odyssey throughout a demanding and uncertain exercise of competitive or wartime statecraft. In relation to campaigning, an individual joint operation is only a single brushstroke across a massive canvas or string pluck within a vast symphony. The two functions are distinct, but essential for the practical pursuit and achievement of policy.

**Delineate: Contrasting Operational from Strategic Objectives.** Operational and strategic objectives exist within the same universe and should relate to one another, but they are uniquely different. First of all, operational objectives can be animate (behavioral) or inanimate (territorial/conditional). Joint doctrine does not make a distinction between the two, but successful campaigning requires careful development and accomplishment of both. When accounting for all the factors surrounding the circumstance, campaign artistry interprets requirements and cascades out from the prevailing logic to formulate a guide or “tree” within the conceptual construct for specific and informed applications of force. Operational objectives build out from the reasoning. As a result, what emerges and matures is a coherent suite or constellation of prerequisite and intermediate operational goals which provide focus and flexibility for military and military-supported actions. In following the logic, campaign artistry links and arranges capabilities across the construct to accomplish the operational goals or objectives. However, rapid adaptation to failure and exploitation of success can drive numerous military revisions and changes in prioritization to the array of operational objectives. Regarding the contested interests at stake, successful progression in pursuing operational objectives validates or contradicts the campaign’s rationale, and advances and expands leverage, partnerships, opportunity, and the guiding narrative. Regarding the enemy, operational progress temporarily constrains their actions, complicates and stymies their choices, and shrinks their relevant influence, relationships, capability, and credibility.

On the other hand, strategic objectives can be best described as varying and elastic political values, not necessarily physical entities as alluded to by the UJTL.\(^{50\, 51}\) The adversaries' opposing values do not necessarily exist within a designated theater, although their obvious manifestations usually do. Therefore, the keys to attaining our strategic objectives and their challenges can exist thousands of miles away within a small locus of power or reside as disaggregated sentiment spread across several continents, created and maintained through deft uses of information. Therefore, some of these values are not necessarily subject to or advanced by direct target or attack within operational-level boundaries. Effective campaigning must reach beyond current notions of theaters and regions to orient on and account for what drives the competition or armed conflict. Otherwise, the campaigning effort may only address symptoms.

Collectively, the strategic objectives—or better yet the political values—describe the desired outcomes. However, political values are rarely fixed or static. They exist in beta-like form. These values evolve as a function of the gravity of the interests, stakes at risk, political calculus, compromise, and
ambition. Any particular value will have strong advocacy across different parts of the United States government. As campaigning typically includes more than one strategic objective, these values exist within a contentious hierarchy. Therefore, internal competition between these values creates constant tension regarding prioritization. Historically, the prioritization can become politicized and therefore overwhelm sage operational priorities. This tension can be especially apparent when there is little identifiable progress toward any of the values, no matter how seemingly valid the joint force prosecutes actions along the campaigning efforts’ multiple paths. This tension between values can be just as evident with dramatic and unanticipated success as well. In this occurrence, the number and magnitude of political values may expand. The historical risk in these cases is overreach. In other instances, dire or unanticipated operational circumstances can serve to rearrange the priority of the intended values. Orienting on these values requires a multidisciplinary approach, sophisticated organizing framework, and precise terminology for campaigning.

**Transcend: Recognizing the Artistic Relationship between Agile Campaign Logic, Operations, and Objectives.** The formulation of policy goals and corresponding campaign design is not the sole purview of military officials. However, one of the commander’s central roles is assimilating the aggregate desired political values and translating them into the campaign’s foundational concept/construct in a manner the joint force can understand and organize to achieve them.

As the campaign’s logic cures, it informs considerations for revisions of the initial political values via the civil-military dialogue. Invariably, the political values will expand, morph, or re-order themselves based on surprise, miscalculation, failure, and adaptation. Over the demanding course of both competitive and wartime offensives, stalemates, and counteroffensives, agile campaigning logic responds throughout execution. The reasoning continuously guides appropriate modifications of the operational-level objectives and redirects operations as necessary. Within this dynamic universe, the essence of campaign artistry is in creating, connecting, and revising the operational-level activities to meet the shifting contested environment and morphing hierarchy of strategic objectives. Current doctrine repeatedly highlights that logic “is” the sequencing of action, but this interpretation is incomplete. The idea of sequencing is a subordinate function or output of the prevailing logic. A campaign artist’s savoir faire is in continually critiquing and maintaining the prevailing logic as to why the campaigning approach will ultimately succeed despite continual change, pressure, and tension between the strategic and operational objectives, the risk posed by the adversary, and the long-term repercussions of success. Regarding success, campaign artistry orients on attaining statecraft’s aims and anticipates the future challenges which will emerge as a result. Overall, the prevailing logic should provide a convincing level of conviction and confidence for the approach. In due course, the astute and venerable commander, armed with healthy relationships with other military advisors and policymakers, may be in the best position to see, feel, and understand these tensions and maintain the logic’s relevance and rectitude. In the best expressions of campaign artistry, the composer, conductor, and ensemble perform as one.

**Summary.** Joint doctrine should adequately define and distinguish between fundamental terms as much of joint literature centers around campaigning and operations. However, up to now, we have been sloppy and sought to describe each with the same stroke of the pen. Much is the same for their
associated objectives. A great deal of legacy doctrine seeks to justify ersatz end states, while in reality the term is meaningless. The professional literature on campaigning should orient on valued outcomes, while individual operations should focus on accomplishing interim objectives. Right now, doctrine does not make these specific points clear. In summary, joint doctrine masks their important differences and meanings. The forthcoming adaptations to the primary joint publications should provide a clear doctrinal separation between campaigning and operations as well as differentiating operational from strategic objectives. Fortunately, correcting these flaws requires only modest reforms. Both the JP 3-0 and JP 5-0 updates could add more clarity to this shortcoming. This clarity would further enhance each term’s utility and function. As an institution, the joint force and its leadership are far more enlightened than the archaic models and conceptions of waging warfare still clinging to legacy doctrine and professional military education. For example, the 2017 National Security Strategy and the Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy do not include any mention of end states or phases. Many joint organizations have moved beyond the poor logic and ahistorical nature of these artifacts.

Future doctrine should emphasize how the joint force accomplishes the purpose of the use of force—with and without war. For example, the community is developing a Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) for the “cooperation, competition, and armed conflict” framework. In the near future, the community may consider a JDN specifically for campaigning which would identify the logic, factors of campaign design, and relevant terminology for campaigning in competition. Additionally, the doctrine and concept communities should complete the eradication of the legacy phasing construct as a conception of warfare. Finally, we must appreciate the great difference between cumulative military achievement and overall political success. Historically, the joint force must contribute toward both or neither occurs.\textsuperscript{52} For example, at the top of his game, Napoleon preferred to offer generous, but intertwining terms reinforced by both soft and hard power in order to make his strategic accomplishments enduring. During his demise, he mistook military accomplishment for political victory.\textsuperscript{53} In describing another era, Niccolò Machiavelli’s themes in Discourses on Livy suggest that the victor must deliberately choose to be cruel or kind to the defeated adversary, but the mentality of “end state,” and for that matter “exit strategy,” promotes poor and ruinous political half measures.\textsuperscript{54} These half measures are historically insufficient to confront the re-characterized competitions that emerge as a consequence of even the most successful examples of armed conflict. Machiavelli’s interpretation of Roman virtue may not be post-bellum’s best reference, but here he makes a good point on the deliberate calculation of follow through. As a part of the ongoing reformation of joint doctrine, maybe it is time to review and compare the utility of what Edward Luttwak first introduced in 1980 as the “operational level of war” with our current interpretations and definitions as to their correct alignment and association with statecraft and achieving the aims of policy.\textsuperscript{55}

\textit{This article is dedicated to the imagination and creativity of future planning.
Scott Kendrick is an advocate of sound and relevant doctrine, concepts, and war planning. He is a former Division Chief of the Joint Operational War Plans Division (JOWPD), Joint Staff, J-5 and previous member of the Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) development team. Thanks to Kevin Benson, Jenny Cafarella, JP Clark, Tony Echevarria, Ben Fernandes, Lauren Fish, Rob Gardner, George Georgas, Phil Kapusta, Jerry Lynes, Super Dave Toczek, and Andrew “Dex” Wilson for their critique, counsel, and contributions.


And, GEN Dunford, Joseph F., “Air Force Association Air, Space, and Cyber Conference”, at the Gaylord Hotel in National Harbor, MD on 21 September 2016. General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., noted, “Our traditional way that we differentiate between peace and war is insufficient to [the dynamic of competition below armed conflict].” http://secure.afa.org/events/Conference/2016/recordings/Wednesday-830am-Dunford.asp; See also, GEN Dunford’s remarks at the Association of the U.S. Army Conference, 5 October, 2016, “We think of being at peace or war...our adversaries don’t think that way.” https://www.ausa.org/news/dunford-challenges-require-more-%E2%80%99buying-newhardware%E2%80%99

2 Eliot A. Cohen. The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force (Kindle Locations 3939-3943). Basic Books. Kindle Edition. Dr. Cohen writes: “American military planning doctrine . . . divides conflict into six phases: (0) prewar preparations to 'shape the environment,' (I) deterrent activities to prevent war, (II) seizing the initiative through deployments if deterrence has failed, (III) dominating the enemy (probably by destroying it), (IV) stabilizing the postwar situation, and (V) handing over to civilian authorities at the end of conflict. The orderliness is absurd. And yet this conceptualization shapes how the American military approaches war. In practice nothing like so orderly a process can or does take place.”


5 William C. Hix, MG USA, Email 2016 Tuesday, August 30, 2016, 6:36 AM. To: Scott Kendrick, COL USA : “Thoughts on clear separation between Campaigning from Major Operations (UNCLASSIFIED)” MG Hix explains, “The distinction between campaigns and operations has been blurred and we have pulled up tactical and operational constructs to levels that exceed their meaning, capacity and utility.”


DoD, Joint Staff, J-7. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington, DC. As amended through April 2018. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf. The dictionary provides a tactical and tactical commander-centric definition of objective. Absent is any description of the character of an operational-level objective or the idea of an objective being equivalent to a strategic policy aim or desired outcome or associated result. Definition of objective: “1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken which is essential to the commander’s plan. See also target. (JP 5-0).”


a. UJTL Task SN 3.8 – Conduct Special Operations Activities – describes a strategic objective as something to be “achieved.” UJTL Task ST 3.1.2 – Assign Joint /Multinational Theater to Targets/Target Systems – describes a strategic objective as something to attack and re-attack. The description is consistent across all the higher level fires tasks. UJTL OP1 series (specifically OP 1.2) describes joint force as maneuvering against/to accomplish strategic objectives as if they
physically exist within a designated area. The issue here is similar to the doctrinal theme of describing operational and strategic objectives together in the same sentence.

b. The most disappointing of all tasks is OP 5.3.3. After experiencing what we have learned and relearned about the fleeting nature of clear conclusion and finality, this task is titled “Determine the End State.” If this was an artifact from the 1990s, it would be one matter, but the joint staff approved this task in July 2015. The sub-tasks, conditions, and standards read like a relief-in-place with either the interagency or a host-nation like entity pursuant to ending operations. The UJTL does not recognize or use the term consolidation in the context of consolidating gains as part of a greater campaign pursuing political outcomes.

14 DoD, Joint Staff, J-7. Joint Publications (JP) JP 1, DOD Dictionary, JP 3.0, and JP 5.0. Washington, DC. The primary Joint Staff publications mention operational and strategic objectives or goals together and “joined at the hip” within definitions or in describing the focus joint force actions and purposes over fifty times. Specifically, the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms describes them in tandem. In researching operational and strategic objectives, approximately twenty definitional terms state their purpose is to accomplish/achieve “operational and/or strategic objectives,” “to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or (other) operational areas,” or a close facsimile thereof. This observation includes the joint definitions of both campaign/plan and major operation. Finally, the case in point is a strategic objective is loosely applied hundreds of times, but never defined or accurately described.


17 William E. Rapp, “Civil-Military Relations: The Role of Military Leaders in Strategy Making.” Page 14-15. (Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War College Press) Parameters, Vol. 45, No. 3, Autumn 2015. http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Autumn_2015/5_Rapp.pdf The author writes: “Enumerating goals is relatively easy to do, but all too often strategic discourse ends there. Having the capacity, time, energy, and knowledge to craft a sufficiently detailed set of workable strategies to achieve policy goals is a much more elusive and difficult endeavor. These need to be strategies that not only contain initial ends, ways, and means, but also things like development of supporting objectives and thorough risk analyses. All of that takes time and each day brings unforeseen challenges that strip away the time and energy leaders and their staffs have, especially in Washington.”


Cohen, *The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force* (Kindle Locations 3872-3874). Basic Books. Kindle Edition. Dr. Cohen highlights, “The wars of the twenty-first century will differ from those of the past, and from each other. If there is one lesson to be learned from America’s wars from Korea through Iraq, it is that attempting to fit them into a template (particularly a template that excluded protracted irregular conflict) was a mistake.”


25 Katherine Zimmerman, “America’s Real Enemy: The Salafi-Jihadi Movement.” 18 July 2017. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/americas-real-enemy-the-salafi-jihadi-movement. Ms. Zimmerman provides a good example of failing to diagnose the true problem, or staying with a theme of this paper – the subject. She states; “The United States is losing the war against an enemy it has misunderstood for decades. Al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), and the Salafi-jihadi groups that threaten the United States are stronger, smarter, and more resilient than they were on September 11, 2001. Americans have confused tactical successes on the battlefield against ISIS and al Qaeda with progress in this war. They have narrowed their understanding of the threat to faraway and compartmentalized fights in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, and to the random acts of inspired violence conducted by ‘lone wolves.’ Yet 16 years after going to war, the US is even further away from winning.”


27 Lauren Fish, “Painting by the Numbers: A History of the U. S. Military’s Phasing Construct.” *War on the Rocks*. 1 Nov, 2016. https://warontherocks.com/2016/11/painting-by-numbers-a-history-of-the-u-s-militarys-phasing-construct/. Ms. Fish effectively highlights a few of the many flaws inherent within the roots of the legacy “notional plan phasing construct”: “While the campaign outlined in the BUR (Report on the Bottom’s Up Review, Oct 1993) was intended to be generalizable, the phases were clearly influenced by the stunning U.S. success in the Gulf War only two years prior. An obvious shortcoming of this model is that a swift buildup of forces may not be replicated in a country with only a few forward U. S. bases nearby, not to mention prepositioned stocks, easy airlift or seaports, or ready supporting allies. However, these were not its only limitations. The phasing construct was developed to estimate force requirements for conventional regional conflicts, not an overarching model for the conduct of war generally, great power conflict, or nuclear actors. The BUR did not provide an analogous model for peacekeeping or stability operations, the number of which were expected to increase under U.S. global engagement. Further, the BUR indicated an expectation to fund other actors, such as the United Nations, to carry out peace enforcement and transfer this task from U.S. forces. Finally, the requirement of fighting two wars required a quick, decisive victory in one theater before shifting the brunt of resources to the other fight, while maintaining steady-state strategic nuclear and presence operations. Rapid victory was expected, and conflicts were assumed to remain conventional competitions between state actors. The construct institutionalized many of these unrealistic assumptions that the phasing construct perpetuates today.”

28 Paul Scharre, “Losing the Peace is still losing the War.” *War on the Rocks*. 17 Oct, 2016. https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/losing-the-peace-is-still-losing/ Mr. Scharre continues to ask penetrating questions regarding the legacy phasing construct. In this article, he queries, “At a certain point, it is worth asking whether the traditional U.S. concept of war is too narrow or even if it is ‘conventional.’ Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted that war does not fit into ‘neat, tidy boxes.’ There are many ways to use violence or the threat of violence to achieve political aims. Perhaps it’s time to drop the qualifiers and expand the default
concept for what constitutes war. The U.S. military acts like a team playing a game for which it wrote the rules. Unfortunately, the other teams never agreed to play by them. Instead of annotating each deviation the other team makes of our ‘rules,’ maybe it’s time to burn the rulebook.”

29 Paul Scharre, “American Strategy and the Six Phases of Grief.” War on the Rocks. 6 Oct, 2016. https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/american-strategy-and-the-six-phases-of-grief/ Mr. Scharre examines the limitations of the legacy phasing construct. In one paragraph, he writes, “This is a problem. The phasing construct is a tool the U.S. military created to help understand conflict, but now it’s muddying the waters. At best, it is not particularly useful for today’s challenges. At worst, it hampers U.S. effectiveness in responding if Defense Department leaders need to ‘bend authorities and capabilities according to where we think we are in a phase.’ A tool for thinking about conflict should help facilitate understanding the conflict and crafting solutions – not be an overly restrictive box that planners must shoehorn their approaches into.”

30 Paul Scharre, “Phases of War and the Iraq Experience.” War on the Rocks. 22 Nov 2016. https://warontherocks.com/2016/11/phases-of-war-and-the-iraq-experience/ Mr. Scharre states: “The difficulties of applying the U.S. military’s phasing construct to the realities of conflict are rarely more evident than when examining the American experience in Iraq. Though U.S. involvement in Iraq has traditionally been divided into two distinct periods of conflict, the 1990–1991 Gulf War and the 2003–2011 Iraq War, the reality is that U.S. military has been nearly continuously engaged in Iraq for the past 26 years. The United States has conducted special operations raids into, launched cruise missiles at, imposed no-fly zones over, and outright invaded Iraq. The United States also provided humanitarian aid, financially supported local actors, and even governed the country. The six-phase planning construct does a poor job of accurately representing the range of activities over a quarter-century of U.S. foreign policy and military strategy in Iraq.”

31 David Maxwell, “On Campaign Planning: Six-phase or Unconstrained?” War on the Rocks. 3 Nov 2016. https://warontherocks.com/2016/11/on-campaign-plan-phasing-six-phase-or-unconstrained/ Professor Maxwell writes: “After 9/11, the new joint doctrine forced all planners to follow the same template regardless of the conditions, threats, and political objectives. This makes eminent sense from a resource allocation perspective, but actually hinders campaign planning and the stifles the intellectual rigor required for operational art and support to national strategy.”


33 James Blight and Janet M. Lang, The Fog of War: Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara (Kindle Locations 338-346). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Kindle Edition. Through multiple interviews with Robert S. McNamara, Blight and Lang write: “Lesson number one in this book (chapter 1) is identical to the first lesson in the film The Fog of War: ‘Empathize with your enemy.’ And for good reason. The absence of empathy leads straightaway to misperception, miscommunication, and misjudgment—to mistakes—and thus to actions which are in turn likely to be misunderstood by an adversary. Sometimes, as in the Cuban missile crisis and the war in Vietnam, events spiral out of control, seeming to confirm each side’s worst fears about the other. When one side carries out actions for defensive reasons, the other side may feel threatened, and vice-versa. When empathy is present, as it was during the climactic phase of the Cuban missile crisis—when the U.S. and Soviet Union locked onto the same wavelength just in the nick of time—a seemingly imminent and unavoidable disaster can be averted.”

34 DoD, Joint Staff, J-7, Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-16 Command Red Team. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/notes/doctrine_notes.htm. One observation of the JDN is it does not mention empathy or applying an empathetic perspective. In fact, the community will not find any mention of empathy anywhere across the primary or secondary publications or in the DODMAT. This oversight is a significant shortfall.
by Eliot A. Cohen, Senate Armed Services Committee, 22 October 2015.

In seeking to capture his experience, Churchill writes it is “not possible in a major war to divide military from political affairs. At the summit, they are one.”

The concepts of end states and exit strategies were born of the late Cold War, of the Vietnam war and its aftermath, and in particular, of the American military’s repudiation of that experience. Periodically these terms creep into public discourse; they are more often found in the deliberations of government, and they were pervasive in the war colleges of the American armed forces from the 1980s and for thirty or more years thereafter. Born of frustration with the Indochina War, the term end state suggests that military planners can have a very concrete understanding of what they hope to achieve by waging a war, the completion of which is just that—completion. The term exit strategy means that once the war is won (and it implies that winning is an unambiguous concept), one can safely extricate oneself from conflict, and that how to do so can be known in advance. Upon close examination, these ideas disintegrate. Politics is fluid and continuous.” He goes on: “To ‘exit’ a war requires the cooperation of friend and foe alike: the fatal conceit of an exit strategy, like that of an end state, is that it conceives of war as a kind of engineering enterprise, which it is not, rather than a contest of opposing wills conducted in the murk of politics, which it is. These tired and shallow concepts have real consequences. An American military imbued with the notion of end states and exit strategies fought two stunningly swift conventional wars against the Iraqi state led by Saddam Hussein in 1991 and 2003. In neither case was there a real end state: the contest went on in different forms. In neither case was there a well-conceived exit: in the former case American forces lingered to protect nearby Kuwait as well as the Kurdish population of northern Iraq; in the latter, a vicious, and generally unanticipated set of insurgencies and civil conflicts broke out. Containment, end state, and exit strategy are a kind of strategic pixie dust, the sprinkling of which over the complex problems of contemporary policy problems may seem to make them manageable. In fact, they do not manage them. They oversimplify them, and because their intended results are often unattainable, these concepts paralyze decision-makers rather than inform them. Understanding strategy in the years to come will require walking away from these concepts and devising new ones in line with the political and strategic realities of our times.”

Nadia Schadlow, War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory (Kindle Location 6889). Georgetown University Press. Kindle Edition. Dr. Schadlow artfully describes that in “virtually all of its experiences with war, the United States has faced the problem of how to consolidate combat successes.”

Gideon Rose, How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle (the Foreword and pp.1-11). Simon & Schuster. Kindle Edition. Dr. Rose suggests “that ending a war successfully involves establishing durable political arrangements for the territories in question, that American leaders have repeatedly botched this challenge by making a variety of unforced errors, and that they could do better in the future if they forced themselves to think more clearly and plan more carefully.”

Rupert Smith, The Art of War in the Modern World. (pp. 12). Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. Smith suggests that militaries’ perspectives on employing force must change: “It is necessary to understand that in many of the circumstances into which we now deploy, our forces as a military force will not be effective. The coalition forces in Iraq were a classic example of this situation: their effectiveness as a military force ended once the fighting between military forces was completed in May 2003. And though they then went on to score a series of victories in local skirmishes, they had greatly diminished—if any—effect as an occupation and reconstruction force, which had become their main mandate. They were neither trained nor equipped for the task, and therefore could not fulfill it. To use the parlance of this book, there was little utility to the force.”

previous generations would have found meaningless and that today are downright dangerous.” Dr. Cohen, Professor of Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins SAIS has commented on these terms and others for over a decade.


Dr. Freedman highlights how the defense establishment has institutionalized certain aspirational, but flawed terms to steer the discussion and employment of the force in optimally preferred conditions of clarity and certainty. He captures this throughout the article, but on page 2 he writes: “The ill-fated interventions in Beirut in 1983-84 and in Somalia a decade later are also often held up as object lessons, with politicians blamed in both cases for becoming too ambitious and carelessly shifting objectives mid-mission, causing the operating environment to change from benign to hostile and casualties to be taken without any strategic gain. It was after Beirut that then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger issued his well-known guidelines restricting future U.S. military operations in cases involving vital national interests, clearly defined objectives, and the advance support of the American people. After Somalia, clear ‘exit strategies’ joined the list of desiderata.” The issue is the idea of these terms have become fixated within doctrine, an entrenched, but poor assumption of what civilian leadership will or are even able to provide before the armed conflict, and an impediment to effective campaigning that orients on outcomes.

43 Lt. Gen. (R) James M. Dubik, “Definition of ‘Decisive’ Depends on Context” ARMY Magazine. Published: February 16, 2016. http://www.army.mil/LPD/archives?articleSeries=82. Lt. Gen. (R) Dubik writes, “A military campaign is designed to attain part of a strategic aim, or set the conditions for the attainment of a strategic aim. So decisiveness at the operational level may mean not settling a matter, but producing a definitive result that, in turn, sets the conditions for other acts — whether military or not — to settle an issue.” He concludes that “settling a war involves much more than settling a fight.”

44 LTG Dubik offers that: “Several conclusions derive from the type of war we’re in. First, success in this war will require a new Western-regional coalition, one that is committed to sufficiently common principles and goals and will follow a common civil-military strategy. Given the divergence of interests in the region, no ‘grand alliance’ seems likely. But a lesser coalition, perhaps even several bilateral arrangements, may be possible. Under these conditions, no rigid universal strategy will work; a more flexible, general one may. A precisely defined ‘end state’ may be the wrong construct to use in this war. Rather, the strategy will have to be a combination of creating local successes that build toward the future the coalition seeks. And this war cannot be won without more participation from our Arab allies. We need to study carefully, learn from and adapt to the reasons why they have been hesitant.”

45 DoD/Joint Staff, J-5, Joint Publication JP 3-08 Interorganizational Cooperation. Page II-13-14. Whether it meant to or not, JP 3-08 highlights the flaws of a military end state. It emphasizes a clear distinction between a military end state from the objectives of other USG entities and the actually accomplishment of political aims. Joint doctrine shouldn’t maintain terminology that artificially orients on termination short of policy’s articulation of goals. It makes no mention of aligning interagency activities in the context of campaigning in competitions occurring before or after armed conflict.

46 DoD/U. S. Army, Joint Publication JP 3-07 Stability. Page IV-14 JP 3-07 continues to blur distinctions between campaigning and operations. The document states both campaigns and operations unfold according to the six-
phase construct. JP 3-07 makes no mention or observation that the phasing construct is merely notional. Very few individual operations have a stability aspect and not every campaigning effort faces instability as a barrier between military accomplishment and translating that success into political outcomes or confounds the United States’ vision of the future. Second, in over seventy instances JP 3-07 emphasizes an end state as the intended point of accomplishment and a time/condition when the joint force terminates and “transfers” responsibility and the burden of campaigning over to another entity. JP 3-07’s assertion is that other actors are actually responsible for following through to attain the political aims. This is a poor principle idea woven throughout the document and ahistorical in the context of the United States’ successful campaigning efforts. The US military has always had an undivided interest and responsibility in ensuring the intended outcome. Next, JP 3-07 does not recognize that a new competition is a known pattern and consequence of armed conflict regardless of how dramatic the military victory. Additionally, JP 3-07 over-emphasizes instability instead of recognizing the challenges of the re-characterized competition. Competitions can be a function of both external and internal opportunistic threats and interests that expand the political considerations at stake. JP 3-07 orients on external support to weak institutions within a host-nation, not what to do about external threats that create the instability.

48 Chris Prigge, Joint Staff, J-5, JSP Strategy, (Spring, 2016). During a discussion in Arlington, VA (Later followed up by email/phone) on exigent doctrine, then COL Prigge, who oversaw strategy development for the Joint Staff, J-5, described the joint notional plan phasing construct as a one size fits all “cookie cutter” template that the community uses to examine just about every circumstance where the USG might employ military force.


52 Schadlow, War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory (Kindle Locations 482-487). Georgetown University Press. Kindle Edition. Nadia Schadlow’s book examines many case studies in the United States experience with translating military success into political outcomes. In her Introduction, she writes: “The United States still requires a concept of operations and the organizational and command structures to allow US military forces to conduct the governance operations that will inevitably fall to them during war and that are necessary to link military actions to political outcomes. When civilian and military leaders debate the use of force, they must also determine whether the US has the will, organizations, and resources to go from combat successes to achieving political outcomes. They should decide if this burden is too great and therefore decide against military action. This is an enduring problem with the American way of war and must be part of any calculus to use force. This book, by exploring what has unfolded in America’s experiences with war, hopes to contribute to smarter deliberations about the decision to use force.”


54 Wilson, Masters of War: History’s Greatest Strategic Thinkers. Chapter 7. The Teaching Company LLC. The Great Courses Audiobook. 2012. As interpreted from Discourses on Livy, “Book Two, Chapter XXIII, titled, “How Much The Romans, In Judging The Matters For Any Incident That Should Necessitate Such Judgement, Avoided Half-Way Measures,” Machiavelli writes, “For, as I have said already, the Romans never, in matters of moment, resorted to half-measures. . . . I conclude, as well from this instance of Privernum, as from the measures followed with the Latins, that when we have to pass sentence upon powerful States accustomed to live in freedom, we must either
destroy them utterly, or else treat them with much indulgence; and that any other course we may take with them will be unprofitable. But most carefully should we avoid, as of all courses the most pernicious, such half-measures.”